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
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
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THE

PRINCETON REVIEW.

Rev. P. J. Warfield
By Whom, all things; for Whom, all things.
1882

FIFTY-EIGHTH YEAR.

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JANUARY.

	PAGE
FUTURE PAPER MONEY OF THIS COUNTRY	1
PROF. LYMAN H. ATWATER, PRINCETON COLLEGE	
THE MORAL AND RELIGIOUS TRAINING OF CHILDREN	26
G. STANLEY HALL, PH.D., CAMBRIDGE	
THE CONCORD SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY	49
PRESIDENT JAMES McCOSH	
THE ARCHITECT AND HIS ART	72
JOHN F. WEIR, N.A., SCHOOL OF THE FINE ARTS, YALE COLLEGE	
ANTI-NATIONAL PHASES OF STATE GOVERNMENT	85
EUGENE SMITH	
THE PLACE OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE THEOLOGICAL CUR- RICULUM	103
FRANCIS L. PATTON, D.D., LL.D., PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY	

MARCH.

THE PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF LAND	125
J. M. STURTEVANT, D.D., LL.D.	
MODERN AESTHETICISM	148
PROF. THEODORE W. HUNT, PH.D., PRINCETON COLLEGE	
THE COLLAPSE OF FAITH	164
PRESIDENT NOAH PORTER, YALE COLLEGE	

	PAGE
PATRONAGE MONOPOLY AND THE PENDLETON BILL	185
DORMAN B. EATON, LL.D., NEW YORK	
PHILOSOPHY AND ITS SPECIFIC PROBLEMS.	208
GEORGE S. MORRIS, PH.D., UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN	
EVOLUTION IN EDUCATION	233
PRINCIPAL DAWSON, LL.D., F.R.S.	

MAY.

AMERICAN AGRICULTURE	249
FRANCIS A. WALKER, LATE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE TENTH CENSUS	
RIGHT AND WRONG IN POLITICS	265
SHELDON AMOS, LL.D., UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON	
ORTHODOX RATIONALISM	294
NEWMAN SMYTH, D.D.	
THE PAINTER'S ART	313
JOHN F. WEIR, N.A., YALE SCHOOL OF THE FINE ARTS	
CHURCH ECONOMICS	325
REV. DR. JOHN HALL, NEW YORK	
THE COLLAPSE OF FAITH	339
PRESIDENT NOAH PORTER, D.D., LL.D.	

JULY.

	PAGE
WAGES, PRICES AND PROFITS	I
HON. CARROLL D. WRIGHT	
THE PERSONALITY OF GOD AND OF MAN	16
GEORGE P. FISHER, D.D., LL.D.	
POLYGAMY IN NEW ENGLAND	39
LEONARD WOOLSEY BACON	
RATIONALITY, ACTIVITY AND FAITH	58
PROFESSOR WILLIAM JAMES, HARVARD COLLEGE	
THE NEW IRISH LAND LAW	87
PROFESSOR KING, LAFAYETTE COLLEGE	
PROPOSED REFORMS IN COLLEGiate EDUCATION	100
LYMAN H. ATWATER, PRINCETON COLLEGE	

SEPTEMBER.

CAN AMERICANS COMPETE IN THE OCEAN CARRYING TRADE?	121
GEORGE F. SEWARD	
THE FUTURE OF TURKEY	133
CANON GEORGE RAWLINSON, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD	
THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT PSYCHOLOGY	156
HENRY N. DAY, D.D.	

	PAGE
PERSONALITY AND LAW—THE DUKE OF ARGYLL	180
MARK HOPKINS, EX-PRESIDENT OF WILLIAMS COLLEGE	
CO-OPERATION IN THE UNITED STATES	201
R. HEBER NEWTON	
THE DAWN OF THE ENGLISH REFORMATION	215
JAMES E. THOROLD ROGERS, M.P., LONDON	

NOVEMBER.

WAGES	241
WILLIAM G. SUMNER, YALE COLLEGE	
THE THEOLOGICAL RENAISSANCE OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY	263
PROFESSOR ALLEN, OF THE CAMBRIDGE EPISCOPAL SCHOOL	
GREAT BRITAIN, AMERICA AND IRELAND	283
GOLDWIN SMITH, D.C.L.	
THE EDUCATION OF THE WILL	306
G. STANLEY HALL, PH.D.	
THE SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY AS CONTRASTED WITH THE GERMAN	326
PRESIDENT JAMES McCOSH, PRINCETON COLLEGE	
TARIFF REVISION	345
DAVID A. WELLS, LL.D., D.C.L.	

WAGES.

ONE may read, in scores of books and articles, that political economy is going through a transition stage. The inference appears to be that the period is a convenient one for any one who chooses to do so to contribute some crude notions to the prevailing confusion. It is certainly true that there is no body of economists engaged in carrying on the science of political economy by a consistent development of its older results according to such new light as can be brought to bear upon them. The science is exposed to the derision and flippant jests of those whose vested interest in old abuses is threatened by it, and it has forfeited its influence in the counsels of legislators and the cabinets of statesmen because those who call themselves economists are busy in turning economic science to scorn. Every science suffers more or less from men who meddle with it without mastering it, and from those who think carelessly, generalize rashly, or make concessions hastily; but a progressive science is always in the control, in the last resort, of a body of competent scholars who correct aberrations, and every such science possesses a body of criticism which is strong enough to repress presuming ignorance and charlatanism. Political economy is in no such position. A host of writers have been busy for the last twenty years introducing conflicting and baseless notions which, for want of a competent criticism, have won standing in the science. Others have made a boast of turning their backs on scientific method, and of describing, by way of contributing to political economy, some portion of the surface appearance which is presented by the mass of economic phenomena in their sequence, variety, and complexity. That is as if a historian should boast of abandoning the attempt to trace

social forces in history, and of returning to the description of royal marriages and diplomatic intrigues. With all this the new school has been by no means moderate in its terms of contempt for all who did not accept the decree that Smith, Ricardo, and Mill were exceptional imbeciles to adopt and teach the old doctrines. I confess, for one, that for some years the writers of the new school imposed on me not a little by their airs of confidence and superiority. It seemed to me that I could perceive the errors into which they had fallen, the emptiness of their objections, the crude and unscientific character of their thinking; but I was forced to doubt and hesitate lest it might be I who was at fault.

For an example I will not take a small case or an extreme case. I will take an example of a very interesting and valuable book by one of the best living writers on political economy, but one who has, in my opinion, made unfounded and improper concessions on important economic doctrine. Leroy-Beaulieu¹ has not been able to escape the fascination of the longing for equality, and he declares his conclusion that Ricardo's doctrine of rent has no application at present because of the immense amount of new land which has become available, and that the Malthusian doctrine of population has no application because improvements in the arts are lowering the cost of subsistence in spite of the increase of population. Further on I shall notice some of the same writer's views about wages.

In the first place, the question What is true? is one thing, and the question of applicability to a given case is another. The former question is the one which is the concern of the scientific man. There is, however, another and more important view of the objections raised by the French economist.

In all our sciences we are forced to investigate ratios at the limit or other features of limiting cases. The older economists did this without having analyzed their processes sufficiently to classify them. The Ricardian law of rent is stated as a limiting case in the operation of the diminishing return from land. In any such statement the amount of land and the stage of the

¹ *Essai sur la Répartition des Richesses et sur la Tendance à une Moindre Inégalité des Conditions*, par Paul Leroy-Beaulieu. Paris: Guillaumin et Cie. 1881.

arts must be constant quantities. When the statement is derived from the limiting case it is used in political economy, as in all other sciences, by giving all values to the variables. Therefore the Ricardian law of rent applies to all cases whatsoever from Minnesota to Connaught. If we change the constants, either by getting more land or by advancing the arts, we produce no change whatever in the law, but only transfer its operation to another plane. As I regard it, M. Leroy-Beaulieu has fallen into the error of regarding a change in the constant as setting aside the law. The law of population is stated in terms of a limiting ratio between population and subsistence, land and the stage of the arts being constant. In its simplest terms the law is that the mortality and the increase of population are in equilibrium at the limit. M. Leroy-Beaulieu says that the law is set aside because we are not at the limit; but the law evidently covers all cases whatsoever, and to say that it does not apply is like saying that men are not under conditions of heat because they are not being either roasted or frozen. Whole libraries of books have been written, by way of criticism on the doctrines of political economy, whose argument consists in showing that human societies are rarely at the limit, or that limiting cases rarely or never occur. It seems to me, therefore, that the responsibility ought to be strictly enforced against men of standing in the science for concessions which introduce confusion, set the popularizers all astray, and make greater the task of those who are striving to secure the appreciation of sound doctrine. The men of the new school have scarcely met with any contradiction for the last ten years. They have had things all their own way. The effects of their teachings are to be met with in newspaper's and popular writings. I am, however, one of those who believe that all this activity of the new school has been in the way of confusion and mischief. I do not doubt that we can to-day, with the aid of wider social philosophy and more careful study, expand and correct the doctrines of our science. We can advance it by an orderly and strictly genetic development. Any one who tries to advance it otherwise may be an apostle or a prophet; he is not a man of science.

I now propose to re-examine the subject of wages.

The origin of capital is lost in the obscurity which covers

the first beginnings of civilization. Some faint presages of capital are to be noted amongst brutes. We are told that a gorilla has been seen to take up a stick with which to defend himself when attacked. It is related that a monkey in a zoölogical garden used a stone to crack a nut, and hid the stone under the straw so as to have it ready on the next occasion. Beasts, however, with such extraordinary exceptions, live on the spontaneous products of the earth, which they consume as they find them, and which they obtain without tools or weapons. Such must also, at some time, have been the condition of man. In that stage of life alone could a man subsist on the immediate product of his labor. His labor consisted purely in an act of appropriation of the spontaneous fruits of the earth, which he consumed as he obtained them.

There is one tool-weapon given in nature—the flint; and there is one natural agent which man learned to use so early that we can find no period when it was not in use—fire. Accident was the leading factor in the earliest stage of civilization. All that we know of primitive men warns us not to believe that, if one man found a flint-knife, his comrades quickly took up the determination to acquire something of the same kind. The evidence all imposes upon us the conviction that the period during which the first steps towards capital, by the use of flints and fire, were being made must have been so long and painful that we cannot appreciate it. It is probable that steps forward were made only where population was dense enough to make effort necessary, and not dense enough to produce degeneration or distress. During that period the developments of rudimentary civilization must have been erratic and uncertain. Whenever any man or men, stimulated by perceiving the advantages which a man enjoyed who owned a flint-knife, and unable to conquer him and take it away from him, undertook to acquire one, not by accident but of set purpose, such persons were driven either to accumulate a store of food which would support life while searching for flints, or to go hungry while prosecuting that search. In either case the price of advance was the acquisition of capital by self-denial. From that stage of things up to the present moment it is true, leaving accident out of account, that *every step of advance by which man has raised himself above the*

level of other animals has been won by standing on a past self-denial, i.e. capital. Capital is, like every other good, only a chance. Man may abuse it to his destruction or may use it for his advancement. That is where the moral deduction comes in, with which the economist has nothing to do, but the converse of the above proposition admits of absolute statement: Every diminution of capital lowers civilization without any possible alternative, and, in its measure, carries the race back towards the primitive barbarism. Labor and self-denial, to work yet abstain from enjoying, to earn a product yet work on as if one possessed nothing, have been the conditions of advance for the human race from the beginning, and they continue to be such still. From the beginning capital has been multiplied into itself in a constant involution. It is labor raised to a higher power and concentrated, and it is by this accumulation that man has gained the disposition of power enough, capable of concentration on a given point, to accomplish all his victories over nature. From the flint-knife up to the breech-loading rifle and the ocean steamer every step of the development is open to our observation, and not a single step in the sequence could be omitted or put in another position without making the result impossible.

The extension of our political economy which is most essential is the investigation of the element of *time*, and a specification of its value and relation in each of our generalizations. Already in the above sketch of the development of capital it is apparent that the relations of time are of the first importance. The work of mankind on low stages of civilization is irregular and unmethodical, but by the time that the agricultural stage is reached the successive periods of production repeat themselves with the regularity, because according to the necessity, of the seasons. Capital is the product of the past season. The work of the present season cannot go on without it, and it is not present unless the past period has been industriously employed. The future enjoyment, in its turn, depends on the industry of the present. The capital, moreover, in each period of production must be consumed; that is, used up and sacrificed. It must be sought again in the new product at the end of the present period of production, but in the interval it must be suffered to pass away and disappear. The element of risk therefore

belongs to the nature of capital, and the work of mankind goes on in a series of pulsations in which the capital is consumed and sought again with increase in an endless series of reproductions.

On the hunting stage each man participates in the work and in the enjoyment. On the pastoral stage we already find cases in which men are left outside of any family connection and without cattle, the most essential form of capital. Such men, if not adopted into a family, and others who voluntarily take such a course, serve others who can give them a social status (security) and a share in the means of subsistence. In the early stages of the agricultural stage each man tills land for himself, and, so long as the land is abundant, new-comers simply take up more of it. In such a state of society, which is repeated substantially in all new countries, there is no class of persons who labor for others for hire. If any do this in their youth, or for a few years, they speedily acquire the small amount of capital necessary, in that stage of society, for tilling land, and become independent land-owners. As the population increases, however, the stage of the arts being assumed constant and land being taken constant in amount (viz., such an amount as is available for the use of a given society, whether it be, on that stage of the arts, a square mile or the whole earth), increments of subsistence must be won at greater cost of labor and sacrifice. The society is therefore forced to higher and higher organization because higher organization with differentiation of function increases production. As this movement goes on the society becomes more and more complex; the stake of each one in the stability of the organization is greater and greater, and whole classes arise which perform remote and incidental functions which would not exist at all in a less developed social system. In such a society a class of persons comes into existence who have no capital and no land. They must subsist from day to day out of the existing capital of the society by obtaining that capital from the owners of it through some form of voluntary agreement.

The English economists speak of the gain from the poorest land in cultivation as equal to current wages and profits. That they should have regarded wages and profits as positive data or known quantities is not strange in view of their situation and the circumstances of their country. There are in fact no posi-

tive data in economics from which results may be deduced as unknown are derived from known quantities. We have to accustom ourselves to think of the industrial system as in constant flux and readjustment. The elements of the system are numerous and are subject to constant variations in quantity and in their relations to each other. They are constantly moving, so that all forces which are produced in the system are distributed and taken up throughout the whole of it, so that every part is affected. A man of scientific training who studies society can no more doubt that this is true than he could doubt its truth as a general doctrine of the physical universe, altho society is more complex and its phenomena elude our investigation more completely. No doubt, taking a certain period, say a decade, into account, the existing ratio of product from the poorest land in cultivation to the labor and capital which must be expended on that land in the existing stage of the arts sets the general limit of the status of the lowest class of the population, from which the status of other classes is established in the proportion of what they contribute by their labor and capital to the total product of the country. In a new country where land can be tilled with a minimum of capital and a minimum organization of labor, any able-bodied man can obtain it and can win from it all the essentials of subsistence. To such a man the relation of wages to land is presented as an open alternative. There is no class, in such a country, of men who are driven, by the necessity of living, into a desperate competition with each other, without reserve, to get a share in the capital of the society. Women do compete with each other without the alternative. This is one of the chief reasons why their earnings are less than those of men in similar cases. In such a country there will be only an imperfectly differentiated wages class. The minimum of wages, where wages are paid, must be such as will give, all things considered, as good a return of comfort as can be won directly from the land. Since the latter return is great, wages must be high. Such is the state of the case at the present time in the United States. On the other hand, a country whose population is so great that the last increment of subsistence must be won from soils which require a great expenditure of labor and capital to win a meagre supply of the means of sub-

sistence per head of the laborers must have a class of persons always on the verge of distress. As the use of such soils requires a large expenditure of capital, the laborers engaged upon it are employed by hire, and their status fixes a minimum of wages for manual labor.

Let us now vary the constants, the amount of land and the stage of the arts. It is plain that we immediately widen the margin of ease still further in the new country, and that we immediately relax the stringency of the situation in the old country. That is why civilization has advanced, and why we are now striving all the time to win progress in the arts. If the advance should be won as a single isolated step, it would bring relief for a time to all and an enlarged chance to all, but the law itself would not change at all; and if the population increased until it had absorbed all the advantage which had been won, the same results as before would be repeated. At the present time the unoccupied land of the earth is brought within such easy reach of all civilized men that there is no reason, save in the negligence of the classes interested themselves, why there should be any class of persons in the civilized world directly dependent on hire. The greatest mischief of all socialistic and semi-socialistic teaching is that it teaches the classes in question not to avail themselves by their own energy of the chances which are open to them, but to stay where they are and expect somebody else to make them happy there.

In a village community each man addressed himself directly to the soil to get out of it the means of subsistence. If then he failed for any reason whatsoever, he could only blame himself or nature. In our highly organized society we are all bound to each other in various relations while trying to win subsistence. The struggle for existence, therefore, which formerly had the character of a struggle of man with nature, now has the character of a struggle of man with man, and a "social question" arises whenever a man is dissatisfied with the return which he wins from the social co-operative effort. For instance: If a man were working by himself as a wheelwright and selling his wagons, he would have to put up with the best return which his labor and capital could win. If he could find any other trade which he could adopt and which would pay better, he would

change. If, however, a capitalist employed wheelwrights and sold wagons, and if the trade should not bring back the capital and profits, the employer would either discharge men or lower wages. This is the form in which, under the social organization, the warning would come to the men that a redistribution of labor was required, but it would appear to them to be the act of the employer. Similar observations would hold of scores of other cases in which the ills of earthly life come to us as misdeeds of our neighbors towards us, on account of the relations in which we stand in the industrial organization.

Supply and demand, in the last analysis, are only so much need of subsistence and so many resources of subsistence, or, in other words, they are only the forms which are taken in the social organization by the original need of man addressed to nature on the one side, and the stores of nature open to the effort of man on the other. An isolated man would find the demand in his brain and the supply by his hand. When the supply had produced satisfaction the demand would arise again, and the reactions between the man and his environment would be repeated as long as he lived. In a primitive society a man who needed food exerted himself to get it from nature by some direct effort. A "just" return for his effort was—what he got. Under division of labor and exchange, even up to the last refinements of our modern industrial organization, it is still true that the society develops needs and addresses its efforts to nature to try to win satisfaction, but every man is forced to reach nature through a multitude of relations with his fellow-man. We stand in a double relation as suppliers and demanders around the one pile of goods which our organized effort has won from the earth and advanced into a shape to satisfy human needs. Hence every exchange involves two articles, each under two different relations. One article is supply to A and demand to B, while the other article is demand to A and supply to B. Hence demand and supply are the relations which bind men together into a human society for co-operation and high organization in a joint effort to win the supplies of life. The lowest terms to which any exchange can be reduced are therefore represented by two curves cutting each other; that is to say, by two simultaneous equations between two variables. Even then

we have only a representation of an instantaneous transaction. If we take into account successive transactions and variations in supply and demand, we must introduce the element of time. We should then have to use the third dimension to represent the case, and after all we should have only an empirical, statistical, or, as we might call it, a statical, representation of supply and demand. If we should attempt any analysis of supply and demand regarded dynamically, we should also have to use the element of time; and if we made such an attempt, we should find ourselves doomed to inevitable failure. It is not possible to analyze supply and demand. Why does A offer wheat for \$1 and B bid only 99 cts. for it? These are secrets of the consciousness of the parties. One or both of them may be led by considerations which are erroneous. That will not affect the influence of his bid on the market. The economist can do no more than to note the bid when it is made as a contribution to the making of the price. The reasons for it he cannot discover. The most that he can do towards the analysis of supply and demand is to study the facts and circumstances which, by general tendency, go to make the supply of a given commodity, or the demand for it, greater or smaller. Indeed this is the only thing which it is of importance for us to know. Supply and demand are together the ultimate force or fact to the economist. They are to him what gravity is to the astronomer or chemical affinity to the chemist. We want to know the mode of their action, but the reason of it is beyond our reach. Supply and demand act to clear the market. If there were a closed market and a sale without reserve, supply and demand would just distribute all the commodities on the market. Supply and demand would not give each person what he would like to have, nor satisfy any ideal desires, any more than a man who addresses himself directly to nature in the first instance gets what he would like to have, but, if they act freely, supply and demand distribute commodities so that a given amount shall produce a maximum of satisfaction to the community between whose members the exchanges are made. At that point supply and demand would be in equilibrium and no further transactions would be made. In a simple society, with exchanges at country fairs, this state of things was reached. In our modern society, in which pro-

duction, exchange, and consumption never cease, the conditions of the market constantly change and never cease, so that supply and demand move on towards an equilibrium which is never realized because the conditions of it are constantly changed. What then is "justice" in this connection? The distribution which takes place under the free play of supply and demand gives us our definition of justice as applied to the contribution which an individual puts into the social effort and the share he gets out of the social product. There is no other definition of justice which can be seriously considered.

There are two sources of confusion which must now be corrected.

1. The first is the definition of wages. If wages mean the remuneration of labor, then wages are a chief class, and we must distinguish between payment by the piece, contract wages, deferred wages, store pay, etc. etc., as sub-classes. If we make the definition of wages to fit contract wages, then the remuneration of labor will be a chief class, and we must distinguish between wages, payment by the piece, store pay, etc. etc., as sub-classes. Either classification is legitimate if it is faithfully observed throughout, but if any ambiguity is allowed to creep in it will produce the logical errors of a double definition and confusion between a chief class and a sub-class. These logical errors run through a great deal of the controversial literature about wages, and when they are cleared away a great part of the controversy falls to the ground. The second of the above classifications is by far the best, because it allows of a definition of wages which conforms to the popular use of the term. *Wages are a payment per unit of time by the employer, in return for which the employee agrees to use his productive powers during the time specified as the employer may direct.* I use the word under this definition only.

2. In the works of Mill and the other authorities there is a confusion as to the source from which wages are paid which is, I think, one chief cause of all the controversy which has arisen on this subject. It is distinctly taught under the head of wages that the demand for labor is capital, and that wages are paid out of capital. Under the head of distribution it is said that the *product* is divided into wages, profits, and rent, from which it

would follow that wages are paid out of product. Leroy-Beaulieu describes the employment of *capital* to sustain labor during production with great minuteness (pp. 366-70), and then declares summarily that the only "wage-fund" is "the total annual *production* minus what is necessary to maintain capital" (p. 382). Ricardo held that profits and wages are the leavings of each other. Later economists have generally rejected this doctrine, but even those of them who maintain that wages are paid out of capital fall back into arguments which imply its truth. For instance, Cairnes, who earnestly maintained that capital is divided into wages, raw material, and fixed capital, argued that trades-unions could not increase the wages in the several trades, because, if they did so, they would reduce profits below the rate which would make investment worth while. On his own doctrine, increased wages could not trench on profits. He should have argued that wages, if increased by a trades-union, could only be increased at the expense of raw material or fixed capital, which would be far more difficult than to increase them at the expense of profits. Indeed if the trades-union movement did not coincide with a new distribution of capital into its three parts (a new distribution which would produce a rise in wages), the trades-union could not possibly force an advance at the expense of raw materials or fixed capital. We shall see further on that wages and profits are not the leavings of each other, because they are not parts of the same whole.

If we could arrest the production and consumption of wealth in the United States at a given moment of time and take an inventory of all the wealth at that moment existing, it is evident that it would be an exact arithmetical quantity. It would be what the combined industry, economy, extravagance, folly, and idleness of all past time on the part of the American people had made it. It would be less because we have had a civil war, a protective tariff, a paper-money crisis, fires at Chicago and Boston, etc. etc., than it would have been if our public policy had been wiser and our misfortunes less. Whatever the existing wealth might be, no regrets could carry us back to increase it by a grain of wheat or a pound of iron beyond what it was at the moment supposed. This wealth would be divided by its character and by the disposition of it which

was intended by the persons who owned it, in the then beginning period of production, into fixed capital, raw material, and supplies for the support of laborers. In one country, like England, the industrial system might be such that the support of laborers would nearly all be distributed in wages. In that case the term "wage-fund" might with great propriety be applied to it as a technical term to avoid a circumlocution. In another country, like the United States, the supplies for the support of labor might be, for the most part, owned by yeomen farmers and other independent laborers, or they might be distributed by other modes of remunerating labor than wages. A laborer may own a farm and support himself while working, and wait for his pay until the work is done. He then advances part of the capital and is not strictly a laborer only. He may take "store-pay." In that case he also advances part of the capital of the enterprise, and he goes into the market to borrow that capital, paying very heavy discount rates for it. These cases cannot throw any light on wages. They have to be noted only to eliminate them from the consideration of wages. The wages system exists, as above shown, only where the ratio of population to land is such that a class is differentiated which, having no capital or land, is dependent day by day for support on a contract relation with those who have capital. We have also seen that, above the very lowest stage of life, capital must precede and be the means to every productive effort.

In the actual period of production then, on a wages system, the existing supplies for laborers are distributed to laborers in wages while they, with the help of the fixed capital, till the ground and work up the raw materials, transforming the old capital into a new product. The risk, as we have seen, belongs to capital, and the great advantage of the wages system is that it leaves the risk all on capital. The laborer works by *time*, and when the time is over his contract is fulfilled. He takes no risk or responsibility. He is therefore at liberty to address himself to the accumulation of capital in the simplest possible manner, by economy of his wages, undisturbed by other elements. His share in the business lasts during the period of production and ends with it. He has no claim or right in the product, for he sold his share in producing it and took his pay for it during the pro-

cess. The product is divided at the end of the period of production into the replacement of the capital (support of laborers, raw material, and wear of fixed capital), profits, and rents. As the capital to be replaced belonged to the capitalist, all the replacement goes to him together with the profits. Rent goes to the land-owner. The products are next distributed by supply and demand amongst all the members of the society, who turn them into capital and divide them, according to their good judgment, into the same parts as before, the product of the last period perhaps becoming the raw material of the next, and another period of production is then begun. If the product and profit of the last period were large, the accumulation of capital will be large—that is, the stock of supplies for laborers in the next period will be great; but it is not until the next period, and after an increase of capital, that any effect on wages can be produced. Hence it is clear that wages and profits are not parts of the same whole. Wages were in capital at the beginning of the period of production; profits are in the product at its close. We cannot establish any equation between the wages and the total capital, or the profits and the total product, or the total capital and the total product. How then can we establish an equation between wages and profits so as to determine the effect on one of variations in the other?

When now we have thus analyzed the operation in detail of the constant action and reaction by which the industrial functions of society are carried on, it is immaterial what may be the speed at which the process goes forward, or what may be the varieties of detail in different industries. Nothing can alter the nature or sequence of the forces and effects. The effect of credit to economize time and synchronize certain steps changes nothing in the scientific analysis of the process. It is a separate complication and refinement to be studied by itself.

Four inferences may be drawn immediately.

(1) We see that all questions whether the laborer gets his share of the product or not are, under the wages system, nonsensical. (2) That the appeal, often made in England, to workmen to take lower wages, so that the English products can be sold cheaper in foreign markets, are founded on false conceptions of wages, and ought to have no weight. (3) That the

arguments of the American protectionists, drawn from comparative rates of wages, are all fallacious. (4) That the attempt to connect wages with the price of products, by a sliding scale or otherwise, is founded on no true relations, and is doomed to failure. If an employer should say to his men, " My business is not prosperous like that of my neighbors. I want you to work for me for \$2 a day, altho the market rate which you could get is \$2.25,"—he would not deserve a respectful reply. Neither is there any sense at all in the demand of the men, if they say to the employer, " Your business is exceptionally prosperous, and we want you to give us \$2.25, altho the market rate which we could get elsewhere is \$2."

The notion that wages ever can be paid out of product is the most ridiculous notion which has ever been introduced into political economy. It would mean that a man who was tilling the ground in June could eat the crop he expected to have in September, or that a tailor could be wearing the coat which he was making. Men could then eat their intentions, wear their hopes, and be warmed by their promises. Even more than this: they might then believe that regrets were no longer vain, and having borrowed the future they could recall the past. The man who has been industrious to-day has a supper to-night. The man who has been idle to-day is hungry to-night. If wages can be paid out of product, the latter man, in his hunger, penitence, and regret, might as well obtain a loaf advanced from nature on credit to-night as to get one at any other time before he has won it by labor. He could then eat and sleep, and in the morning he could break his promise to nature and refuse to produce the loaf. Whenever nature yields to man an atom which he has not earned, or advances it one second of time before he has earned it, we may all turn socialists and utopists. The real gist of the question about wages lies right here. The "wage-fund" is of no importance one way or another. Every one who has yielded to sentimental faiths or longings to lessen the hardships of getting a living, or to discover some way by which men may attain to happiness except by conquering it, has seen himself forced to attack the doctrine that wages are paid out of capital.

Some instances of the fallacy about wages which has just been exposed are worth analyzing. In the July number of the

PRINCETON REVIEW Mr. Carroll D. Wright gives two cases which he makes the basis of deduction on the doctrine that wages are paid out of capital. The first case is stated thus:

"The workers are often the direct cause of the reduction in wages. This is well illustrated by circumstances within my observation. A well-known and prosperous dealer in boots and shoes in one of our large shoe towns is very popular with the workingmen because he will sell them a pair of boots for a quarter less than the same quality can be purchased elsewhere. It does not occur to them that they have paid that discount, but they complain to their employers who have cut them down—a cut-down required in order to furnish the popular dealer with goods at a low price to enable him to undersell smaller dealers. This retail dealer obtains from the manufacturer his lowest price for making one hundred cases as per sample. He then offers to pay so much—a sum less than the manufacturer's estimate—and pay cash. The manufacturer rather than lose a good cash order consents to make the goods, but not being able to reduce the cost of raw material takes the discount out of labor, and the workman berates the employer for reducing his wages while he praises the dealer for selling him his boots at a low price. Such circumstances often exist."

The inference which we are invited to make is that the workmen were foolish to buy where they could buy most cheaply because they thereby caused their own wages to be reduced.

In the first place, is the case correctly observed? If so, the employer-manufacturer sold goods by favoritism to one dealer who lowered his price to *all* his customers, and the employer lowered his wages for *all* his production so that his men had less to spend for *all* objects of their desire. The employer, therefore, in the last analysis, took something from his men and gave part of it to the general public of the vicinity and kept part himself, while his men lost on their wages what they gained on their shoes and more too. No one can regard such a statement as correct who has any conception of economic laws and relations. The true facts lie on the face of the statement. The reduction in price to the retailer came out of interest and insurance against bad debts, because it was given for cash. It did not have any connection at all with wages. It is to be assumed that the manufacturer would have given similar terms to any retailer who would have paid cash. Otherwise he would have been guilty of favoritism which would have ruined his business.

If wages were reduced, that act could not have had any connection at all with the fact that the employer had allowed to one customer a reduction for cash. Were, then, the men wise to profit by the reduction? Undoubtedly they were. Mr. Wright is driven by his view of the matter into the venerable fallacy that we get rich by what we spend, not by what we save, or that a demand for commodities is a demand for labor. That is really the fallacy at the bottom of all the unsound views of wages, but it is a certain extension of it to hold that the way for the men to make their wages large is themselves to demand a great many of their own products; that is, to spend their money freely.

Mr. Wright's second case is this:

"The day-laborer feeling himself more of a man than formerly must oftener wear a white laundered shirt, but he cannot pay over fifty cents for one. The demand of the higher civilization of the day-laborer must be met, and white laundered shirts are supplied at retail for fifty cents, and even for thirty-seven cents. But the wages of the women who make them have been reduced to eight cents per shirt. All such illustrations are simple, but well adapted to show the workingman what is meant by wages being paid from the product of labor, and in accordance with the profit which may be expected from the sale of the product."

What effect this proof of the effect of paying wages out of product may have on the laborer I cannot say, but I should think that it might arrest the economist by some misgivings as to his dogma. The fixed fact, the known quantity, in this case is "the demand of the higher civilization of the day-laborer." The day-laborer appears to be in command of the situation. He decides that he wants a white laundered shirt and that he only wants to pay fifty cents for it. Considering that he is the first man in the history of the human race who has ever been in a position to make his wants the law of his satisfactions, he certainly is moderate. As it is, his demand is satisfied by cutting the sewing-women down to eight cents wages. He might have called for shirts at a cent apiece, in which case the sewing-woman must have seen her wages reduced to two or three mills. He might have demanded boots at twenty-five cents, coats at fifty cents, cigars ten for a cent, and so on, and the wages of boot-makers, tailors, and cigar-makers must have come down in

obedience to the law that wages come out of product, to the proper figure to satisfy his demand. Mr. Wright would be forced to argue that the way for the wages class to improve their condition is to buy each other's products freely at generous prices. I am a day-laborer myself. My higher civilization demands that I have a saddle-horse for five dollars and a cottage at Newport for a hundred dollars. If wages are paid out of product, I presume that, now that I have published my wishes, they will be gratified not later than next summer. As for horse-breeders and builders, let them look to their wages. I should like the cottage furnished.

The wild and untrained writers on political economy perform one useful function. They seize on all the fallacies and, naïvely and with good faith, perpetrate the *reductio ad absurdum*. Mr. George holds that wages are paid out of product, and that they are a portion only of the laborer's own product which the employer gives back to him. If this is true, it suggests three questions: 1. What is the difference between a slave and a wage-receiver? 2. Why is any man an employee? 3. Why is not every man an employer?

The rate of wages is determined, like every other case of value, by supply and demand. The total capital will be divided between wages, raw material, and capital by supply and demand. Capital, however, is limited by its nature with respect to the extent to which it may be transferred from one of these divisions to the other. From period to period the capital, when reproduced, is transformed into one or the other class by the dynamical operation of supply and demand.

From period to period changes in the arts, in the industrial development, in national habits, in fashion as to co-operation, etc. etc., will alter the proportion between the amount of capital paid in wages and the amount used to support laborers under other industrial organizations. The supply of laborers in one or the other mode of industry will also vary. Capital is divided between the wages system and other systems by supply and demand.

Changes in fashion, art, science, education, etc., will alter the relative importance of non-competing groups in industry. General changes will also affect the number of laborers in each of

the non-competing groups. Capital is divided between the non-competing groups by supply and demand.

Inside of any one group the capital of that group will be distributed (in the absence of trades-union rules or other interferences) by supply and demand, according to the demand and supply of personal talents and capacities.

Some have inferred from the application of supply and demand to wages that the problem of wages was a simple case of a ratio, so much capital to so many men. The error here lies in applying a mathematical relation which is far too simple for the facts of the case. I have stated above what is the simplest mathematical form of an exchange under supply and demand. Obviously it is a great error to treat it as a simple ratio of arithmetical quantities, or even as a ratio of variables.

Others have turned away from the application of supply and demand with impatience. The Germans like to say of it that it is *nichtssagend*. Some of them put "law" in quotation when they speak of it. Any one who can sneer at supply and demand or regard it as a barren formula has certainly failed to understand it, or to study the scope and subtlety of its action. No one has ever analyzed supply and demand, regarded dynamically, because no one can. Leroy-Beaulieu says: "We cannot affirm that this formula [supply and demand] is false. We ought only to say that it is philistine and commonplace. It is certainly true, as Cobden said, that when two bosses run after one workman wages rise, and when two workmen run after one boss wages fall; but this sort of truism is not fitted to satisfy strict thinkers. What are the circumstances which determine the demand and the supply?" This last question he does not answer, nor even attempt to answer. It seems to me that a strict thinker proves himself by recognizing an ultimate scientific fact or law when he comes to it. The more one studies, the more one finds that the results of all studies are truisms. One is astonished that he did not see at once, by pure common-sense, the highest and last result of laborious investigation. If there is anything philistine and commonplace, it is to set aside the results of study as "truisms," and to pursue questions which can only lead off again into a maze of unclassified phenomena. Further on the same author says that in addition

to the supply and demand of labor we must take into account the fecundity of capital. He urges that the demand for labor is a function not simply of the amount of capital, but also of its organization and activity. But in any given period of production any new activity or improved application of capital cannot act upon the wages during that period. The advantage will appear in the product of that period, it will swell the capital of the next period and then act upon wages. He then adds: "It is not proper to say simply, The more capital increases relatively to population, the more do wages rise. This proposition would be either inexact or incomplete, for the productive force may advance far more rapidly than the accumulation of material capital." This objection is not sound. If productive force increases, it immediately produces more capital. That is the proof that it has increased, and the mode in which the gain from increased force is realized. Advance in productive power is therefore followed by increase of capital within an interval of at least one period of production, altho further increase of capital, due to the same development of productive power, may continue to advance in a geometrical ratio through a long series of subsequent periods. New machines produce quick and approximately uniform increase of capital. Education or better government produce slower returns, which advance at a high ratio through a long period. The same author then comes to the "true formula" which he proposes "after having set aside the formulas and inflexible notions of the principal economists." "The more production increases relatively to population, the greater is the chance that wages may rise." We have here a capital example of the necessity of separating the element of *time* in economic problems, and subjecting it to special study. We set out to find a formula for what determines the rate of wages, which is always a fact of a given time and place. We are offered a formula of the conditions of change in that fact between one time and another. Let us try a parallel. It is asked, What determines the weight of a man? The answer is, Gravity acting on the mass of his body. No, M. Leroy-Beaulieu would say, that is a formula or inflexible dogma of the principal physicists. The weight of a man is determined by the fact that, if he has a good constitution, good health, good diet,

obeys hygienic rules, does not work too hard, loses no limb by accident, etc. etc., his weight may increase from one time to another. Such errors would be impossible in any science but political economy, but recent economic literature is largely made up of just such confused thinking and reasoning. The rate of wages is the rate at which services are exchanged for means of subsistence under free contract and competition. It is therefore determined by supply and demand, like price, rate of interest, rate of foreign exchange, and all other cases of value.

We find therefore that there never ought to have been any "question" about wages at all, any more than there should have been a question about raw material or fixed capital. It is all wasted energy to re-analyze the subject and expose the fallacies which have been introduced by incompetent meddlers in economic science, encouraged by the concessions of the economists. Wages do not belong in distribution at all. They belong in the application of capital to production. The capitalist-employer is led by self-interest to try to keep wages down just exactly as he tries to prevent waste of raw material or wear and tear of fixed capital. The employee is led by self-interest to try to get all the wages he can. The struggle is legitimate and necessary. The result of it is that supply and demand distribute the capital amongst the laboring wage-receivers in the proportion which conduces to the maximum of production under all the existing circumstances. If trades-unions or employers' associations introduce interferences they may temporarily disturb this adjustment, but all such interferences avenge themselves in the end by compensating reactions. If a man knows how to earn more than he is getting, he ought to insist on getting more where he is or he should change. If an employer can get an equally competent man at lower wages, he ought to get him or lower wages. If we depart at all from this rule, we entangle ourselves in an endless muddle of sentimental rubbish, we lower production, and contract the welfare of all. There is therefore no "social question," or struggle of class with class, involved in wages. The notion that there is under "distribution" some new and unexplored field of economic science is entirely without foundation. That notion threatens to bring political economy still further under the dominion of metaphysics and sentiment, by

the introduction of some notion of "justice," derived *aliunde*, as a controlling conception in economical science. It is indeed painful to think what an immense amount of poetry and declamation is swept away when we once get at the truth of the relations with which we have been dealing. If these relations were correctly understood, it would be impossible to make people any longer applaud the orator who finds it unjust that an industrious man is better off than a lazy one, or who wants a revolution because the man who has won capital by self-denial gets more luxurious living for himself and his children than the man who has spent as he went along. We should, however, have more sober industry and manly effort on the part of free, independent, and intelligent laborers to win capital and to put themselves and their children in a better position. There is no reason at all, at this moment, barring disease and accident, why any man living should not acquire capital, and, in view of the progress in the arts, there is no reason to apprehend, as far in the future as we can see, that this chance will not become rather greater than less for all who are prudent, industrious, and frugal, and who will turn their backs on the social doctors who have patent schemes for making everybody happy by setting those-who-have-not to rob those-who-have.

WILLIAM G. SUMNER.

THE THEOLOGICAL RENAISSANCE OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

THE type of theology which is represented in Dr. Mulford's recent work, "The Republic of God,"¹ is not unfamiliar. Since the time of Schleiermacher in Germany or of Coleridge in England, what has been sometimes called modern religious thought has been gaining ground within the church. While it has been often treated with unintelligent criticism, or rejected with unreasoning dislike, it has also been confronted by intelligent thinkers with one standing objection,—that it advances its conclusions without stating its premises; that it hurls a mass of intuitions at the church with an offensive oracular dogmatism, and does not condescend to give the evidence on which they rest. In endeavoring to meet this objection we propose to emphasize the principle which underlies the so-called modern theology, and which alone can justify its conclusions. To this end we shall attempt a brief review of the history of theology, in order to trace the genesis and development of the modern theological idea. In a subsequent article it will be our aim to trace this idea, as it is seen influencing the re-statement of Christian dogmas, and we shall take as our basis in so doing the "Republic of God." Dr. Mulford's book is an eminently representative one and possesses one great advantage in being the most complete statement of a theology which has, for the most part, hitherto found expression in only fragmentary ways. No other work with which we are familiar has claimed to give a reinterpretation of the whole body of Christian doctrines in an "Institute of Theology."

But we would most seriously protest against the notion that

¹The Republic of God. An Institute of Theology. By Elisha Mulford, LL.D.

the underlying principle which conditions the conclusions that Dr. Mulford reaches in common with so many other modern thinkers is a new one. Those who are acquainted with the history of theology will recognize it as not only not new, but as older, and, if we cared to say so, more respectable in its antecedents than that by which it has been supplanted in the current theology of Western Christendom. The flood of light which has been thrown upon the age immediately succeeding that of the apostles has discovered to us an older theology than that of Augustine, more refined and mature in the expression of its thought, more true, it seems to us, to the idea of Christianity as presented in the New Testament. Just as the Latin Church from the time of the great schism in the ninth century persistently ignored the Greek Church, till it became almost unconscious of its existence, so our Protestant theologians, inheriting the formal outlines of their theology from the Latin schoolmen, have been oblivious to the fact that the Greek theologians had looked at Christianity in another and widely different way.

The idea of God as seen in earlier Greek theology is that of a being whose presence pervades the world and with whose essential nature man has a constitutional kinship or relation. In the Western Church of the third century, represented by Tertullian and Cyprian, the idea of God was that of a being apart from the world, governing it from a distance, and communicating with it through agencies which had no essential connection with him beyond his formal and arbitrary appointment. If we compare the two theologies which grew out of such widely differing motives we shall see at once how on every point they reflect the divergence of their origin. The Greeks conceived God as pure spirit, and aimed to keep their ideal free from the grosser conceptions of anthropomorphism; while the Latins, notably Tertullian, thought of God as existing in a human form. With the Greeks, revelation in its larger aspects was not limited to the Christian and Jewish dispensations, but all truth, wherever found, was held as coming from God, and even heathen philosophers, inspired by him, had in their own way and place contributed to that preparation for Christianity which constituted the fulness of time. Revelation was therefore a living process, superin-

tended by a divine and ever-present teacher, who spoke to men made in the Divine image and constituted for the truth, while human reason, conscience, and experience were the ordained channels for its reception. Among the Latins philosophy and human reason were regarded with distrust, as the sources of heresy, and revelation became a mechanical method of Divine communication, more particularly defined as a deposit embodied in a rule of faith, whose integrity was guaranteed by bishops in apostolical descent. According to Greek theology, the Logos, or Divine Word, in whose image man was made, had always been present in human history, and thus foreshadowed the incarnation of the Divine in the human, when God should be manifest in the flesh in all the fulness of the Godhead bodily. With the Latins his coming had been as abrupt as his departure was complete, and in the stead of a present Christ still guiding the education of human souls was a last will and testament, of which the episcopate was the executor and administrator. In the Greek theology man's position, here or hereafter, was necessarily conditioned by his moral state: with the Latins it did not seem unreasonable that Divine decrees proceeding from an absolute sovereign should operate to fix the condition of man, apart from all moral considerations. The contrast might be extended farther and made to include the doctrines of the church, the sacraments, the resurrection of the body, and the nature of eternal life. With the Greeks the church represented humanity in its ideal state—a body whose limits could not be defined; the sacraments were symbols of that eternal life in Christ which God was always giving to men; the resurrection was the standing up again in life of those who had left the tenement of the flesh. The Latin Church identified the visible organization with the body of Christ; the sacraments took on a magical character and, ceasing to be symbols of a process, became the exclusive channels through which Divine grace was mediated to men; and the resurrection of the body was interpreted as the rising again out of the grave of the same body which had been decomposed and seen corruption. Eternal life was regarded by the Greeks as consisting in an ethical and spiritual relationship with God,—as in the words of St. John, “This is life eternal to know thee, the true God, and Jesus

Christ, whom thou hast sent:" and the loss of this knowledge in which was life, constituted eternal death. To the Latin mind eternal life became a synonym for endless duration of existence in a state of bliss, and its converse became also the endless duration of existence in a state of misery. It is doubtful whether any of the Greek fathers before the middle of the fifth century accepted what has been known in Latin theology as the doctrine of endless punishment.

After the middle of the fifth century, if not earlier, the Eastern Church began to show fatal signs of deterioration in its theology, and we can trace the retrogression in its thought about God away from the Christian ideal to that conception of Deity which constituted the groundwork of Neoplatonism and of some of the Gnostic systems of theosophy. While differing widely in some important features, the Gnostic systems of the second century and the Neoplatonism of the third resembled each other in conceiving God as at an infinite distance from the world, and in filling up the intervening space with a long chain of mediators, æons or demons, through whose agency man might attain to union with the Divine. They differ also from the Christian revelation in asserting the Divine passivity in the process of redemption; the responsibility entailed upon man necessitated a long and arduous struggle onward and upward in order to the attainment of that union with God which the incarnation asserted as already existing,—while the dying Christ upon the cross forever attested the Divine activity in its progressive realization. In the beautiful words of St. Paul we find pictured the attitude of the heathen world: they were feeling after a far-away Deity, dissevered from his creation, when in truth He is not far from every one of us, for in him we live and move and have our being,—in the language even of older heathen poets, we are also his offspring.

That this conception of God was entering into Christian thought may be seen in the Arian controversy of the fourth century. Athanasius was right when he interpreted the Arian view of the person of Christ as essentially heathen in its character, as endangering the church by the introduction of the polytheistic principle. For Arius postulated a remote Deity, and saw in Christ merely a delegate or ambassador, who, however

highly exalted in his rank among supernatural beings, was still below God and not of the same essence with the Father. Athanasius saw in Christ no mere supernatural delegate from an absent Deity, but God himself actually entering the world, the Eternal Word becoming flesh, redeeming humanity, and dwelling among men. It was for this reason that the Arian controversy became a life-and-death struggle for the Christian faith, and the intense and wide-spread excitement it occasioned indicated that the church was shaken to its very foundations. As we review the course of Christian thought, we can see that Athanasius stood as the representative of a theological principle which was destined to grow dim in the Christian consciousness and long remain among the buried treasures of the church's inheritance. But before it disappeared it achieved a formal triumph, and the conviction for which Athanasius fought *contra mundum* and *contra ecclesiam* found permanent expression in the Nicene Creed.

From the time of Constantine, when, Christianity having become the recognized religion of the state, the heathen world had begun to pour into the church, we can recognize in the sweeping changes which came over the ritual, that a subtle transformation was affecting the inward principle of the Christian faith. Ritual is always the expression of an underlying doctrine, yet not necessarily the doctrine formulated in creeds, but rather hidden sentiments which are being generated in the popular mind. Heathen notions of God and of the need of propitiation by material sacrifice began to modify a cultus which in earlier centuries had been so simple, that to the pagan mind, accustomed to great pomp and splendor in its worship, Christianity seemed unworthy to be designated a religion. While the development of ritual is controlled by a popular sentiment, it is also true that the ground of such sentiment is generally anticipated in the work of speculative thinkers. Toward the close of the fifth century there appeared a book destined to become very popular both in Greek and Latin Christendom. The "Celestial Hierarchy" of Dionysius the Areopagite may be taken as evidence of an unconscious revolution in speculative thought about the nature of Deity and his relation to the world. It adopted entire the whole method of Neoplatonic heathen-

ism, a distant Deity, from whom the universe had emanated, with a threefold hierarchy in heavenly spaces, grading down to man from the remote inaccessible throne of God, and on earth a corresponding hierarchy, through whose sacramental acts Divine power might be distributed to humanity. Thus Neoplatonic heathenism, disguised in Christian dress, became the speculative basis of Christian thought, and lent a strange significance and artificial lustre to Christian ritual, while it hardly needed the assumption of apostolic authority in its behalf to give it currency in the church.

In tracing the process of deterioration in Christian thought, due importance must be assigned to a conviction which first found utterance in Gnostic theosophies of the second century, and of which it is not too much to say that the Christian world is now only slowly outgrowing the baneful results. The doctrine that this world is an evil thing and that the curse of God lies upon the whole creation, if never distinctly formulated in so many words, was yet practically accepted in the ancient church and during the middle ages. Causes must have been at work upon a large scale to produce so deep and so enduring a conviction. We may briefly summarize them as the dark and well-nigh hopeless prospects of human society in the age of the decline of the Roman Empire, when the foundations of social order were in process of overthrowal; when life, not to speak in the sentimental mood of modern luxurious pessimism, seemed hardly worth the living. There was coming in those ages, to humanity, a veritable day of the Lord, such as ancient prophets had described, in which the righteous suffered alike with the unrighteous. The social strain which was involved in the tragedy of the fall of the empire marks the darkest period in human history. It was no brief panic destined to yield rapidly to a higher order. In the course of long ages that order was sure to come, but meanwhile the people could only feel that notwithstanding all they had endured there was worse yet to come—the wrath of God had not been turned away, but his hand was stretched out still.

If the circumstances of an age have any force in modifying theistic or religious opinion, it follows that the fifth century was not a favorable moment for the development of a true

theology. At a time when free scientific inquiry was fast yielding to traditionalism, when society was relapsing into barbarism, and recuperative forces had hardly begun to work, Latin theology under the influence of Augustine was assuming its permanent form. Were it any part of our object in this article to trace the philosophy of Christian history, an unrivalled importance must be ascribed to Augustine in the constructive work of the Church. When scepticism and despair were rife all about him, he arose to assert the truth that God lives and actually governs the world. His belief in God was so real and profound, that subsequent ages have turned back to him as to some divine source of support and inspiration. But great as is the debt which the Church owes to Augustine, it must also be borne in mind that the limitations of his age left their traces upon his thought. Like the Latin fathers who preceded him, he conceived of Deity as an *extra-mundane* being, ruling this world indeed, but ruling it from without—an absolute monarch enthroned at a distance, whose will, unqualified by moral attributes which man could discern, was the ground and the cause of all that is. Holding to such a view of Deity with an intensity characteristic of his nature, and keenly alive to the evil and disorder in the world, in society, and also in the human soul, it was not difficult for Augustine to propound a doctrine concerning man which still further increased the sense of distance and estrangement between God and his creatures. Unlike the Greek theologians, whose starting-point was humanity made in the divine image, Augustine, construing literally the opening chapters of Genesis, began with the fall of Adam—a great catastrophe in the moral order, which had sundered the relationship between humanity and its Author. The doctrine of original sin, which was developed by Augustine in the Pelagian controversy, not only underlies the whole Augustinian theology, but it modified more or less every rite of the Church. It is not strange that contemporary Greek theologians should have uttered a protest against such an opinion, as an innovation in theology, as doing dishonor to God and injustice to man. That such a doctrine gained general acceptance in the West, shows it to have been the counterpart in religious thought of

the almost hopeless picture which the world then seemed to present to the philosophical mind.

According to the doctrine of original sin, the image of God in man was lost in consequence of Adam's fall; the sin and the guilt of Adam attached to his posterity; and every individual to the end of time comes into the world under sentence of God's wrath and condemnation. Inasmuch, therefore, as God was at a distance, and the catastrophe of Adam's fall had destroyed the constitutional likeness between man and his Creator, the incarnation no longer sufficed as a bond of union; it became necessary in some other way to represent the reconciliation of an offended Deity with an alienated humanity. A deep and widespread sentiment alone explains the change which at this time was coming over the ritual, especially the Lord's Supper. The latter rite, with its lofty ethical conception of sacrifice, offered a point of contact for the lower view, according to which the wrath of Deity had been placated and divine forgiveness rendered possible by the death of Christ upon the cross. The Lord's Supper was thus transformed from a feast of divine communion into a sacrificial act on the part of the officiating priest, whose constant repetition availed to keep the heavens opened and God propitious to his creation. It was not till comparatively late in the Middle Ages that the popular sentiment which first found expression in the liturgies took shape in the doctrine of the Atonement, and received its speculative form at the hands of the schoolmen. The sacrament of baptism was also affected in its inmost significance by the Augustinian dogma of original sin. From this time it came to be regarded as essential even for unconscious infants, in order that the guilt inherited from Adam might be washed away, and the lost image of the Creator again restored. And so is explained, and from such a point also justified, the inference which Augustine was the first to make, that the whole heathen world as well as children dying unbaptized were forever lost to the presence of God.

Notwithstanding that the Latin Church has honored Augustine as one of her four great doctors, yet she modified his system in favor of a more practical, more lenient, and in some respects more comprehensive theology. For Augustine had laid a burden upon man by his doctrine of predestination which

the Church was not able to bear. It was one of the inconsistencies of this great religious genius, that while advocating during the Donatist controversy a theory of the Church which identified it with the visible hierarchy, he was also the author of the Protestant idea of an invisible church—an *ecclesiola in ecclesia*, constituted of those elect souls who had been predestinated to salvation in the inscrutable mystery of God's absolute will. In the Middle Ages, when the power of the hierarchy had become supreme, it is evident that predestination by a secret divine decree has been exchanged for the larger election by baptism, and election by God has given way to election by the Church. And from this change there resulted another of no slight importance. The purifying discipline which Augustine thought might await the elect after death in order to their complete emancipation from sin, became the purgatorial abode which awaited all the baptized dying in the communion of the Church. Purgatory was therefore practically substituted for eternal punishment within the limits of Christendom, while the darker horrors of endless woe became a reserved power in the hands of the rulers of the Church to enforce submission to her decrees. The Papacy retained its supremacy so long as men believed that the Church could nullify through excommunication her own decrees, or in other words so long as men believed in baptismal election.

The features of mediæval Christianity are too familiar to need enumeration or description here. Our object in alluding to them is to show that they constitute one consistent whole and are the natural outcome of one root-conviction. Latin theology was a regular growth conditioned in all its parts by one and the same principle. It was not a system developed from Scripture by human reason, nor have its advocates preferred to claim for it this distinction. If its premise is granted, one can hardly find any basis in pure reason for rejecting its conclusions. The survival of the system in our own day is evidence that it possesses a certain life in virtue of some deep-seated conviction which its adherents have not yet outgrown. Protestant polemics against Romanism have failed to reach the ground-work of its system, in its conception of Deity. If God be postulated in thought as at a distance from the world, and from his remote abode never moves to draw any nearer to his creation, if Christ

came for a moment in time and then departed to sit down upon his judgment-throne, it is not unreasonable to believe that some Vicar has been appointed to represent absent Deity and to govern not only the church but the world in his stead. A system of mediators is sure to arise as a substitute for that living Divine presence which the mind has lost. If there is no longer any direct communication with God, it is only natural to think that angels and saints and martyrs are in some way nearer to men and receive their prayers. While prayer may still be offered to God, it will be a cold formality compared with the spontaneous invocation of the Virgin Mother, or a patron saint who by a divine arrangement has been detailed to some special guardianship over the church. The church will then become in its visible organization identified with an ark of safety upon the desolate ocean of life, its priesthood the delegates or ambassadors of a remote sovereign communicating between him and his rebellious subjects, and its sacraments the conduits by which the divine gifts and graces entrusted to the church are distributed to its members. Dependence upon the church, its officers, and its rites, in order to salvation, must be strenuously enforced, and hence obedience to the church becomes the highest virtue and heresy the only unpardonable sin. Altho the church professed to have the power of condemning souls to perdition by excluding them from her fold, and tho she could lengthen or diminish the duration of purgatorial fires, yet she never allowed her children to believe in the certainty of their salvation. In the case of the great majority it was only warrantable to indulge a pious hope. Here and there did she formally announce, of elect souls who had gained extraordinary merit, that they had at last passed out of their imprisonment into the presence of God.

Marvellous in its strength and adaptation to humanity as such a system may seem to be, its strength is no greater than its weakest point. If men are led to doubt its primary assumption, the immense structure, with its exquisite and varied charms, made dear to the imagination by the tender associations of devotion, becomes a prison-house of the soul shutting man out from God, starving the demands of his spiritual nature. We can trace such a doubt wide-spread in the church in the ages that preceded the Protestant Reformation.

It becomes deeply significant from this point of view that the doctrine of transubstantiation proved to be the stumbling-block in the case of almost every thinker or reformer in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries who broke away from ecclesiastical tradition. No doctrine more impressively set forth that which was most distinctively characteristic of Latin Christianity. It was a faint relic of the earlier belief in a Divine presence within the church. When the change came over the spirit of the church, which banished Christ to a distance from the world, the belief arose that the priest had power to bring back the absent Lord to the altar, and still to retain the localized presence of Deity in the sacred wafer. The dim light burning before the Host, while it served to make darkness visible, served also to shed a feeble ray upon the destinies of men. The antagonism to transubstantiation, or the scepticism in regard to it, had become so general during the twelfth century that at the Lateran Council in 1216 it was found necessary to give the doctrine a formal statement, in order to guard against or detect more easily the prevailing unbelief. It is worthy of remark—and the explanation is not a remote one—that a pantheistic tendency began from this time to find increasing expression in the church. The localization of Deity upon the altar bred by a natural reaction, the belief in the universal diffusion of his presence. The gross statement made by fantastic sectaries that every man was a Christ incarnate, may be taken as a protest of the human soul in behalf of closer contact with God than the church afforded the means of realizing. The doctrine of transubstantiation was, of course, a most audacious defiance of the growing reason, and to many was mainly obnoxious on this account. But with all classes of opponents to the received theological system it stood as an obstacle in the way of closer union with Deity.

In the increasing disaffection of the pre-Reformation age there may be traced two tendencies distinguished from each other by the thought of God which underlies them. They have sometimes been termed the mystical and the evangelical, but the popular designation gives no clue to their inner meaning. Mysticism, it has been often said, dwelt upon the Christ in us, to the exclusion of the Christ for us. It certainly attached little importance to the idea of atonement as generally presented in the

theology and ritual of the church. It identified the spiritual process within the soul with a Divine presence. The title of a little book very popular before the Reformation, the "Theologia Germanica," further explained itself as a "treatise which sets forth how Adam is to die and Christ is to rise in us." In the case of Eckart, whose writings were found heretical by a commission appointed to examine them, pantheism was openly asserted. Later mysticism developed a more ethical tendency and avoided that physical basis for the union of the soul with God which showed itself in the "Brethren and Sisters of the Free Spirit." But the pantheistic tendency which is apparent in all these mystic thinkers, whether it found full expression or not, indicates a revolution in their thought concerning God by which he was to be brought back into direct and living union with the spirit of man.

On the other hand the so-called evangelical reformers, among whom Wycliffe and Huss stand as representatives, did not seek to disturb the existing conception of God as a being apart from the world. They found the principle of union with God in a re-assertion of the Augustinian doctrine of election, by which men were brought face to face with God in the simple majesty of his direct decrees. It was this school of reformers who did battle against the mediæval system in its outward forms, and whose principles led in the age of the reformation to the rejection of a priesthood, together with that complex machinery which is the accompaniment of the sacerdotal idea.

The Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century so far as relates to its formal theology is represented by Calvin rather than by Luther or Zwingle. England contributed no great theological thinker, and the reformation of the Church of England was conducted more upon an ethical or practical basis than a purely theological one. Zwingle followed an ideal of reform so far in advance of his time that he was easily superseded by Calvin in his own country, and all memory of him died out in the church except his free spiritual interpretation of the Christian sacraments. It has been left to our own age to appreciate as they deserve his principle of free theological inquiry, his large conception of the *civitas Christiana*, and his comprehensive views of the reign of Law. Luther presented a rare combination of

theological insight with religious experience, and possessed a certain breadth and freedom in his apprehension of the nature of God and of divine revelation which do not appear among the next generation of Lutheran theologians. His doctrine of justification by faith had it been accepted as Luther propounded it would indeed have revolutionized theology. The *fiducia fidei*, which with him was essential to the consciousness of justification, was afterwards completely neglected, if not intentionally dropped from all theological systems. When revived in this age, as in the Scotch Church by spiritual thinkers like Erskine and McLeod Campbell, it was regarded with suspicion as if it were some morbid heretical outgrowth. But the *fiducia*, the assurance of justification, was perhaps the one tenet of Luther's which justified to theological thought the Protestant revolution. It indicated at how great a remove he stood from the prevailing conviction of mediæval Christianity, which was known in theological parlance as the *conjectura moralis*. If we set over against this moral conjecture, this possibility that one's salvation may be secure, the absolute assurance which Luther declared was a necessary consequence of faith, we have a contrast which points to a radical difference in the conception of God. It was the "I know in whom I have believed," of St. Paul; "I am *persuaded* that nothing shall separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus." It was the high-water mark of the Protestant Reformation, to be reached again, with the approaching tide of religious life, only after ages had passed away.

It was Calvin, then, who gave form and mould to the coming theology, whether in England or Germany. His system of thought had a certain fascination for the age. Lutheranism was no match for it, and submitted to see much of its fairest territory despoiled by its theological rival. It entered France, took possession of the Netherlands, was received with enthusiasm by the Scotch, and became for nearly a century the theology of the Church of England. The thought of God which underlies it, while it is still that of the distant extra-mundane' Deity, is also that of a sovereign whose will is supreme, and which it is man's highest duty and privilege not to criticise but to obey. In an age when the foundations of civil and religious order were shaken to their foundations such a doctrine was indispensable.

It is necessary in any criticism of Calvin or of his creed to remember that modern civilization as well as the church owes to him a vast obligation. Like Augustine, whom he followed in the spirit as well as in the letter, he stood up to assert the absolute supremacy of the divine will when men in their weakness or scepticism were magnifying human sovereigns, holding by divine right or ruling in the place of God. Like the faith of Mohammedanism, Calvinism was a fighting and conquering creed for Christianity. It nerved the arm of great heroes in the sanguinary, almost disheartening wars in the Netherlands, in Germany and England. But when the necessity which created it had disappeared, Calvinism became a stereotyped theology, in which empty formulas did duty for what had once been living convictions, and instead of being an inspiration became a burden to the religious consciousness, presenting a distorted conception of Deity, and only faintly reflecting the idea of the Christian revelation.

In the creeds and confessions of the age immediately succeeding, a period in this respect most prolific, there is no evidence that the basis of theology had been disturbed. The idea of God as remote from the world reigned supreme in Catholic and Protestant theologies. The differences between them are not slight or unimportant, but they are not explained by any ground-divergence in the thought about God. Protestants had indeed rejected the whole system of sacerdotal mediation with the interpretations of the church and the sacraments which it implied. Philosophical realism, or the doctrine of universals which formed the chief contribution of the great scholastic thinkers of the middle ages to the explication or defence of the tenets of the church, had given place to nominalism, as was inevitably necessary in the interest of human progress as well as theological reform. Scripture had been substituted for tradition as the source of authoritative appeal in matters of faith. Systems of theology were painfully elaborated on this basis, which challenge our admiration for the intellectual power and ingenuity they display. But somehow the seventeenth century as thus represented appears to us among the most dreary in all the Christian centuries. A great deliverance had indeed been accomplished, but, like the exodus of Israel at the Red Sea, a

day of high spiritual triumph and exaltation had been followed by aimless wanderings in a barren wilderness. It is no doubt hard for us in this age to do full justice to the principle of individualism, which belongs to the Protestant systems of which we are speaking. But the Catholic efforts at restoration under the lead of the Jesuits, which were attended with so great success, do not indicate the weakness of Protestantism so much as the weakness of human nature, which sighed again for a return to the easier because more irresponsible religious life of the old régime. Very unlike from this point of view were the relative tendencies of Protestantism and Catholicism. But in their formal theologies, with which we are chiefly concerned, the idea of God remained the same. Man was conceived as at a distance from his Creator, and life was construed as a probation, on which depended the final admission to the presence of God. And further, the Protestants had only set up another method of communication between man and God, which while it professed to bring them together did so on the same ground on which the old sacerdotal system had risen and flourished. The Bible was made to take the place of the direct presence and action of the Holy Spirit. The Lutherans distinctly took the position, and in so doing were followed by the great English theologians of the Puritan school, that God spoke to men only through the text and letter of Scripture. The Bible became a substitute for a living Christ, and its language, dictated by God himself, was thought to have in it a regenerating, life-giving power. Direct communion with a present God was emphatically rejected; only through the word and sacraments were the means of grace to be sought and found.

Meantime there was the usual mystic protest, the inevitable concomitant of all formal theologies which shut out the soul from the presence of its Maker. It is significant to observe that the mystic tendency now appeared not only in a more intelligible spiritual garb, but is more widely diffused among the people. Jacob Böhme is the pantheistic successor of an Eckart, dwelling rather upon the physical union with Deity as the basis of spiritual communion. But there were mystics of another cast, among whom occur the familiar names in the Roman Catholic Church of Francis de Sales, Madame Guyon, and Féne-

lon; in Germany, the first generation of the pietists; in England, George Fox and the Quaker movement; and later in the century the Cambridge school of Platonists, including John Smith and Henry More. Widely unlike as they all were, unbalanced and onesided in their apprehension of truth, yet all agree in taking exception to the prevailing scholasticism in theology, in the interest of some deeper, more spiritual interpretation of God and his relation to the soul.

The real interest of the eighteenth century to the student of religious opinions lies no longer in the formal theology of the church. Both by deists and by Christian apologists, whether in England or Germany, it was tacitly assumed that the connection of this world with God was not a close one. And it forms perhaps a turning-point in the history of Christian thought when the later deists, by denying the doctrine of a special providence, forced upon the church the discussion of the question, How far and in what way God showed any interest in man. Both parties in the controversy admitted that he had made the world as the machinist makes a watch, and then left it to go of itself, with the further qualification on the part of the apologists, which the deists denied, that he could and did interfere to regulate its workings whenever necessity required. Miraculous interposition to which so great importance was attached became the evidence which attested the active interest of a remote Deity in his creation. The reappearance in the church of the Arian tendency, which toward the close of the century gave birth to Unitarianism, had the same significance then as when it first appeared in the time of Constantine. Such were the indications as the last century drew to a close that the awakened reason in the full consciousness of its freedom, and unchecked by the deeper religious instincts, was pushing commonly received premises in theology to their legitimate conclusion. It has been generally and correctly enough assumed that the deists were overcome, so far as argument went, by their Christian opponents. But it must be also admitted that there was something in deism which was not overcome, which no argument could reach, and that was the unconscious groping after a system of universal law to whose sway religion and the church should be no exception. It is interesting to see this principle, which science has since con-

firmed, struggling to its birth in the throes of a religious controversy.

The distinction between natural and revealed religion which played so prominent a part in the deistic controversy indicated that the nature and method of divine revelation was becoming for the first time in the history of Christian theology a subject of vital interest and inquiry. As such it was sure to lead back to a deeper question in regard to the nature of God and his relation to the world before any satisfactory or final conclusion could be reached. If God were conceived as outside of and remote from the world, revelation would become simply an addition to that which the natural unaided faculties of man could discover, and as such might be held as a deposit in a book or in a creed; but if God were conceived as present, living in the forces of nature and in the courses of human history, then revelation would become a living continuous process, and the reason of man would discover only that which God revealed. Such was the issue which the last century bequeathed as its legacy to the church of our own age.

The results of the conflict between traditional theology and the spirit of free inquiry popularly known as rationalism were of so negative a character as to necessitate a great reaction. The principle of that reaction lay in the recovery of the idea of the immanence of God. It is no trifling or unimportant circumstance that the first, the clearest, the most emphatic expressions of this conviction occur not in theology but in literature. In the famous conversation between Lessing and Jacobi we may see, almost as in a mirror, the modern spirit rising into consciousness. The contrast is most striking between Lessing with his bold assertion after years of struggling uncertainty, and aware of the revolutionary significance of the truth which he had reached, and Jacobi attracted and awed, but timid and only half convinced. "I can no longer," said Lessing, "be satisfied with the orthodox conception of a *God out of the world*." Goethe, like Lessing, had been a devout student of Spinoza's philosophy, and has recorded the disturbance which its reception created within him as most momentous. With him also it led to the same conviction which is expressed in one of his poems:

"No ! such a God my worship may not win,
Who lets the world about his finger spin
A thing extern; my God must rule within,
And whom I own for Father, God, Creator,
Holds nature in himself, himself in nature;
And in his kindly arms embraced, the whole
Doth live and move by his pervading soul."

The same feeling may be traced in those English writers at the beginning of the century who foreshadowed the coming change in literature and theology. Coleridge was in this respect the pioneer in a new world for the human spirit, whose richness and wonders were to become for the soul what the fabulous wealth of the new America was to the commerce of the sixteenth century. Wordsworth, who uttered in poetry what Coleridge had discovered through the speculative process, has clothed the idea of indwelling Deity in language unsurpassed for its beauty :

" And I have felt
A presence that disturbs me with the joy
Of elevated thoughts : a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky and in the mind of man:
A motion and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things."

Such is the conviction which underlies all that is highest, all that is most truly characteristic of our own age. It has given a new meaning and value to outward nature, and it has lent sanctity to all that concerns man in his history and development. Under its influence the curse beneath which the creation so long has groaned has been lifted, and the world and humanity have become allied to God in an intimate and necessary relationship. We have called it a re-discovery, for as we have seen it was a familiar thought to ancient Greek theology. Nor did it appear in Greek thought for the first time in history, but rather in the sacred records of Divine revelation, in the teaching of Him in whom, to speak in the words of Athanasius, "humanity has received its deification." None the less may it be aptly termed a revelation to this modern world, and revealed in no abrupt or arbitrary way, but through the natural processes of human thought, re-

search, and experience. Among these may be mentioned the study of nature or the physical sciences, which received so great an impulse in the last century; the rise of the historical spirit, and the study of history, which from being a dry chronology, or a field of theological partisanship, has been elevated to a science by the labors of the last two generations; the deeper study of the Bible after a truer and freer method of interpretation, in which history has combined with a grammatical exegesis to throw light upon the inner meaning and process of the Divine revelation; the teachings of philosophy from the time of Kant, who, as has been well remarked, put a new centre in the mental as Copernicus did in the planetary system, when he started with self-consciousness as the most important and reliable means of getting at the truth. Political science has also contributed to the same result. In the French revolution and its antecedents the question was forced upon the attention of Europe of the true nature and end of all human government. From this time, when the sentiment took root that all government should be for the good of the governed, the Calvinistic principle of Deity as arbitrary will began to decline. In the feeling that God too must govern the world in the interest of all his subjects, lies the true force of the democratic principle in modern society; and hence also comes the higher sacredness which attaches to all divine-human institutions, the family, the state, the church, which must have been designed to reflect and subserve the Divine method and purpose.

In ways like these was the world coming to realize and acknowledge the presence of God in nature and in history. But it does not altogether suffice to put it thus, because all history is a continuous process, and every movement or event is part of a larger whole. The only self-consistent hypothesis is that of Deity indwelling in the historical process and conducting it to its conclusion. Hence when God was enthroned in the remotest parts of space, or was localized on the altar or in the sacred book, the protest of humanity never ceased to be heard, and with increasing force bore witness to a higher truth. To formal theology this cry of the soul for God was known as mysticism. Mysterious it undoubtedly was to those who fancied that they stood in the place of God, and believed that

the government of the world or the church devolved solely upon themselves. It was not given to vicars of Christ, nor did the light come first to ecclesiastical hierarchies, "to see the things which we see." The marvellous ways in which God works to perform his wonders are nowhere better shown than in the strange fantastic sects, with their morbid fancies, in the gross pantheistic tendencies bordering on the verge of immorality, or in the so-called secular agencies, which become instruments for the announcement and furtherance of a higher revelation. Not but what he had also a work to do for hierarchies, for that more conservative line of development which we are sometimes tempted to regard as including the whole scope of Divine activity. But as in the apostolic age, "God hath chosen the weak things of the world, and even base things hath God chosen, yea, and things which are not, to bring to naught the things that are. For of him and to him and through him are all things."

Such, in too brief an outline, are the historical antecedents of the modern theological principle. Its vital influence is reflected in all the movements of the nineteenth century which carry on them the stamp of the highest excellence. It has led to a wide and keen appreciation of the beauty of nature, which has given rise to a new school in art. It has produced a revolution in literature and in philosophy. It has stimulated philanthropical endeavors, and created a new zeal for the extension of Christian missions. It has led to a revival of the church in a higher because more spiritual form, and by consecrating the history of the past has enriched our ecclesiastical heritage. In another article it will be the aim to show what it has done in the science of theology, which is the reflex of Christian thought and experience.

ALEXANDER V. G. ALLEN.

GREAT BRITAIN, AMERICA, AND IRELAND.

THE friendly union of English-speaking people throughout the world is an object of more than diplomatic interest. It is now all but complete. The old quarrel with George III. and Lord North is dead and buried ; scarcely a trace of it lingers among native Americans, even in Fourth-of-July orations ; the House of Brunswick has done everything that royalty could do to cement the reconciliation ; and if aristocratic dislike of republicanism is not extinct, it is silenced, or finds a voice only in some organ of decrepitude. Intercourse between America and England grow apace ; intermarriage among their citizens increases ; sympathy becomes stronger, and shows itself on all great national occasions ; common interests multiply ; the fusion of science, literature, the churches, is complete ; international reviews are set up, and the periodicals of each country circulate largely in the other ; wherever the American and the Englishman meet, on distant shores and in face of common peril, it is felt that blood is thicker than water ; Westminster Abbey hears the funeral sermons and receives the effigies of the great men of both divisions of the race. Great Britain, if she has hitherto given umbrage by her overweening power, is not likely to continue the offence ; for tho' her sun is still far from its setting, the shadows of her day of Empire begin to lengthen, and she will probably in the future excite in her offspring less of jealousy than of the affection which attaches to the parent of their race, the foundress of their institutions, and the custodian of their historic monuments, tombs, and fanes. To the existence of perfect amity, and a union as entire as the severing Atlantic will permit, almost the sole impediment is now the anti-British feeling of the Irish in the United States. This, apparently, is the main source of all that is hostile to Great Britain in the atti-

tude of American diplomacy, in the action of the American Legislature, or in the language of the American Press. To entangle the two sections of the Anglo-Saxon race in a quarrel is the constant and avowed object of Irish machinations. That the Government of the United States will deliberately make itself the organ of Celtic enmity in an Old World quarrel is not to be feared; it has refused to open the door for war by recalling Mr. Lowell at the dictation of the Irish; but if the Fisheries question or any other question should breed a dispute, in a balanced state of American parties, there is no saying what the Irish vote may do.

An eminent member of the New York Press, Mr. E. L. Godkin, for whose pen I entertain the greatest respect and who is sure always to command attention, writing in the *Nineteenth Century*, maintains that the most fundamental of the facts in the case between England and Ireland has been overlooked by British statesmen, of whose sagacity he has evidently formed rather a low estimate. English hatred of Ireland and Irishmen is, according to him, the root of the mischief, and the feeling, being more than reciprocated by the Irish, is in his opinion so insuperable an impediment to union that separation is the only hopeful course. Mr. Godkin's paper appears as an American view of the Irish question. It is, however, that of an Irish-American, and one who plainly sympathises with the emotions of his kinsmen towards Great Britain. I am an Englishman, and in controverting his arguments I may be equally moved by national feeling on the other side. But I can say for myself that I have been, as a journalist, the steadfast opponent of British aggrandizement, and during the ascendancy of Jingoism bore my share of the honorable obloquy which was cast on counsels of morality and moderation. My position is much the same as that of an American who opposed the Mexican war, abjured the maxims of an unscrupulous patriotism, but was loyal to the Union. Nor am I likely to be inordinately rapacious on behalf of a country, in which it is not probable that I shall ever set foot again. If I understand my own feelings, I care more for the relations of the English-speaking communities in the two hemispheres than I care for any special object of the Mother Country's ambition.

Mr. Godkin speaks of Ireland and the Irish indiscriminately; so do writers in general: but there is a distinction which it is most important at once to mark and constantly to bear in mind. Disaffection prevails only in the three Celtic and Catholic provinces—Leinster, Munster, and Connaught. Ulster, which, having been colonized from Scotland, is mainly Teutonic and Protestant, continues all the time prosperous, contented, obedient to the law, and attached to the Union. Yet the political relations of Ulster to Great Britain are exactly the same as those of the rest of the island.

What are the proofs adduced by Mr. Godkin of the general existence in English breasts of this insolent dislike of his compatriots which he deems so fatal a bar to union, and which seems to have entered like iron into his own soul? He begins with perfect candor by admitting that the sentiment has, in a creditable way, been kept out of sight by Englishmen in public writing and speaking about Ireland, as well as excluded from influence in legislation. Surely a sentiment which can be entirely suppressed both in public utterance and in important action, and this in face of a torrent of delirious abuse poured by Irishmen on England, is hardly strong enough absolutely to defy the softening power of time, especially in minds capable of such self-control as the suppression proves. Should we not rather say that as such suppression is impossible to a nation whose organs are a popular assembly and press, if a sentiment finds no expression, it cannot really exist? But, says Mr. Godkin, *Punch* in its caricatures represents the Irish as savages and Thackeray did nothing with so much gusto and success as ridicule Irishmen. *Punch*, I suppose, like *Harper's Weekly* and *Puck*, represents Irishmen as savages when they act like savages, as some of them unhappily do, but not otherwise. Ireland herself, if my memory does not deceive me, generally appears in *Punch* in rather a pathetic guise. As to Thackeray, I should have thought that he had done nothing with half so much gusto and success as ridicule English snobbery; and really in his picture of "The O'Mulligan" I can see no more venom than in Shakespeare's picture of Fluellen. If Mr. Godkin asks who are the principal propagators of the comic idea of Irish character in fiction, he will find, I believe, that they are Miss Edgeworth, by descent and

domicile an Irishwoman, tho born in England, and the Irishman Mr. Lever. On the other hand, the melodies in which Moore has presented Ireland in her pathetic aspect have been among the most popular of poems among Englishmen, while their author was the spoilt child of English society in his day.

Of the social prejudices of the richer class in England there are no mirrors more perfect than the great public schools. I was at Eton, about the most typical of those schools, and I declare that while there are other prejudices the existence of which I remember clearly enough, I search my memory in vain for the slightest trace of a prejudice against Irish boys. I can say the same thing with regard to Oxford, where I never heard it breathed that an Irish student was socially or academically at any sort of disadvantage. There may have been jokes against Irishmen as there are against Scotchmen and Welshmen, as there are against John Bull, but in these there was no sting. I cannot pretend to know the great world of London society as well as I know the little worlds of Eton and Oxford, yet I feel sure that there also, if the self-esteem of an Irishman is hurt, he owes it not to his nationality, but to something in himself. Nobody ever objects to intermarriage with an Irish family, or regards Irish blood as a ground for blackballing at a club. That the laboring classes of England cherish no very bitter sentiment against their Irish compeers has been proved by a crucial and even cruel test. They have suffered the bread to be taken from their mouths, their condition to be lowered, their efforts to improve it hindered, and themselves in large numbers to be uprooted and driven to emigrate by the torrent of pauperism annually poured in upon them from the land of the philoprogenitive and unthrifty Celt, almost without uttering a murmur of discontent. Not a finger has been raised against the Irish immigration which is the bane of the British artisan.

That Irishmen have their full share, and even more than their full share, of all the honors of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godkin frankly acknowledges. He may add that they have their share, and rather more than their share, of the places in the Indian Civil Service, while their kinsmen are shouting for the downfall of the Empire. What then is the ground of complaint? Why, that the honor in each case, tho conferred upon an

Irishman, is not conferred upon him as an Irishman, but as an Englishman, the Briton, in his arrogance, mentally "annexing" every Irishman of mark. There ought, it seems, to be a special form for patents of peerage and knighthoods, designating the recipient as of Irish blood, tho I suspect that supersubtle acrimony would soon discover in this an insidious mark of disparagement. A still more intricate process will be required when Irish titles such as "Duke of Connaught" and "Royal Irish" are given as marks of honor. Lord Gough is one of a list of Irish worthies named by Mr. Godkin, as instances of what most people will probably regard as a somewhat metaphysical wrong, and an insufficient cause for the dissolution of an empire. In the Phœnix Park at Dublin, close to the residences of the Lord Lieutenant and the Chief Secretary, close also to the spot where Lord Frederick Cavendish and Mr. Burke were murdered, stands the equestrian statue of Lord Gough. It is not easy to see how recognition of a man's merits as a citizen of the United Kingdom, and of his special connection with Ireland at the same time, could be more clearly signified than by making him a peer of the Imperial Parliament and putting up his statue in an Irish park. That "England has failed to make provision to satisfy the cravings of Irish vanity" may be true. It would be impossible to make such provision, even if vanity were not, as it is, insatiable. The very suggestion seems to me as full of contumely as anything that ever was said of Ireland. Proper provision, and the only possible provision, has surely been made for the reasonable pride and self-respect of Irishmen when every place of honor in the empire has been fairly and freely thrown open to their merits. But the fact is that in Mr. Godkin's eyes nobody is a genuine Irishman who is not a Nationalist and an enemy of the Union; and the real burden of his complaint will be found to be that the British Commonwealth does not confer places and honors upon those who are avowedly hostile to its existence. He rehearses a long roll of heroes,—Wellington, Castlereagh, Canning, the Lawrences, Gough, Nicholson, Roberts, and Wolseley,—of the credit for whom he says Ireland has been robbed by England. But what is to be said of the men themselves? Have they all doffed their nationality in deference to British prejudice, and become renegades for the

sake of preferment? "Irishmen," says Mr. Godkin, "have, it is true, been freely admitted to the service of the Government and have earned some notoriety as persistent and successful place-hunters." Does the phrase apply to Wellington, Canning, the Lawrences, and the rest? Does it apply to all the Irishmen who are or have been Ministers of State, Privy Councillors, Peers, Bishops, Viceroys of India, Governors of Colonies, Ambassadors? Does it apply to the Chancellors and Judges of Ireland? Suppose an Englishman had called all the Irishmen who ever attained Imperial honors "persistent and successful place-hunters," what an outcry would there have been! Nothing, apparently, will satisfy Mr. Godkin short of the reception of the Disunionist leaders into the Imperial Government. He does not see "why the confidence of the Birmingham electors should be a better reason for putting Mr. Chamberlain in the Cabinet than the confidence of the Irish people for putting Mr. Parnell or Mr. Sexton in it." If Mr. Parnell and Mr. Sexton really enjoy the confidence of the Irish people, it is curious that they should find it necessary, for the purpose of maintaining their ascendancy, to have recourse to a system of murderous terrorism and to the aid of the Fenians of New York. But Great Britain surely may reasonably say that she will admit to her councils men who are morally reeking with the blood of her loyal citizens, and who have conspired with her foreign enemies for her destruction, when the American Republic or any other nation not lost to honor shall have done the same.

It is hard, says Mr. Godkin, that the Irish nation, of all nations in the world, should be judged solely by reference to its poorest class, and that the small farmer, the farm laborer, and the small shop-keeper should be taken as the types of the whole people. Hard indeed! But is not this exactly what the framer of the indictment himself does? Does he not cut off from Irishry not only all the men of mark, but all the more educated classes, who are now unionist, or at least opposed to revolution, and confine nationality to the Fenians and Land Leaguers, the followers of O'Donovan Rossa and Parnell?

In regard to the "mental annexation" grievance, he thinks that Americans can sympathize with the Irish, inasmuch as they are constantly insulted in English society by an analogous mani-

festation of British self-conceit. They find themselves taken for Englishmen and addressed as such, by way of "subtle but intentional compliment," and as "evidently the most seductive flattery which an Englishman thinks can be administered." I venture to surmise that sometimes the subtlety is on the side of the person who fancies himself flattered, and that the stolid Englishman is either making a perfectly honest tho perhaps maladroit remark, or has simply fallen into an error. I do not myself know a native of Philadelphia or Baltimore by his pronunciation or by any other outward sign from an Englishman, and I might talk to him for a whole evening without discovering the truth. An inauspicious fancy has played over the whole of this subject and makes its influence felt, I submit, even in Mr. Lowell's pungent essay "On a Certain Condescension in Foreigners," which to Mr. Godkin appears fraught with instructive facts. Americans who have lived long in London cease to be haunted by these suspicions.

Has not Mr. Godkin himself inadvertently taken an eminent citizen from Ireland and annexed him to England in styling Mr. Philip Bagenal "an English traveller"? Bagenal is a well-known Irish name, and in the last century was borne by the member for the county of Carlow, who proposed a grant of public money to Grattan for his services in the assertion of Irish independence. I doubt therefore whether England can be said to stand convicted by her own confession when Mr. Philip Bagenal declares that the low place in the social ladder taken in America by the mass of the Irish emigrants is due to the influence of British calumny. How is it possible that uneducated and unskilled laborers coming into a community which is pre-eminently one of education and of skilled industry should take any but a low place till they had undergone a training for something higher?

Irishmen must expect to be judged, like the rest of us, by their deeds. When they do well they will receive praise, and in overflowing measure if they have had to contend against disadvantages. When they do ill they will be blamed, with due allowance for the extenuating circumstances of their case. When they become the agents or the slaves of a dark and sanguinary system of terrorism; when they commit a long

series of cold-blooded and most hideous murders; when they butcher the husband with the wife and children clinging to their knees; when they deliberately shoot down women and slaughter boys; when they burn the houses of widows; when they mutilate helpless cattle and cut off the udders of cows; when instead of condemning the assassin they applaud, abet, and harbor him; when they outrage civilization and humanity with their dynamite; when, children of misfortune themselves, they cruelly trample on the unhappy negro; when they requite the hospitality of the American Republic by abetting the slave-owner in his assault upon its unity, rising in concert with him to resist the draft at the most perilous crisis of the civil war, and perpetrating in the streets of New York the same horrors which they perpetrate in Ireland,—we shall not refrain from giving utterance to the feelings of nature, even tho it should cost us the integrity of our empire. Nor can we be constrained to call the Irish good citizens where they follow blindly in the train of political sharpers and form the army of violence and corruption, or ascribe to them independence of character where they remain the slaves of wirepullers and priests. If of late some strong things have been said against them, it must be borne in mind that the deeds of the Irish terrorists are not like those of the Carbonari, or even those of the Nihilists, dark, bloody, and such as society to preserve itself must repress, yet within the pale of political crime. Never was the assassin's dagger sheathed in a breast which had less merited the blow than that of Lord Frederick Cavendish, and the savage brutality of the act shocked the civilized world. But the murder of the Joyce family was worse than that of Lord Frederick Cavendish and Mr. Burke, and yet in some circumstances of atrocity even this yielded to crimes which have made less noise. In the English correspondence of the *New York Tribune* the other day there was an account of the murder of John Leahy, of Killarney. Leahy, according to the correspondent, was a quiet, inoffensive man, advanced in years, who took a piece of meadow land from which a tenant had been evicted and paid rent for it. At midnight fifteen armed men broke into his house and dragged him out of bed. His wife threw herself upon his body and entreated the assailants to kill

her and spare his life. They pushed her aside, dragged him into the kitchen, forced him to kneel before them, and demanded if it was not true that he had paid his rent. He could not deny it. They then asked if there was any whiskey in the house, and the wife said they should have the keys and anything they wanted, if only they would not shoot her husband. But shoot him they did, even while she was clasping him in her arms. Three men were called upon to fire in turn, being addressed by different numbers, three, twelve, and fourteen, and the old man was left to breathe his last, murdered because he had hired a meadow and paid rent for it. So far as men of this character were concerned, there was no difficulty in believing the private accounts, which, in contradiction to the public, told us that the murder of Lord Frederick Cavendish was hailed with general exultation, and that the corpse was hooted at its departure from Dublin. That the commission of these outrages is the only way of waking the House of Commons into activity about Irish grievances is a plea in meeting which I find it hard to suppress indignation. The worst of the outrages were committed after the passing of the Land Act, the very worst after the passing both of the Land Act and the Arrears Act; almost the whole of them, I believe, after the appointment of the Irish Land Commission (July, 1880). In those neat and rose-covered cottages of England, the delight of the artist's eye, where poverty struggles hard by cleanliness and neatness to keep up the appearance of respectability, the pinch of want has been hardly less severe than in the Irish cabin. The English laborers combined under the leadership of Joseph Arch for the improvement of their condition; their movement has been successful, and I am not aware that it has been sullied by a single crime.

Nor are the Irish outrages palliated by the grandeur of their object. What the tenant farmers who compose the Land League seek is not the nationalization of the land, but the appropriation of it to themselves, they being in many cases merely casual occupants, and in some cases occupants in consequence of previous evictions. Their aim is simply to repudiate the payment of rent, to oust the proprietor and to take his place, which having been effected they would sell the land, sublet it if they pleased, and deal with it in all respects as the

proprietor deals with it now. They have not the slightest intention of giving a rood to their farm laborers, of whom there is a large number, and to whom they are often hard masters. Still less do they intend that the land shall be restored to the tribe. I believe I was among the first to point out that the tradition of tribal ownership is a factor in the sentiment of the question ; but it is a factor in the sentiment and nothing more. Let a man who traces his pedigree to the Tribe ask a Land Leaguer for his share of the tribal land and the Land Leaguer will give him six feet of it.

No doubt when Englishmen and Scotchmen are provoked beyond measure by the conduct and the language of the Irish they sometimes give vent to their exasperation, and in violent terms, if they are hot-tempered and free of speech, they say that Ireland is not worth what she costs, and that they wish she could be towed a thousand miles off or swallowed up by the sea. But these outbursts are very different from settled hatred and contempt.

The hatred felt for England by the Irish in the United States amounts, says Mr. Godkin, to frenzy, and proves by its intensity that the feud is internecine, and that the breach can never be healed ; to which he might perhaps add that frenzy is neither a cool judge of the facts of a case nor so wise a counsellor that the American people can prudently surrender to it the guidance of their national policy. But Mr. Godkin's view seems to be limited to that which is immediately around him. If he will do us the honor to visit Canada he will find that here the feeling is comparatively weak. I am told that it is comparatively weak in Australia also. In New York and Boston it is fostered and inflamed by the assiduous arts of Tammany politicians angling for the Irish vote, and of Fenian dynamite-mongers who subsist upon the fund. When the Fenians twice invaded Canada, not a single Irish Canadian lifted a finger in aid of them or gave them any overt sign of welcome. I must leave it to Americans to say whether, when the Irish prosper and become settled in comfortable homes, their active sympathy with Fenian enterprises does not begin to abate.

Now a word by way of general reply to Mr. Godkin's view of the political case and prospect. The three Celtic and Catho-

lic provinces of Ireland are the ill-starred Brittany or Calabria of the United Kingdom. The people have been kept economically, socially, and politically in a backward state by untoward influences of situation, soil, and climate, by aboriginal weaknesses of character, by calamitous accidents of history, and by the Roman Catholic religion. They are being gradually and painfully brought up to the level of the more advanced civilization, and trained to constitutional self-government, tho the process of education is interrupted from time to time by recurring outbreaks of tribal anarchy, which call for the adoption of temporary measures of repression in order to prevent the people from ruining their own prospects and free institutions at the same time. Even in the United States, Irish lawlessness has sometimes given birth to emergencies of a similar kind. The difficulty is enormously increased by the prevalence of political incendiaryism, which has now become a trade, plied by adventurers in America as well as in Ireland itself, whose object is not to further practical improvement but to keep alive disaffection.

The situation of Ireland is unhappy, because while nobody can look at the two islands on the map and mark how they lie relatively to each other and to the continent without seeing that their destinies are knit together by the hand of nature, the channel which separates them has been wide enough hitherto to estrange them and prevent the smaller island from partaking in the progress of the larger, tho improved steam navigation is now doing its work. Of the soil no small portion is mountain or bog, while the climate is generally too wet for the profitable raising of cereals, so that the most important industry is cattle-breeding, a fact apparently fatal to that vision of the patriot, a peasant proprietary with small farms. A large population can be maintained only on the potato, and as the people multiply recklessly, failures of that precarious crop have bred famines, to the sufferers by which, I believe it may be said, Great Britain has ministered relief, both in the way of public grant and of private subscription, with no niggardly hand. A happier mode of depletion has of late years been found in emigration, tho that remedy has been opposed by priest and demagogue alike; and a number of Irish, certainly larger than the present population of the island, finds subsistence in the British Colonies or in the

United States, and denounces British tyranny for robbing them of a country in which they could not possibly have found bread. As Ireland raises only 130,000 tons of coal, while she imports two millions, she cannot herself be a manufacturing country; but a million and a half of her people at least find employment in the manufacturing cities of Great Britain, where their political character is the same as it is in the cities of the United States. Some other sources of wealth such as fisheries and quarries might be opened, the beauties of the coast might attract the dwellings of opulence, and a larger measure of prosperity might be attained, if outrage would cease and investment could become secure. In the last forty years the number of cattle had doubled, pauperism had decreased ninety per cent, and the amount of money in savings-banks and other banks of deposit had become very large, and while the marine suburbs of Dublin were attesting by their extension the growth of wealth, when a bad season, causing local distress and rendering many of the poor tenants incapable of paying the rents, the rate of which in their desperate competition for the land they had raised against themselves, brought on an agrarian agitation. Political incendiarism, Irish and American, pounced upon the movement for its own purposes, and the result has been an outbreak of murderous anarchy which has had the usual effect on commerce and the material prosperity of the country.

I am not one of those who believe that the defects of races are congenital or ineradicable: I regard them as the offspring of unpropitious circumstance, which more propitious circumstance may remove. But whatever the cause may be, whether it be an undue prolongation of the clan organization, or any other primeval accident, certain it is that the Celt, while gifted with a lively sociability and many graces, is politically weaker than the Teuton, and less capable of self-government. America sees this as well as Great Britain. Mommsen, who is a neutral in the Irish question, concludes his portrayal of the Celtic character with the harsh words "politically useless." The frenzy of hatred which Mr. Godkin himself ascribes to his compatriots, and the frantic language in which it finds vent, are signs not of force but of weakness, and for that very reason may not be so lasting as Mr. Godkin thinks. Is it very "pedagogic" to hold

that the Celt, in his progress towards self-government, requires to be supported and sometimes to be saved from his "frenzy" by a stronger arm? In the quality of independence it is impossible to doubt that the Irish Celt is wanting; for he allows himself to be bullied and fleeced from his cradle to his grave by priests and political swindlers, whose exactions are no small drawback on his chances of improving his material condition. I have said all along, and the demeanor of the neighborhood after the Joyce murder confirms me in the belief, that on the present occasion the mass of the people were the victims, not the agents, of the Terror, and that the blow which struck Terrorism down would set the people free.

The Roman Catholic religion has produced in all countries the same effect upon the character and the material condition of the people. The Church may be the door of salvation, but it is not the oracle of intelligence or thrift. Nor has aptitude for self-government been anywhere found in conjunction with such a belief as that of the Irish in the miracles wrought by plaster taken from the church of Knock. This may be said without denying that honor and sympathy are due to the Roman Catholic priests who were the spiritual guides and comforters of the Irish peasantry during centuries of darkness and distress. The British Government has introduced into Ireland an excellent system of national education which, unless all analogy misleads us, could never have been introduced by the clergy. I would invite Mr. Godkin, before he uses unmeasured language of censure, to compare the condition of Ireland in this respect with that of any other country at all similarly circumstanced in which the Roman Catholic priesthood has equal sway. For French Canada a British and Protestant partner has done pretty much what Great Britain has done for Ireland. In Spain, Southern Italy (at least till yesterday), and Mexico, no extraneous influence intervening, we have seen what the natural tendencies of Catholicism were. The Scotch Highlanders were in much the same condition as the Irish before Presbyterianism extended its influence to the Highlands.

That the course of Irish history has been most unfortunate, and that the greatest allowance is to be made on this account for anything that may be amiss in Irish character, no writer, I

believe, has taken greater pains to show than I have. The two main fountains of calamity, whose bitter waters have not yet ceased to flow, were mediaeval conquest and the religious wars of the Reformation, for neither of which is any living Englishman more responsible than he is for the events of the glacial period.

The conquest of Ireland was not English but Norman. It was a supplement of the Norman conquest of England, both in its aspect as an enterprise of military ambition and as a religious crusade undertaken at the instigation of the Papacy for the purpose of bringing a schismatic Church more completely under the dominion of Rome. It was doubly invited by the Irish themselves, the clergy having stretched out their hands to the Anglo-Norman ecclesiastics for aid against the impious aggressions of the chiefs, while Dermot, one of the chiefs, called in the fatal help of Strongbow to avenge his personal quarrel. It killed, so far as we can see, nothing of much value or promise, since the Church, the organ and the sole organ, at an earlier period, of a precociously brilliant civilization, had been trampled down by the barbarism of the clans whose anarchic conflicts filled, and would probably long have continued to fill, the scene. Mr. Godkin, I think, can hardly be serious in setting it down as one of the wrongs of Ireland that history will not recognize the primeval glories of Tara's Halls: it would be paying his race a poor compliment to suppose that they loved to be fed on blarney. Unluckily, while the Norman conquest of England was achieved by a king whose power suspended the anarchic tendencies of feudalism, and was thus rendered complete, the conquest of Ireland was left to private adventure under the auspices of feudal lords, the consequence of which was that the conquest of Ireland remained incomplete, and instead of a national aristocracy, destined afterwards to coalesce with the people, gave birth to a military colony or pale, between which and the natives who occupied the rest of the island there raged for centuries a deadly war of race, afterwards aggravated by a war of religion.

In the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Celtic Ireland was involved as a member of the Catholic Confederacy, and, being weak and remote from her allies, she

met the usual fate of the dwarf who goes to war as the companion of the giant. But she aided to the utmost of her power the attempt of the Catholic kings to extirpate Protestantism and liberty with the sword and the stake. She co-operated with the fitters-out of the Armada, she massacred the Protestants in 1645, she furnished soldiers to the persecuting armies of Louis XIV., she conspired with James II. against civil and religious liberty. The Protestants, after their narrow escape from the conspiracy, bound down the Catholics with cruel disabilities. The Catholics of the Continent meanwhile were burning Protestants alive; and toleration advancing with the eighteenth century had begun practically to mitigate the penal code before the *auto-da-fe* had ceased to be performed. An Irish army in the service of the Pope made the last stand against Italian independence, and public education in the United States is even now not wholly free from disturbance or menace on the part of the Irish Catholic Church.

Perhaps the blackest portion of this disastrous history are the restrictions imposed, before the Union, on Irish commerce, because these were the offspring of mere selfishness, unredeemed by any zeal for a principle. But they belonged to the general era of protection when the whole of Europe was possessed with that economical heresy, and when nobody found fault with Chatham, the champion of colonial liberty, for saying that he would not allow a colony to manufacture a nail for a horseshoe. Since the Union, England has opened to Ireland, with perfect freedom, the richest and best market in the world, which a severance of the Union would put it in her power, in case of unfriendly relations, again to close.

The abolition of the Irish Parliament in 1800 I cannot regard as a substantial wrong, tho it was done in the worst possible way. What that Parliament was, the Nationalist Sir Jonah Barrington has told us, and Mr. Godkin cannot question the truth of the description, tho he thinks it disingenuous in us to refer to it without saying that the English Parliament was as bad.. The British Parliament, however, tho vastly in need of reform, was nothing like as bad as that of Ireland: it would never have sold its own existence and that of the nation as the Parliament of Ireland did. Mr. Godkin has himself told us that

it "had only an idle, dissolute, and bigoted class behind it." The conclusive reason for not believing that it would, like the British Parliament, have improved with time, is the doom which it brought on itself. After twenty years of corruption, profligacy, and violence, its career closed in a hideous war of races and religions, in which it morally expired, nothing remaining between the country and the bloodiest anarchy but the military power of England. Pitt ought to have recognized the fact, and instead of buying with money and peerages the votes of scoundrels who had practically nothing but themselves left to sell, and thereby incurably tainting the transaction, to have done what Cromwell under similar circumstances did, and simply declared Ireland united to Great Britain.

The British nation obtained for itself self-government by the Reform Bill of 1832, before which the Parliament had been nominated by an oligarchy, not elected by the people. It fully imparted its recovered liberties to Ireland, who received her full share of representation, and towards whom from that hour legislation, whatever may have been its shortcomings, has been uniformly animated by a spirit of liberality, of kindness, and of remorseful anxiety to atone for the wrong-doings of the past. I well remember the emphasis with which a great French statesman, who, tho friendly enough to England, was no Anglo-maniac, asserted and repeated the assertion that the conduct of England to Ireland for thirty years had been admirable. This was before the disestablishment of the Protestant Church. If there is any fact on the other side, let it be pointed out. Coercion there has been, when anarchy broke out, but never, I suspect, coercion so vigorous as that which followed the Irish rising in New York. In an old country where the party of reaction is still strong, progress is slow ; it is slow for Great Britain as well as for Ireland : but it has been faster for Ireland than for England : Ireland had her national system of education some time before England had hers ; the State Church of Ireland has been abolished and perfect religious equality established, while in England the State Church still exists; and in regard to the Land question, the most momentous of all, changes have been made by successive Acts of Parliament in the interest of the tenant far in advance of anything that has been done for the

tenants in England, and such as would not be possible in the United States, where legislative breaking of contracts and sponging out of debts already due is precluded (wisely and righteously, as I believe) by a fundamental law. For disestablishment Mr. Godkin denies to Parliament any credit on the ground that the Irish people had never entered the churches which were disestablished; but on consideration he will find that beneath this stricture there lurks what the scoffers call a characteristic product of the Irish mind.

Mr. Godkin seems to think that Ireland might be contented if she were put on the same footing with regard to legislation as Scotland. She is already on the same footing as Scotland. The House of Commons makes by its rules no special arrangement for the benefit of the Scotch delegation. But the Scotchmen are not bushwhackers: they are solid, shrewd, and serious people: they choose to work parliamentary institutions rather than to wreck them; and by simply combining, where combination was necessary, in their special interest and acting cordially on all other matters with their colleagues, they have got everything which with any approach to unanimity they desired. Nothing hinders the Irish members from going into caucus on any Irish question but their own fierce dissensions which the House of Commons did not create and cannot heal.

The last move of the Irish members, at least of the Fenian section of them, which I would beg leave to remind Mr. Godkin hardly numbers more than thirty, has been a deliberate and avowed attempt to wreck Parliament by obstruction, for the purpose of bringing about Disunion. Would the people of the United States bear with tameness the attempt of a party, say, of "unreconstructed" Southerners to wreck Congress in the same way for the purpose of renewing Secession? Is not the British Parliament in repressing the Obstructionists by the clôture, by suspension, or by any other measure that may be needful, defending the very life of representative government? I do not trust much to the clôture, nor can I help thinking that in forcing on the House with the party whip a form of it to which the convictions of the majority are notoriously opposed, the Ministry is doing what is impolitic and wrong; but nobody will be gagged who makes an honest and loyal use of his power of speech.

In regard to administration Mr. Godkin thinks the case is as bad as in regard to legislation; the Government of Ireland, he avers, has been for the last eighty years the worst in Europe—worse than that of Spain, of Naples, of the Italian provinces of Austria, of the Christian provinces of Turkey. Once more I would call attention to the fact that Ulster is a part of Ireland. But even with respect to the Celtic provinces, apart from agrarian or disunionist agitation, and the temporary measures of repression which they entail, can Mr. Godkin's sweeping statement be sustained? Nobody taxes the government with corruption or with violence; the practical administration is almost entirely in the hands of natives, tho, as we saw in the case of Mr. Burke, their Irishry does not save them from assassination; the law is the same as that of England, and substantially the same as that of the United States; the judiciary is learned, respectable, and pure; if jury trial does not work well, it is because, like representative government, it has been given to the people in advance of their real fitness; the fiscal system is free trade; there are very good public schools, with every reasonable safeguard for conscience; the police is excellent, and Mr. Godkin is mistaken in imagining that, as a general rule, life and property are insecure; for statistics will show him that the average of ordinary crime is low. That the government has not for the last fifty years resorted to exceptional measures except when, and so long as, they appeared necessary for the repression of lawlessness, that it has never shown the slightest desire to encroach permanently on liberty, I am as firmly convinced as I am of any fact in history. It is preposterous to brand as despotism the force which a commonwealth threatened with civil war puts forth to save itself from disruption, and which twenty years ago was put forth on the most gigantic scale by the United States.

To Mr. Godkin it evidently appears an absurdity verging upon impudence to say that the same hands which have given Ireland the Land Act are ready to give her any rational and feasible measure of Home Rule. Yet nothing is more certain than that at the moment when all legislation was arrested by Obstruction the Liberal leaders were about to propose an extension of local self-government, in which Ireland would have had

her share. A Grand Committee of the House of Commons for Ireland is a plan which has sometimes presented itself among the possible solutions of the Irish problem. The objections are, first, the difficulty of making Grand Committees work at all under the party system, unless the majority of the committee is of the same party as the majority of the House; secondly, the awkwardness of assigning the local affairs of Scotland and Ireland to Grand Committees, and leaving the affairs of England to the House at large; thirdly, the heterogeneous character and mutual hostility of the elements, Catholic and Orange, of which the Grand Committee for Ireland would be composed; lastly, what is most serious, that, as institutions are apt to take their practical bent from the circumstances under which they are established and the hands into which they first fall, a Grand Committee for Ireland established at the present crisis and composed at the outset of the present Irish members would almost certainly be turned into an engine of secession. I have often wished, tho I fear the difficulty of fulfilling the wish is too great, to see Parliament hold an occasional session in Dublin, both for the purpose of informing itself more thoroughly about Irish questions and for that of letting the people see their government and paying homage to national feeling. But there is the will, if the way can be found, to make any concession compatible with the preservation of the legislative Union, the strain upon which would be eased by the extension of local self-government. That the legislative union should be deserted by British statesmen is not conceivable, far removed as we are from the Commonwealth. On both sides of the Atlantic, party has its evil and ignoble exigencies: it has already betrayed England into paying blackmail to Terrorism when a single hour of a patriotic Parliament would have abashed rebellion and at once put an end to the peril. There is a party among the English politicians which, partly under the influence of the Irish vote, has throughout screened and virtually abetted the Terrorists, and which would perhaps under the same influence be willing, for the purpose of retaining power, to tamper with the integrity of the Union. But I cannot believe that this party will be allowed to prevail: if I could I would almost as soon be a Mexican as an Englishman. To give up a part of the United King-

dom and to allow it to be made the seat of a hostile power which would have offshoots and outposts in every British city where there is an Irish colony, as well as in the United States, is surely a folly and a dishonor to which even the recklessness of faction can never make a nation stoop. An American protectorate of Ireland, which some people propose, will be possible after a conquest of Great Britain by American arms, as a Franco-British protectorate of a Southern confederacy, which was also projected, would have been possible after a conquest of the United States by the arms of France and England. Let American statesmen judge for themselves what interest they and their country have in giving Irish Catholicism a new basis and a stronger fulcrum for its operations against the fundamental principles of Anglo-American institutions.

"Part in peace" is Mr. Godkin's advice to Great Britain and Ireland. The same advice was tendered in another case, and was rejected with the best results not only to the nation immediately concerned but to humanity. Yet Slavery was at least as sharp and estranging a line of division as any which exists between the Irish Celts and the other people of the United Kingdom, with whom in fact, both in England and Scotland, the Irish Celts are largely blending. If the Irish Celt is irreconcilable he is doomed; for a high civilization assailed with dynamite and the Thug-knife, tho from constitutional scruple and sensibility to scandal it may hesitate to strike, will be compelled to strike at last. But the Irish Celt is not irreconcilable. Mr. Godkin, as has been said before, has in his eye only the cities of the United States where a fire fanned by politicians and conspirators is blazing and crackling among thorns. Where it is left to itself the feeling is not nearly so strong. Upon the Catholics of the upper classes in Ireland the Liberal policy of half a century has told, and they are now almost without exception opposed to revolution. The most eminent of them are decided Unionists. The Protestant gentry have always been on that side. Mr. Parnell is one of the smaller gentry, but there is a distance, which he is said pretty distinctly to mark, between him and any of his followers who, let me repeat, muster less than thirty in the House of Commons. Movements without any leaders of the higher class have seldom been successful. There

have been many notable conversions from the revolutionary ranks; among them Sir Charles Gavan Duffy, formerly editor of the *Nation*, D'Arcy McGee, who was murdered by the Fenians, and I believe I may add the great poet of the movement, the writer of "Who Fears to Speak of '98?" Mr. Godkin predicts that the bitterness of the Irish will increase instead of diminishing with their prosperity and education; such facts as have fallen under my own notice point rather the other way; but of this at all events I feel sure, that if the oratorical and literary expression of a vindictive sentiment increases with prosperity and education the tendency to fly to arms does not. A common language is a great assimilating force; and tho it is true (and I have myself more than once pointed it out as a dangerous feature of the present situation) that in the course of this protracted struggle a popular literature steeped in Disunionism has grown up, this literature is of a coarse character and will certainly be superseded in time by the higher, which breathes sentiments of the opposite kind. Mr. Godkin may have noticed that the police, which is almost entirely composed of Irishmen and largely of Roman Catholics, has remained perfectly true to the government; the brief dispute which occurred the other day about the rate of pay being one of those exceptions which prove the rule; and it has seldom happened that where popular feeling has been very intense a native police, or even a native army, has escaped infection. Nay, furiously secessionist as the utterances of the Parnellite members of Parliament are, there is some reason for surmising that these gentlemen secretly value their seats in the Imperial House of Commons, and that the fear of losing a position which they affect to abhor has had something to do with their recent display of comparative moderation. Nothing could be more fraught with Irish frenzy than a letter which at the commencement of the Land League agitation was published by one of our Irish Catholic prelates in Canada; but the same prelate has just been recounting, with the greatest complacency, his gratifying reception at the British Court. For Irish sentiment, of which I desire to speak with hearty sympathy and respect, there is room, as there is for Scotch sentiment, within the Union.

The fact is that the political revolution, tho to Mr. God-

kin, who is in the midst of the Fenians, it seems the principal movement, has ever since 1798 been extremely weak. It has never been able to generate a particle of military force ; its appearances in the field have always been the merest flashes in the pan. The agrarian movement, which touched the pockets of the people, has alone been really strong. Hence, among the political conspirators it has always been easy, as the New York *Evening Post* remarked the other day, to find any number of spies and informers ; while among the agrarian conspirators, the object being substantial and the feeling really intense, mutual fidelity has been strict. The present movement, so far as the people of Ireland are concerned, is almost purely agrarian, tho' the agrarian quarrel is no doubt in some degree envenomed by antipathy of race and religion. Only from its alliance with the Land League does Fenianism derive any strength, beyond the agencies of terrorism purchased with its own funds. The real centre of the political insurrection, as well as the main source of its supplies, is not in Ireland itself but in New York, where one of the leaders told us the other day that his motto was "dynamite first, last, and all the time." American Fenianism appears to be compounded in proportions, which it is difficult to determine, of Irish sentiment, Nihilism, and the tendency of certain active spirits to live, not by the sweat of their brows, but by the collection and administration of political funds. The chief of the whole, and the destined regenerator of his race, is described in a biographical notice which, if I guess rightly, is the work of a well-informed writer as having wandered through various callings and enterprises, including an unsuccessful attempt at journalism and two unsuccessful attempts at saloon-keeping, before he took to Dynamite. He and one of his principal associates were the other day publicly accusing each other of peculation, lying, and treachery, in language of Celtic fervency, and probably without any breach of veracity on either side. From the same sketch I learn that the *Irish World*, the great organ of Irish Nationalism, like many other properties of a confidential description, is in reality owned by a Jew. I should like to see the native American who believes that the Skirmishing Fund is going to give good government and happiness to Ireland.

That the troubles of Ireland are at an end I do not affect to believe. They will not be at an end till Parliament sets faction aside and shows patriotic spirit in dealing with a public peril. Such a policy as that embodied in the Arrears Act is successful for a time only. By the events of the last two years the respect of the people for contracts and law must have been severely shaken, the security of property impaired, and capital frightened away. It is not unlikely that the next general election may send, instead of twenty or thirty, sixty or seventy Fenians to the House of Commons, and the attempt to wreck Parliament may be renewed, with perhaps still more practical encouragement from English members owing their seats to the Irish vote. Still if we look back not for two years only, but for half a century, we shall see that progress has been made towards a just, beneficent, and voluntary Union. The present relapse, serious as it is, seems to owe its dangerous character not to causes operating in Ireland itself so much as to the machinations of American Fenianism, which have prevented the subsidence of the agrarian agitation. American Fenianism has been greatly developed of late, but it depends on subscriptions, the stream of which can hardly flow forever.

GOLDWIN SMITH.

THE EDUCATION OF THE WILL.

A CHIEF characteristic of contemporary psychology is to reduce most of the activities of the soul to some form of will. The more popular sayings of Schopenhauer, that the normal man is two thirds will and only one third intellect, of F. W. Robertson, that doing is an essential organ of knowing, of Matthew Arnold, that conduct is three fourths of life, or of Maudsley, that both history and character are written in the habits of muscles, which constitute about one half of the human body, and are pre-eminently the organs of the will—these now seem to many not more but less than the truth. We are told that belief is a function, or a part, or even a product of deliberated activity, that thought is repressed action, that attention is inner will, that reason is not only dominated by the will to think, but that thought-laws are no less necessarily will-laws, and sometimes that the aimless drift of all associative thinking, and even reverie, owes the impulse by which it passes from one notion to the next to a “spontaneous will.” Not only is logic subordinated to ethics, and the intellect, even its lower perceptive activities, reduced to practical activity, or motor innervation, but even the impulsive side is no less subordinated to will. Desire, we are told, is one concept getting ahead of the rest in the struggle for the highest clearness, and ripening into volition as the rest are more or less completely overcome. So, too, wishes, interests which preform the will and which must be carefully studied and inventoried in children as its prelusory forms, or as the forefeelings of not only their capacities but of their destinies, and even feeling, Wundt argues, is a process in the development of will.¹ Thus instead of Cicero's *vivere est cogitare* we might now say *vivere est velle*.

¹ See in this line, as perhaps the best of the Herbart-Beneke pedagogical literature, the excellent work of Dressler, *Ueber das Wesen u. Bildung des*

With all this we are not here concerned, save to point out a tendency of contemporary thought congenial to a practical country like our own, and of special import for teachers. We raise here no speculative issue, even with those who prefer to regard the will as a finished innate faculty, or as transcendental or noumenal, as substance, prototype, matter of all things, supporting the intellect, which is only accident, ectype, form, "as a stout blind beggar carries a dwarfed and crippled but seeing one," and its every act an absolute beginning. All we say is that, so far as the will of an individual in action may be regarded as made of or even conditioned by consolidated traces or residua of past volitions, so that in a sense we will with all we have willed, and in a direction which is the resultant of actual ideo-motor experience, so far its laws of growth may be best observed, and later best applied. Central as the will is now regarded, from whatever standpoint, a practical difference between it and the intellect is so distinct that even the three R's must, save in ideal schemes, long be taught in different ways as the one or the other is made the chief object of education. Indeed the intellect may be so trained as to enfeeble and dissipate the will, and it is because this is so widely seen and felt that it has come to be one of the chief endeavors of educational thought to-day to go deeper and to moralize as well as to mentalize children, and to develop will as a chief factor of *character*; a word which meant in the original Greek, first a dye or tool to stamp with, then the mark left by it, then fixed reliable traits.¹

From its nature too as well as from its central importance it might be easily shown, were there space, that the will is no less dependent on the culture it receives than the mind. It is fast becoming as absurd to suppose men can survive in the great practical strain to which American life subjects all who would succeed if the will is left to take its doubtful chances of training

Menschlichen Willens, in Diesterwegs Jahrbüche, 1861. Also Dittes: Naturlehre des Moralischen, u. Kunstlehre der Moralischen Erziehung. Leipzig, 1858. And Dr. F. M. Wendt, Die Willensbildung. Leipzig, 1875. C. Habel, Entwickelungs-geschichte des Willens. Leipzig, 1882. As well as in the general pedagogic treatise of Waitz, Strümpel and Kern.

¹ As to the meaning of the word "character," see suggestive remarks in Dr. A. Hagemann's brochure, Was ist Charakter u. wie kann er durch die Erziehung gebildet werden? Leipzig, 1881.

and discipline, as to suppose the mind develops in neglect. Our changed conditions make this chance of will-culture more doubtful than formerly. A generation or two ago most schoolboys had either farm work, chores, errands, jobs self-imposed, or required by less tender parents; they *made* things, either toys or tools, out of school. Most school-girls did house-work, more or less of which is like farm-work perhaps the most varied and most salutary as well as most venerable of all schools for the youthful body and mind. They undertook extensive works of embroidery, bed-quilting, knitting, sewing, mending, if not cleaning, and even spinning and weaving their own or others' clothing, and cared for the younger children. The wealthier devised or imposed tasks for will-culture, as the German crown prince has his children taught a trade as part of their education. Ten days at the hoe-handle, axe, or pitchfork, said an eminent educator lately in substance, with no new impression from without, and one constant and only duty, is a schooling in perseverance and sustained effort, such as few boys now get in any shape; while city instead of country life brings so many new, heterogeneous and distracting impressions of motion rather than rest, and so many privileges with so few corresponding duties, that with artificial life and bad air the will is weakened, and eupptic minds and stomachs on which its vigor so depends are too rare. Machines supersede muscles, and perhaps our athleticism gives skill too great preponderance over strength, or favors intense rather than constant, long-sustained, unintermittent energy. Perhaps too many of our courses of study are better fitted to turn out many-sided but superficial paragraphists than men who can lay deep plans, and subordinate many complex means to one remote end. Meanwhile, if there is any one thing of which our industries and practical arts are in more crying need than another, it is the old-fashioned virtue of thoroughness, of a kind and degree which does not address merely the eye, is not limited by the letter of a contract, but which has some regard for its products for their own sake and some sense for the future. Whether in science, philosophy, morals, or business, the fields for long-ranged, cumulative efforts are wider, more numerous, and far more needy than in the days when it was the fashion for men to contentedly concentrate

themselves to one vocation, life-work, or mission, or when cathedrals or other yet vaster public works were transmitted unfinished but ever advancing from one generation of men to another.

But great as is the need the practical difficulties in the way are very great. First, there are not only no good text-books but no good manuals to guide teachers. Some give so many virtues or good habits to be taught per term, ignoring the unity of virtue as well as the order in which the child's capacities for real virtue unfold. Advanced text-books discuss the grounds of obligation, the nature of choice or freedom or the hedonistic calculus, as if pleasures and pains could be balanced as measurable quantities, etc., so that philosophic morality is clearly not for children or teachers. Secondly, evolution encourages too often the doubt whether virtue can be taught, when it should have the opposite effect. Perversity and viciousness of will are too often treated as constitutional disease, and insubordination or obstinacy, especially in school, are secretly admired as strength, instead of being vigorously treated as crampy disorders of will, and the child is coddled into flaccidity. Because the lowest develops first, there is danger that it will interfere with the development of the higher, and thus, if left to his own, the child may come to have no will. The third and greatest difficulty is, that with the best effort to do so, few teachers can separate morality from religious creed. So vital is the religious sentiment here that it is hard to divorce the end of education from the end of life, proximate from ultimate grounds of obligation, or finite from infinite duties. Those whose training has been more religious than ethical can hardly teach morality *per se* satisfactorily to the *noli me tangere* spirit of denominational freedom, so wisely jealous of conflicting standards and sanctions for the young.

How then can we ever hope to secure proper training for the will? Two ways suggest themselves: First, we may try to assume, or tediously enucleate a consensus of religious truth as a basis of will-training, e.g., God and immortality, and, ignoring the minority who doubt these, vote them into the public school. Pedagogy has nothing whatever to say respecting the absolute truth or falsity of these ideas, but there is little doubt that they have an influence on the will, at a certain stage of

average development, greater and more essential than any other; so great that even were their vitality to decay like the faith in the Greek or German mythology, we should still have to teach God and a future life as the most imperative of all hypotheses in a field where, as in morals, nothing is so practical as a good theory; and we should have to fall to teaching the Bible as a moral classic, and cultivate a critical sympathy for its view of life. But this way ignores revelation and supernatural claims, while there are other objections to emancipating or "rescuing" the Bible from theology just yet. Indeed, the problem how to teach anything that the mind could not have found out for itself, but that had to be revealed, has not been solved by modern pedagogy, which, since Pestalozzi, has been more and more devoted to natural and developing methods. The latter teach that there must not be too much seed sown, too much or too high precept, or too much iteration, or that, in Jean Paul's phrase, the hammer must not rest on the bell, but only tap and rebound to bring out a clear tone. Again, a consensus of this content would either have to be carefully defined and would be too generic and abstract for school uses, or else differences of interpretation, which so pervade and are modified by character, culture, temperament, and feeling, would make the consensus itself nugatory. Religious training must be specific at first, and, omitting qualifications, the more explicit the denominational faith, the earlier religious motives may affect the will.

This is the way of our hopes, to the closer consideration of which we intend to return in the future, tho it must be expected that the happiest consensus will be long quarantined from most schools. Meanwhile a second way, however unpromising, is still open. Noble types of character may rest on only the native instincts of the soul or even on broadly interpreted utilitarian considerations; while if morality without religion were only a bloodless corpse or a plank in a shipwreck, there is now need enough for teachers to study its form, drift and uses by itself alone. This at least is our purpose here in considering the will and this only.

The only duty of small children is habitual and prompt obedience. Their will, purpose and even mood when alone is

fickle, fluctuating, contradictory. Our very presence imposes one general law on them, viz., that of keeping our good will and avoiding our displeasure. As the plant grows towards the light, so they unfold in the direction of our wishes, felt as by divination. They respect all you smile at, even buffoonery; look up in their play to call your notice, to study the lines of your sympathy, as if their chief vocation was to learn your desires. Their early lies are often saying what they think will please us, knowing no higher touchstones of truth. If we are careful to be wisely and without excess happy and affectionate when they are good, and saddened and slightly cooled in manifestations of love if they do wrong, the power of association in the normal eueptic child will early choose right as surely as pleasure increases vitality. If our love is deep, obedience is an instinct if not a religion. The child learns that while it cannot excite our fear, resentment or admiration, etc., it can act on our love, and this should be the first sense of its own efficiency. Thus too it first learns that the way of passion and impulse is not the only rule of life, and that something is gained by resisting them. It imitates our acts long before it can understand our words. As if it felt its insignificance, and dreaded to be arrested in some lower phase of its development, its instinct for obedience becomes almost a passion. As the vine must twine or grovel so the child comes unconsciously to worship idols, and imitates bad patterns and examples in the absence of worthy ones. He obeys as with a deep sense of being our chattel, and at bottom admires those who coerce him, if the means be wisely chosen. The authority must, of course, be ascendancy over heart and mind. The more absolute such authority the more the will is saved from caprice and feels the power of steadiness. Such authority excites the unique unfathomable sense of reverence, which measures the capacity for will-culture, and is the strongest and soundest of all moral motives. It is also the most comprehensive, for it is first felt only towards persons, and personality is a vinculum, enabling any number of complex elements to act or be treated as 'a whole, as everything does and is in the child's soul, instead of in isolation and detail. In the feeling of respect culminating in worship almost all educational motives are involved, but especially those

which alone can bring the will to maturity; and happy the child who is bound by the mysterious and constraining sympathy of dependence, by which, if unblighted by cynicism, a worthy mentor directs and uplifts the will. This unconscious reflection of our character and wishes is the diviner side of childhood, by which it is quick and responsive to everything in its moral environment. The child may not be able to tell whether its teacher often smiles, dresses in this way or that, speaks loud or low, has many rules or not, tho every element of her personality affects him profoundly. His acts of will have not been *choices*, but a far greater mass of psychic causes than consciousness can estimate have laid a basis of character, than which heredity alone is deeper, before the child knows he has a will. These influences are not transient but life-long, for if the conscious and intentional may anywhere be said to be only a superficial wave over the depths of the unconscious it is in the sphere of will-culture.

But command and obedience must also be specific to supplant nature. Here begins the difficulty. A young child can know no general commands. "Sit in your chair," means sit a moment, as a sort of trick, with no prohibition to stand the next instant. Any just-forbidden act may be done in the next room. All is here and now, and patient reiteration, till habit is formed, and no havoc-making rules which it cannot understand or remember, is our cue. Obedience can, however, be instant even here, and is its chief virtue, and there is no more fear of weakening the will by it than in the case of soldiers. As the child grows old, however, and as the acts commanded are repugnant or unusual, there should be increasing care, lest authority is compromised, sympathy ruptured, or lest mutual timidity and indecision, if not mutual insincerity and dissimulation, as well as parodied disobedience, etc., to test us, result. We should of course watch for favorable moods, assume no unwonted or preternatural dignity or owlish air of wisdom, and command in a low voice which does not too rudely break in upon the child's train of impressions. The acts we command or forbid should be very few at first, but inexorable. We should be careful not to forbid where we cannot follow an untrusty child, or what we cannot prevent. Our own will should be a

rock and not a wave. Our requirements should be uniform with no whim, mood, or periodicity of any sort about them. If we alternate from caresses to severity, are fickle and capricious instead of commanding by a fixed and settled plan, if we only now and then take the child in hand so he does not know precisely what to expect, we really require the child to change its nature with every change in us, and well for the child who can defy such a changeable authority, which not only unsettles but breaks up character anew when it is just beginning to insipidate. Neglect is better than this, and fear of inconsistency of authority makes the best parents often jealous of arbitrariness in teachers. Only thus can we develop general habits of will and bring the child to know general maxims of conduct inductively, and only thus by judicious boldness and hardihood in command can we bring the child to feel the conscious strength that comes only from doing unpleasant things. Even if instant obedience be only external at first, it will work inward, for moods are controlled by work, and it is only will which enlarges the bounds of personality.

Yet we must not forget that even morality is relative, and is one thing for adults and often quite another for children. The child knows nothing of absolute truth, justice, or virtues. The various stimuli of discipline are to enforce the higher tho weaker insights the child has already unfolded, rather than to engraff entirely unintuited good. The command must find some ally, feeble tho it be, in the child's own soul. We should strive to fill each moment with as little sacrifice or subordination as mere means or conditions to the future as possible, for fear of affection and insincerity. But yet the harder and sounder the nature, the more we may address training to barely nascent intuitions, with a less ingredient of immediate satisfaction, and the deeper the higher element or interest will be grounded in the end. The child must find as he advances towards maturity that every new insight or realization of his own reveals the fact that you have been there before with commands, cultivating sentiments and habits, and not that he was led to mistake your convenience or hobby for duty, or failed to temper the will by temporizing with it. The young are apt to be most sincere at an age when they are also most mistaken, but if sincerity be kept

at its deepest and best, error will be least harmful and easiest overcome. If authority supplant rather than supersede good motives, the child will so love authority as to overcome your reluctance to apply it directly, and as a final result will choose in its slowly-widening margin of freedom the state and act you have pre-formed, and will be all the less liable to undue subservience to priest or boss or fashion or tradition later, as obedience gives place to normal, manly independence.

In these and many other ways everything in conduct should be mechanized as early and completely as possible. The child's notion of what is right is what is habitual, and the simple, to which all else is reduced in thought, is identified with the familiar. It is this primitive stratum of habits which principally determines our deepest beliefs—which all must have over and above knowledge—to which men revert in mature years from youthful vagaries. If good acts are a diet and not a medicine, are repeated over and over again, as every new beat of the loom pounds in one new thread, and a sense of justice and right is wrought into the very nerve-cells and fibres; if this ground texture of the soul, this "memory and habit plexus," this sphere of thoughts we oftenest think and acts we oftenest do, is early, rightly and indiscreetly wrought, not only does it become a web of destiny for us, so all-determining is it, but we have something perdurable to fall back on if moral shock or crisis or change or calamity shall have rudely broken up the whole structure of later associations. Not only the more we mechanize thus the more force of soul is freed for higher work, but we are insured against emergencies in which the choice and deed is likely to follow the nearest motive, or that which acts quickest, rather than to pause and be influenced by higher and perhaps intrinsically stronger motives. Reflection always brings in a new set of later-acquired motives and considerations, and if these are better than habit-mechanism then pause is good; if not, he who deliberates is lost. Our deliberate volitions are very few compared with the long series of desires, acts and reactions, often contradictory, many of which were never conscious, and many once willed but now lapsed to reflexes, the traces of which, crowding the unknown margins of the soul, constitute the elements of the conscious will.

It is only so far as this primitive will is wrong by nature or training that drastic reconstructions of any sort are needed. Only those who mistake weakness for innocence, or simplicity for candor, or forget that childish faults are no less serious because minimal, deny the at least occasional depravity of all children, or fail to see that fear and pain are among the indispensables of education, while a parent, teacher, or even a God, all love weakens and relaxes the will. Children do not cry for the alphabet, the multiplication table is more like medicine than confectionery, and it is only affected thoroughness that omits all that is hard. "The fruits of learning may be sweet, but its roots are always bitter," and it is this alone that makes it possible to strengthen the will while instructing the mind. The well-schooled will comes, like Herder, to scorn the luxury of knowing without the labor of learning. We must anticipate the future penalties of sloth as well as of badness. The will especially is a trust we are to administer for the child, not as he may now wish, but as he will wish when more mature. We must now compel what he will later wish to compel himself to do. To find his habits already formed to the same law that his mature will and the world later enjoin, cements the strongest of all bonds between mentor and child. Nothing, however, must be so individual as punishment. For some a threat at rare intervals is enough, while for others, however ominous they may be, they become at once "like scarecrows, on which the foulest birds soonest learn to perch." To scold well and wisely is an art by itself. For some children pardon is the worst punishment; for others, ignoring or neglect; for others, isolation from others, suspension from duties; for others, seclusion—which last, however, is for certain ages beset with extreme danger—and for still others, shame from being made conspicuous. Mr. Spencer's "natural penalties" can be applied to but few kinds of wrong, and those not the worst. Bassedow tied boys who fell into temptation to a strong pillar; if stupid and careless, put on a fool's cap and bells; if they were proud, they were suspended near the ceiling in a basket, as Aristophanes represented Socrates. Two boys who quarrelled were made to look into each other's eyes before the school till their angry expressions gave way before the general sense of the ridiculous. This is more

ingenious than wise. The object of discipline is to avoid punishment, but even flogging should never be forbidden. It may be reserved like a sword in its scabbard, but should not get so rusted in that it cannot be drawn on occasion. The law might even limit the size and length of the rod and place of application, as in Germany, but it should be of no less liberal dimensions here than there. Punishment should, of course, be minatory and reformatory, and not vindictive, and we should not forget that certainty is more effective than severity, nor that it is apt to make motives sensuous, and delay the psychic restraint which should early preponderate over the physical. But will-culture for boys is rarely as thorough as it should be without more or less flogging. I would not, of course, urge the extremes of the past. The Spartan beating as a gymnastic drill to toughen, the severity which prevailed in Germany for a long time after its Thirty Years' War,¹ the former fashion in so many English schools of walking up not infrequently to take a flogging as a plucky thing to do, and with no notion of disgrace attaching to it, shows at least an admirable strength of will. Severe constraint gives poise, inwardness, self-control, inhibition, and *noluntas*, if not *voluntas*, while the now too common habit of coquetting for the child's favor, and tickling its ego with praises and prizes and pedagogic pettifogging for its good will, and sentimental fear of a judicious slap to rouse a spoiled child with no will to break to make it keep step with the rest in conduct, instead of delaying a whole school-room to apply a subtle psychology of motives on it, is bad. This reminds one of the Brahmin who sweeps the ground before him lest he should unconsciously tread on a worm. Possibly it may be well, as Schleier-

¹ Those interested in school statistics may value the record kept by a Swabian schoolmaster named Hauberle, extending over fifty-one years and seven months' experience as a teacher, as follows: 911,527 blows with a cane; 124,010 with a rod; 20,989 with a ruler; 136,715 with the hand; 10,295 over the mouth; 7905 boxes on the ear; 1,115,800 snaps on the head; 22,763 *nota benes* with Bible, catechism, hymn-book, and grammar; 777 times boys had to kneel on peas; 613 times on triangular blocks of wood; 5001 had to carry a timber-mare; and 1701 hold the rod high, the last two being punishments of his own invention. Of the blows with the cane 800,000 were for Latin vowels, and 76,000 of those with the rod, Bible verses and hymns. He used a scolding vocabulary of over 3000 terms, of which one third were of his own invention.

macher suggests, not to repress some one nascent bad act in some natures, but let it and the punishment ensue for the sake of Dr. Spanckster's tonic. Dermal pain is not the worst thing in the world, and, by a judicious knowledge of how it feels at both ends of the rod, by flogging and being flogged, far deeper pains may be forefended. Insulting defiance, deliberate disobedience, ostentatious carelessness and bravado, are diseases of the will, and, in very rare cases of Promethean obstinacy, the severe process of breaking the will is needful, just as in surgery it is occasionally needful to rebreak a limb wrongly set, or deformed, to set it over better. It is a cruel process, but a crampy will in childhood means moral traumatism of some sort in the adult. Few parents have the nerve to do this, or the insight to see just when it is needed. It is, as some one has said, like knocking a man down to save him from stepping off a precipice. Even the worst punishments are but very faint types of what nature has in store in later life for some forms of perversity of will, and are better than sarcasm, ridicule, or tasks, as penalties. The strength of obstinacy is admirable, and every one ought to have his own will; but a false direction, tho almost always the result of faulty previous training, when the soul was more fluid and mobile, is all the more fatal. While so few intelligent parents are able to refrain from the self-indulgence of too much rewarding or giving, tho it injures the child, it is perhaps too much to expect the hardihood which can be justly cold to the caresses of a child who seeks, by displaying all its stock of goodness and arts of endearment, to buy back good-will after punishment has been deserved. If we wait too long, and punish in cold blood, a young child may hate us, while, if we punish on the instant, and with passion, a little of which is always salutary, on the principle, *ohne Affect kein Effect*, an older child may fail of the natural reactions of conscience, which should always be secured. The maxim, *summum jus summa injuria*, we are often told, is peculiarly true in school, and so it is; but to forego all punishment is no less injustice to the average child, for it is to abandon one of the most effective means of will-culture. We never punish but a part, as it were, of the child's nature; he has lied, but is not therefore a liar, and we deal only with the specific act, and must love all the rest of him.

And yet, after all, indiscriminate flogging is so bad, and the average teacher is so inadequate to that hardest and most tactful of all his varied duties, viz., selecting the right out-crop of the right fault of the right child at the right time and place, mood, etc., for best effect, that the bold statement of such principles as above is perhaps not entirely without practical danger, especially in two cases which Madame Necker and Sigismund have pointed out, and several cases of which the present writer has notes. First, an habitually good child sometimes has a saturnalia of defiance and disobedience; a series of insubordinate acts are suddenly committed which really mark the first sudden epochful and belated birth of the instinct of independence and self-regulation, on which his future manliness will depend. He is quite irresponsible, it is never repeated, and very lenient treatment causes him, after the conflict of tumultuous feelings has expanded his soul, to react healthfully into habitual docility again if some small field for independent action be at once opened him. The other case is that of *ennui*, of which children suffer such nameless qualms. When I should open half a dozen books, start for a walk, and then turn back, wander about in mind or body, seeking but not finding content in anything, a child in my mood will wish for a toy, an amusement, food, a rare indulgence, only to neglect or even reject it petulantly when granted. These flitting "will-spectres" are physical, are a mild form of the many fatal dangers of fatigue, and punishment is the worst of treatment. Rest or diversion is the only cure, and the teacher's mind must be fruitful of purposes to that end. Perhaps a third case for palliative treatment is, those lies which attend the first sense of badness. The desire to conceal it occasionally accompanies the nascent effort to reform and make the lie true. These cases are probably rare, while the temptation to lie is far greater for one who does ill than for one who does well, for fear is the chief motive, and a successful lie which concealed would weaken the desire to cure a fault.¹

¹ On the topic of this paragraph there is a voluminous literature in German. The reader may like to consult the following pamphlets and books:

Dr. L. Wiese: Die Bildung des Willens. 4te Auflage, Berlin, 1879.

We have thus far spoken of obedience, and come now to the later necessity of self-guidance, which, if obedience has wrought its perfect work, will be natural and inevitable. It is very hard to combine reason and coercion, yet it is needful that children think themselves free long before we cease to determine them. As we slowly cease to prescribe and begin to inspire, a very few well-chosen mottos, proverbs, maxims, should be taught very simply, so they will sink deep. Education has been defined as working against the chance influences of life, and it is certain that without some precepts and rules the will will not exert itself. If reasons are given, and energy is much absorbed in understanding, the child will assent, but will not do. If the mind is not strong, many wide ideas are very dangerous. Strong wills are not fond of arguments, and if a young person falls to talking or thinking beyond his experience, subjective or objective, both conduct and thought are soon confused by chaotic and incongruous opinions and beliefs, and false expectations, which are the very seducers of the will, arise. There can be little will-training by words, and the understanding cannot realize the ideals of the will. All great things are dangerous, as Plato said, and the truth itself is not only false but actually immoral to unexpanded minds. Will-culture is intensive, not extensive, and the writer knows a case in which even a vacation ramble with a moralizing rabulist has undermined the work of years. Our precepts must be made very familiar, copiously illustrated, well wrought together by habit and attentive thought, and above all clear cut, that the pain of violating them may be sharp and poignant. Vague and too general precepts beyond the horizon of the child's real experience do not haunt him if they are outraged.

Th. Weber: *Die Lüge des Kindes und ihre Behandlung.* Halle, 1881. And Heinroth, *Die Lüge.*

Ed. Jordan: *Die körperliche Züchtigung.* Wien, 1881.

A. H. Weinhold: *Die hauptsächlichsten Quellen, aus denen die Fehler der Kinder entspringen.* In *Strümpel's Päd. Abhandlungen*, III. Heft. Leipzig, 1877.

K. Pfirsches: *Erziehung zur sittlichen Selbständigkeit.* Breslau, 1876.

J. Christinger: *Die ethische Aufgabe der Schule.* Frauenfeld, 1879.

A. W. Grube: *Von der sittlichen Bildung der Jugend.* Leipzig, 1855.

To these and many others the writer is indebted.

Now the child must obey these, and will if he has learned to obey well the commands of others. One of the best sureties that he will do so is muscle-culture, for if the latter are weaker than the nerves and brain, the gap between knowing and doing appears and the will stagnates. Gutsmuths, the father of gymnastics in Germany before Jahn, used to warn men not to fancy that the few tiny muscles that moved the pen or tongue had power to elevate men. They might titillate the soul with words and ideas, but rigorous, symmetrical muscle-culture alone, he and his Turner societies believed, could regenerate the Fatherland, for it was one thing to paint the conflict of life, and quite another to bear arms in it. They said, "The weaker the body the more it commands; the stronger it is the more it obeys."

In this way we shall have a strong, well-knit soul-texture made up of volitions and ideas like warp and woof. Mind and will will be so compactly organized that all their forces can be brought to a single point. Each concept or purpose will call up those related to it, and once strongly set toward its object the soul will find itself borne along by unexpected forces. This power of totalizing, rather than any transcendent relation of elements, constitutes at least the practical unity of the soul, and this unimpeded association of its elements is true or inner freedom of will. Nothing is wanting or lost when the powers of the soul are mobilized for a great task, and its substance is impervious to passion. With this organization men of really little power accomplish wonders. Without it great minds are confused and lost. They have only *vellicity* or caprice. The will makes a series of vigorous, perhaps almost convulsive, but short inconsistent efforts. As Jean Paul says, there is sulphur, charcoal, and saltpetre in the soul, but powder is not made, for they never find each other. To understand this will-plexus is preëminent among the new demands now laid on educators.

But altho this focalizing power of acting with the whole rather than with a part of the soul, gives independence of many external, conventional proximate standards of conduct, deepening our interests in life, and securing us against disappointment by defining our expectations; while such a sound and simple will-philosophy is proof against considerable shock and has firmness of texture enough to bear much responsibility, there is, of

course, something deeper, without which all our good conduct is more or less hollow. This is, of course, that better purity established by mothers in the plastic heart, before the superfoetation of precept is possible, or even before the "soul takes flight in language," or perhaps pre-natal or hereditary. Much every way depends on how aboriginal our goodness is, whether the will acts with effort, as we solve an intricate problem in solitude, or as we say the multiplication table, which only much distraction can confuse, or as we repeat the alphabet, which the din of battle could not hinder. Later and earlier training should harmonize with each other and with nature. Thrice happy he who is so wisely trained that he comes to believe he believes what his soul deeply does believe, to say what he feels and feel what he really does feel, and chiefly whose express volitions square with the profounder drift of his will as the resultant of all he has desired or wished, expected, attended to or striven for. When such an one comes to his moral majority by standing for the first time upon his own careful conviction, against the popular cry, or against his own material interests or predacious passions, and feels the constraint and joy of pure obligation which comes up from this deep source, a new, original force is brought into the world of wills. Call it inspiration, or Kant's transcendental impulse above and outside of experience, or Spencer's deep reverberations from a vast and mysterious past of compacted ancestral experiences, the most concentrated, distilled and instinctive of all psychic products, and as old as Mr. Tyndall's "fiery cloud," the name or even source is little. We would call it the purest, freest, most prevailing, because most inward, will or conscience.

This free, habitual guidance by the highest and best, by conviction with no sense of compulsion or obligation, is an impractical if not dangerous ideal, for it can be actually realized only by the rarest moral genius. For most of us the best education is that which makes us the best and most obedient servants. This is the way of peace and the way of nature, for even if we seriously try to keep up a private conscience at all, apart from feeling, faction, party or class spirit, or even habit, which are our habitual guides, the difficulties are so great that most hasten, more or less consciously and voluntarily, to put

themselves under authority again, reserving only the smallest margin of independence in material interests, choice of masters, etc., and yielding to the pleasing and easy illusion that inflates the minimum to seem the maximum of freedom, and uses the noblest ideal of history, viz., that of pure autonomous oughtness, as a pedestal for idols of selfishness, caprice and conceit. The trouble is in interpreting these moral instincts, for even the authorities lack the requisite self-knowledge in which all wisdom culminates. The moral interregnum which the *Aufklarung* has brought will not end till these instincts are rightly interpreted by intelligence. The richest streams of thought must flow about them, the best methods must peep and pry till their secrets are found and put into the idea-pictures in which most men think.

This brings us, finally, to the highest and also most immediately practical method of moral education, viz., training the will by and for intellectual work. Youth and childhood must not be subordinated as means to maturity. Learning is more useful than knowing. It is the way and not the goal, the work and not the product, the acquiring and not the acquisition, that educates will and character. To teach only results, which are so simple, without methods by which they were obtained, which are so complex and hard, to develop the sense of possession without the strain of activity, to teach great matters too easily or even as play, to always wind along the lines of least resistance into the child's mind, is simply to add another and most enervating luxury to child-life. Only the sense and power of effort, which made Lessing prefer the search to the possession of truth, which trains the will in the intellectual field, which is becoming more and more the field of its activity, counts for character and makes instruction really educating. This makes mental work a series of acts, or living thoughts, and not merely words. Real education, that we can really teach, and that which is really most examinable, is what we do, while those who acquire without effort may be extremely instructed without being truly educated. It is those who have been trained to put forth mental power that come to the front later, while it is only those whose acquisitions are not transpeciated into power who are in danger of early collapse.

It is because of this imperfect appropriation through lack of volitional reaction that mental training is so often dangerous, especially in its higher grades. Volitional recollection or forcing the mind to reproduce a train of impressions strengthens what we may call the mental will; while if multifarious impressions which excite at the time are left to take their chances, at best fragmentary reproduction, incipient amnesia, the prelude of mental decay may be soon detected. Few can endure the long working over of ideas, especially if at all fundamental, which is needful to full maturity of mind, without grave moral danger. New standpoints and ideas require new combinations of the mental elements, with constant risk that during the process, what was already secured will fall back into its lower components. Even our immigrants suffer morally from the change of manners and customs and ideas, and yet education means change; the more training the more change, as a rule, and the more danger during the critical transition period while we oscillate between control by old habits, or association within the old circle of thought, and by the new insights, as a medical student often suffers from trying to bring the regulation of his physical functions under new and imperfect hygiene insights. Thus most especially if old questions, concerning which we have long since ceased to trust ourselves to give reasons, need to be reopened, there is especial danger that the new equilibrium about which the dynamic is to be re-resolved into static power will be established, if at all, with loss instead of with gain. Indeed, it is a question not of schools but of civilization, whether mental training, from the three R's to science and philosophy, shall really make men better, as the theory of popular education assumes, and whether the genius and talent of the few who can receive and bear it can be brought to the full maturity of knowledge fully facultized—a question paramount, even in a republic, to the general education of the many.

The illusion is that beginnings are hard. They are easy. Almost any mind can advance a little ways into almost any subject. The feeblest youth can push on briskly a little ways into a new subject, but he forgets, and so does the examiner who marks him, that difficulties increase not in arithmetical but in almost geometrical ratio as he advances. A pass mark, say of

fifty, should be given not for mastery of the first half of the book, or for a knowledge of half the matter in it, but for that of three fourths or more. Suppose he choose the easier method of tattooing his mind by attaining the easy early stages of proficiency in many subjects, as is possible and even encouraged in too many of our school and college curricula, he weakens the will-quality of his mind. Smattering is dissipation of energy. Only great, concentrated and prolonged efforts in one direction really train the mind, because only they train the will beneath it. Many little, heterogeneous efforts of different sorts, as some one has said in substance, leave the mind like a piece of well-used blotting paper, and the will like a rubber band stretched to flaccidity around one after another bundle of objects too large for it to clasp into unity. In der Beschränkung zeigt sich der Meister: all-sidedness through one-sidedness; by staking the horse or cow out in the spring-time, till he gnaws his small allotted circle of grass *to the ground*, and not by roving and cropping at will, can he be taught that the sweetest joint is nearest the root;—are convenient symbols of will-culture in the intellectual field. Even a long cram if only on one subject, which brings out the relations of the parts, or a “one-study college” as is already devised in the West, or the combination of several subjects even in primary-school grades into a “concentration series,” as devised by Ziller and Rein, the university purpose as defined by Zeller, of so combining studies that each shall stand in the course next to that with which it is inherently closest connected by matter and method, or the requirements of one central and two collateral branches for the doctorate examination;—all these devices no doubt tend to give a sense of efficiency, which is one of the deepest and proudest joys of life, in the place of a sense of possession so often attended by the exquisite misery of conscious weakness. The unity of almost any even ideal purpose is better than none if it tend to check the superficial one of learning to repeat again or of boxing the whole compass of sciences and liberal arts as so many of our high-schools or colleges attempt.

Finally, in the sphere of mental productivity and originality, a just preponderance of the will-element makes men distrust new insights, quick methods, and short cuts, and trust chiefly to

the genius of honest and sustained work, in power of which perhaps lies the greatest intellectual difference between men. When ideas are ripe for promulgation they have been condensed and concentrated, thought traverses them quickly and easily—in a word, they have become practical, and the will that waits over a new idea patiently and silently without anxiety, even tho with a deepening sense of responsibility, till all sides have been seen, all authorities consulted, all his latent mental reserves heard from, is the man who “talks with the rifle and not with the water hose,” or, in a rough farmer’s phrase, “boils his words till he can give his hearers sugar and not sap.” Several of the more important discoveries of the present generation, which cost many weary months of toil, have been enumerated in a score or two of lines, so that every experimenter could set up his apparatus and get the results in a few minutes. Let us not forget that in most departments of mental work the more we revise and reconstruct our thought, the longer we inhibit its final expression, the oftener we return to it refreshed from other interests, the clearer and more permeable for other minds it becomes, because the more it tends to express itself in terms of willed action, which is “the language of complete men.”

G. STANLEY HALL.

THE SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY, AS CONTRASTED WITH THE GERMAN.

IT is not very difficult to recognize a Scotchman wherever you happen to meet with him. He has stout, bony limbs, and stands well upon his feet ; he is canny, that is, cautious, otherwise he would not be a Scotchman ; but he is considerably independent, and can resist attack, his motto being “ *Nemo me impune lacescit* ;” he is firm, not to say obstinate, especially if he is from the Highlands, whose rocks and mountains he takes as his models ; he boasts that his ancestors could not be conquered even by the Romans, when they subdued all other people of Europe and western Asia—except the Arabs. He is naturally quiet and submissive to circumstances, but is capable of being roused, like the Yankee, whom he somewhat resembles, into intense enthusiasm, as has been shown in his contests with England, and generally in his fights for the independence of his country and of his church. He uses a softer, broader speech than the English, coming more from the mouth and less from the throat ; and he can make his meaning clear and carry it into practical effect. I mention these things because no man can understand the Scottish philosophy without knowing the Scotch character, of which it is a reflection and a picture.

I am not to dwell on its history, which dates from the second quarter of last century, when it came out of the school of Locke and of Berkeley. It started as a distinct school, with Francis Hutcheson of Glasgow (1694–1746), one of the most successful teachers of his age, and with Turnbull of Aberdeen (the teacher of Reid) (A.D. 1698–1748) ; but its true representative is Thomas Reid (1710–1796), first of Aberdeen and then of Glasgow, who gave to it its specific character. Adam Smith (1723–1790), the founder of political economy, belongs to the same school. In the succeeding ages we have Beattie the poet (1735–

1802); Campbell, the author of the *Philosophy of Rhetoric* (1719–1796); and more influential than either, Dugald Stewart (1753–1828), who trained so many distinguished pupils, and by his wisdom and the elegance of his style did so much to introduce the philosophy into England. There followed Thomas Brown (1778–1820), who so attracted young men by his rhetoric and his ingenuity, and who sought to bring about a marriage between the Scottish and the French schools. Next to Reid the most powerful member of the school is Sir W. Hamilton (1791–1856), so distinguished as a scholar and a logician, who sought, not always successfully, to unite the forms of Kant with the observations of Reid. The philosophy of Reid and Stewart had a salutary influence in France the end of last century and the beginning of this, where it helped to form the philosophy of Jouffroy and Cousin, and checked the sensationalism of Condillac and Helvetius. It can be shown that the Scottish philosophy has had more influence direct and indirect in America than any other for the past century and a half, both in colleges and in the churches, but is now giving way to other systems partly German, and partly English as led by John S. Mill, Lewes, and Herbert Spencer. In the land of its birth it is not particularly strong at this present moment, being opposed by the materialism of Bain and the Hegelianism of Merton College, Oxford, and of Prof. Edward Caird of Glasgow; but it has two genuine representatives in Prof. Calderwood and Prof. Flint of the University of Edinburgh.

But I do not profess in this paper to give a history of the school; my aim is to sketch its characteristics, which are very marked.

I.

It proceeds throughout by observation. It has all along professed a profound reverence for Bacon, and in its earliest works it attempted to do for metaphysics what Newton had done for physics. It begins with facts and ends with facts. Between, it has analyses, generalizations, and reasonings; but all upon the actual operations of the mind. Its laws are suggested by facts and are verified by facts. It sets out, as Bacon recommends, with the necessary “rejections and exclusions,” with what

Whewell calls the "decomposition of facts," but all to get at the exact facts it means to examine. Its generalizations are formed by observing the points in which the operations of the mind agree, and it proceeds gradually,—*gradatim*, as Bacon expresses it,—rising from particulars to generals, and from lower to higher laws. It is afraid of rapid and high speculation, lest it carry us like a balloon, not into the heavens, but a cloud, where it will explode sooner or later. It is suspicious of long and complicated ratiocinations like those of Spinoza and Hegel, for it is sure—such is human fallibility—that there will lurk in them some error or defect in the premise, or some oversight or weak link in the process weakening the whole chain. Thomas Reid was not sure whether Samuel Clarke's demonstration of the existence of God was more distinguished for ingenuity than sublimity. Bacon had said that philosophic speculation needs weights rather than wings. Reid thought that philosophy had been injured rather than promoted by the genius of its investigators. The philosophy of Scotland might take as its motto the doggerel of its great poet, "facts are chieles that winna ding." It has to be added that the Scottish school uses deduction, but rather sparingly, and only after it has got its premises by a previous induction; and it refuses all wire-drawn conclusions.

But while the Scottish school held by the principle of induction, in common with Newton and all inquirers into material phenomena, it had other two principles by which it separated from all physicists.

II.

It observes the operations of the mind by the inner sense—that is, consciousness. In this philosophy consciousness, the perception of self in its various states, comes into greater prominence than it had ever done before. Bacon did not appreciate its importance; he recommended in the study of the human mind the gathering of instances, to be arranged in tables, of memory, judgment, and the like. Descartes appealed to consciousness, but only to get a principle such as *cogito*, to be used in deduction, *ergo sum*, arguing that there is an infinite, a perfect. Locke was ever appealing to internal observation, but it was to support a preconceived theory that all our ideas are derived from

sensation and reflection. Turnbull and Hutcheson and Reid were the first to avow and declare that the laws of the human mind were to be discovered only by internal observation, and that mental philosophy consisted solely in the construction of these. They held that consciousness, the internal sense, was as much to be trusted as the external senses; and that as we can form a natural philosophy out of the facts furnished by the one, we can construct a mental philosophy by the facts furnished by the other. They held resolutely that the eye cannot see our thoughts and feelings even when aided by the microscope or telescope. They were sure that no man ever grasped an idea by his muscular power, tasted the beauty of a rose or lily, smelt an emotion, or heard the writhings of the conviction of conscience. But they thought that the mind could observe the world within by consciousness more directly and quite as accurately as it could observe the world without by sight, touch, and the other senses, and could in the one case as in the other make a scientific arrangement of its observations and construct a science.

III.

By observation principles are discovered which are above observation, universal and eternal. All the genuine masters and followers proceed on this principle, and apply it more or less successfully. I am not sure that they have expressly avowed it and explicitly stated it. I am responsible for the form which is given it at the head of this paragraph. No man can understand or appreciate or do justice to the philosophy of Scotland who does not notice it as running through and through their whole investigations and conclusions. It was in this way that Reid opposed Hume. It was in this way that Dugald Stewart, and indeed the whole school, sought to lay a foundation on which all truth might be built. They were fond of representing the principles as fundamental, and they guarded against all erroneous, against all extravagant and defective statements and applications of them, by insisting that they be shown to be in the constitution of the mind, and that their nature be ascertained before they are employed in speculation of any kind. By insisting on this restriction, their mode of procedure has been de-

scribed as timid, and their results as mean and poor, by those speculators who assume a principle without a previous induction, and mount up with it, wishing to reach the sky, but stayed in the clouds. By thus holding that there are truths above and prior to our observation of them, they claim and have a place in the brotherhood of our higher philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle in ancient times, Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant in modern times.

They present these principles in the mind under various aspects and in different names. Reid called them principles of common sense in the mind itself, and common to all men. Hamilton defended the use of the phrase common sense. I am not sure it is the best one, as it includes two meanings: one, good sense, of mighty use in the practical affairs of life; and the other, first principles in the minds of all men, in which latter sense alone it can be legitimately employed in philosophy. He also called them, happily, reason in the first degree, which discerns truth at once, as distinguished from reason in the second degree, which discovers truth by arguing. Stewart represented them as "fundamental laws of human thought and belief," and is commended for this by Sir James Mackintosh, who is so far a member of the school. Thomas Brown represented them as intuitions, a phrase I am fond of, as it presents the mind as looking into the nature of things. Perhaps the phrase "intuitive reason," used by Milton when he talks of "reason intuitive and discursive," might be as good a phrase as any by which to designate these primary principles. Hamilton, who sought to add the philosophy of Kant to that of Reid, often without his being able to make them cohere, sometimes uses the Scotch phrases, and at other times the favorite Kantian designation, *a priori*. I remember how Dr. Chalmers, who was truly of the Scottish school, was delighted in his advanced years, on becoming acquainted with the German philosophy through Morell's "History of Philosophy," to find that there was a wonderful correspondence between the *a priori* principles of Kant and the fundamental laws of Stewart.

I may be allowed to add, that having before me the views and the nomenclature of all who hold by these primary principles, I have ventured to specify their characteristics, and this in

the proper order. *First*, they look at things external and internal. They are not forms or laws in the mind apart from things. They are intuitions of things. Under this view they are SELF-EVIDENT, which is their first mark. The truth is perceived at once by looking at things. I perceive self within and body without by barely looking at them. I discover that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, that benevolence is good, that cruelty is evil, by simply contemplating the things. *Secondly*, they are NECESSARY. This I hold with Aristotle, Leibnitz, Kant, and most profound thinkers. Being self-evident, we must hold them, and cannot be made to think or believe otherwise. *Thirdly*, they are UNIVERSAL, being entertained by all men.

But it is asked, How do you reconcile your one element with the other—your observation with your truth anterior to observation? I do hold with the whole genuine Scottish school, that there are principles in the mind called common sense, primary reason, intuition, prior to and independent of our observation of them. But I also hold, and this in perfect consistency, that it is by observation we discover them, that they exist, and what they are. I have found it difficult to make some people understand and fall in with this distinction. Historians and critics of philosophy are apt to divide all philosophies into two grand schools, the *a priori* and *a posteriori*, or in other words, the rational and the experiential. They are utterly averse to call in a third school, which would disturb all their classifications, and thus trouble them, and require the authors among them, especially the followers of Kant or Cousin, to rewrite all they have written. They do not know very well what to make of the Scottish school, and I may add of the great body of American thinkers, who will not just fall into either one or other of their grand trunk-divisions. In particular, when they condescend to notice the author of this paper they feel as if they do not know what to make of him. “Are you,” they ask, “of the *a posteriori* or empirical school? You seem as if you are so, you are so constantly appealing to facts and experience. If so, you have no right to appeal to or call in *a priori* principles, which can never be established by a limited observation. But you are inconsistently ever bringing in necessary and universal principles, such as those of cause and effect, and moral good.” Or they

attack me by the other horn of the dilemma. " You hold rather by *a priori* principles; you are ever falling back on principles, self-evident, necessary, and universal, on personality, on identity, on substance and quality, causation, on the good and the infinite." I have sometimes felt as if I were placed between two contending armies, exposed to the fire of both. Yet I believe I am able to keep and defend my position. Now I direct a shot at the one side, say at John S. Mill, and at other times a shot at the other side, say at Kant—not venturing to shoot at Hegel, who is in a region which my weapons can never reach. They pay little attention to me, being so engrossed with fighting each other. But I do cherish the hope that when each of the sides finds it impossible to extinguish the other they may become weary of the fight, look for the *juste milieu*, and turn a favorable look toward the independent height which the Scotch and the great body of the Americans who think on these subjects are occupying. We invite you to throw down your arms, and come up to the peaceful height which we occupy. Hither you may bring all the wealth you have laid up in your separate positions, and here it will be safe. You have here primitive rocks strong and deep as the granite on which to rest it, and here you may add to it riches gathered from as wide regions as your ken can reach, and establish a city which can never be moved or shaken.

The late Chauncey Wright, in a paper written in his "Discussions," characterized the distinction I am drawing as very ingenious, so much so that he could not accept it. But it is one easily comprehended by those who are willing to give their attention to it. When Newton established the law of gravitation nobody imagined that he created the law, that he made the law in any sense—he simply discovered it. It existed before he discovered it, and he discovered it because it so existed. So it is with fundamental mental principles. They are in the mind just as gravitation and chemical affinity are in the earth and heavens, whether we take notice of them or not. Being there, we are able to discover them, find how they work, and to generalize their operations, and express them in laws. These fundamental principles being combined, unfolded, and expressed, constitute mental philosophy, which is true so far as these are properly observed and formulated, and are capable of being more fully

and accurately enunciated as they are more carefully investigated.

Under some aspects I like the phrase *a priori* introduced into philosophy by the Stagyrite, used by Hume, and defined as it is now understood by Kant, who designates by it principles in the mind prior to experience and independent of experience. I approve of it, as denoting something in the very nature and constitution of the mind—to use phrases favored by Butler and the Scottish school. But in some connections it is liable to be misunderstood, and may lead into serious error. It may mean that we are entitled to start with a favorite principle without previously inquiring whether it has a place in the mind, and what is its precise place; and then rear upon it or by it a huge superstructure. I use the phrase as one universally adopted, but I employ it only as I explain it. I denote by it those principles, intellectual and moral, which act in the mind naturally and necessarily. But I do not allow that we can use them in constructing systems till we have first carefully inducted them. I believe in *a priori* laws operating spontaneously in the mind, but I do not believe in an *a priori* science constructed by man. There is a sense indeed in which there may be an *a priori* science—that is, a science composed of the *a priori* principles in the mind. But then they have to be discovered in order to form a science, and their precise nature and mode of operation determined by *a posteriori* inspection. Like the Scottish school, I am suspicious of the lofty systems of ancient, mediæval, and modern times, which have been constructed by human ingenuity. Acting on this principle, I reject, with the majority of thinking people, and with metaphysicians themselves, more than half the metaphysics that have been constructed. At times I am grateful when I discover a native principle woven into these webs, only considerably twisted. In rejecting these speculations I am not to be charged with rejecting *a priori* truths in the mind. I am simply sceptical of the use that has been made of them by the ingenuity of man. With me, philosophy consists in a body of first principles in the mind, carefully observed and expressed. This may be as firm and sure as any system of natural science.

IV.

The study of the mind by consciousness may be aided by observation of the action of the nerves and brain. This has always been allowed by the Scottish school. Reid and Adam Smith were well acquainted with optics, and generally with physiology, so far as these sciences had advanced in their day. Dr. Brown was a physician, a colleague of Dr. Gregory's, and well-acquainted with all parts of the anatomy of the body. Hamilton made experiments on innumerable brains, and helped to cast aside phrenology. The Scottish school, in perfect consistency with its principles, welcomes all the researches of the present day into the physiology of the cerebro-spinal mass. Prof. Calderwood has published a very careful work on Mind and Brain. I may be permitted to add, that last winter in Princeton College half a dozen of the younger officers formed a club to study Wundt's work on physiological psychology, and his anatomical experiments were repeated by skilful anatomists with a well-prepared apparatus. I have sought, in correspondence with one of our young professors, Dr. Osborn, to make all my students take an interest in the curious investigations which have been made by Dr. Galton, of London, as to the Visualizing Faculty, as he calls it, or the Phantasy, as I call it, after Aristotle, and we have sent the answers to queries on to Dr. Galton.

The tendency of the psychology of the day is certainly towards physiology. This should not be discouraged, but rather furthered. Physiology has already made many interesting discoveries bearing on mental action. Helmholtz and others have been carefully examining the senses, and have discovered some laws and more mysteries as to the connection of the physical with the psychical action. It has been shown that an action on the nerves of the senses takes a certain time to reach the brain, and that an act of the will takes a certain time to move the members of the body. Wundt is endeavoring to measure the time occupied by each of the ideas in the mind, and has found that about seventy, or so, ideas pass through the mind in the minute. I find that other German investigators say that his observations are delusive. The researches on this subject by Delbeauf and others are commonly reported in the *Revue Philo-*

sophique, edited by M. Ribot. I believe that some light has been thrown on the operations of the mind by men like Carpenter and Maudesley in England, and by Lotze and Wundt in Germany. But their investigations have, after all, thrown more light on the operations of the brain and nerves than on the peculiar operations of the mind, its thoughts, its emotions and volitions. The scalping-knife has laid bare the brain, but has not disclosed to us the judgments, the reasonings, the imaginations, the hopes and fears of the mind. The multiplied microscopes employed have shown us the movements, the changes, in the soft, pulpy substance of the nerves, but have not yet lighted on the perceptions of the mind, on its ideas of the true, the beautiful, the good, the infinite, and our aspirations after perfect excellence. Let us accept and prize the curious and often instructive physiological facts, but let us carefully notice that they have not accounted for any proper mental act, for any conscious act, for any idea, thought, emotion, or resolve. In the study of the mind proper physiology may be a powerful auxiliary, as mathematics are to physics and astronomy, but cannot construct the science of psychology. The eye, the ear, the hearing, the smell, the touch, the taste, aided even by the microscope and blowpipe, cannot tell us what any special mental act is, what perception is, what memory is, what the imagination is, what comparison is, what reasoning is, what joy and sorrow, what hope and fear are, what the idea of the perfect is, what wish is, what volition is, what the conscience is, what the remorse for evil is, and the dread of merited punishment is, what the approval of and the rejoicing in the good. These can be revealed and studied only in the light of consciousness, which furnishes the beginning and the end of psychology and mental philosophy.

The three first of these principles, with the aid of the fourth, constitute the Method, that is, the mode and manner of investigation, in the Scottish philosophy. In fact they are its specialties, its differentia, separating it from all other systems in ancient or modern times. So far as it adheres to these principles I adhere to it, thus far but no farther, and am quite willing to be regarded as one of its followers. If any professing member of the school does not act on these principles, I separate

from him. I may add, that so far as any other philosophy adopts these principles, I approve of it.

Following the principles I have enunciated, the Scottish school have made a great many psychological investigations. They have taken great pains in classifying the faculties of the mind and observing their laws. They have inquired carefully into the senses and the nature of sense-perception, into the laws of association and habit, into conscience and the will. Alison and Francis Jeffrey have traced the influence of association of ideas on our perception of beauty, erring, however, in imagining that they have thereby explained the whole nature of beauty. Hamilton has discussed profoundly the nature of reasoning, and has thus thrown light on logic. With some of their views on these subjects I concur, from others I wholly dissent. I have endeavored—it is for others to say with what success—to give a more correct analysis than they have done of *The Emotions*. I do not believe that their classification of the faculties is thoroughly scientific or final. Perhaps some of the questions involved cannot be settled till we have a more advanced physiology of the brain. It should be observed of the Scottish metaphysicians, that they never profess to give a full philosophy of the mind. This, they everywhere assert, is to be accomplished only by a succession of inquirers in a succession of ages. All that they claim is that they have contributed to real knowledge, without asserting that what they have done is ultimate and incapable of improvement; that they have gathered a few pebbles (to use a simile usually ascribed to Isaac Newton, but in fact employed in Milton's "*Paradise Regained*"), on the shores of a boundless ocean, rounded by being rolled, but real pebbles, some of them gems.

But what of other systems? "Do you acknowledge no other philosophy than the Scottish?" it is asked. I reply on the instant and without reserve, that I am guilty of no such narrowness. I believe there is more or less of truth in nearly all our philosophies—certainly in all our higher systems. Even the worst of them, pessimism (a name which should not be used of our world, in which there is so much good, but may be applied to the philosophic system, as it is the worst possible), has a truth, as it shows what other philosophies have so much kept

out of sight—that there is evil in the world. Some philosophies, such as that of Plato, of Leibnitz, and others, unfold great truths which have been very much overlooked by the Scottish school because of its caution. All philosophies have truth in so far as they have observed and unfolded to the view the deep principles and high ideas in the soul. Unfortunately, most of them have mixed up error with the truth which they have thus corrupted, and they have really no means of separating the one from the other, unless, indeed, they employ some such tests as those used by the Scottish school. The philosophies deserving the name should certainly be studied by all sincere inquirers, who should be anxious, while they accept the truth, to have some tests by which they may distinguish it from the error with which it is so apt to be associated.

The prevailing philosophies of the day are, first, Materialism (if philosophy it can be called which has and can have no philosophy), and, secondly, the German Philosophy founded by Kant. The former is held by many of the exclusive cultivators of the physical sciences, and those favoring sensationalistic views; the latter by the higher minds addicted to speculation. Materialism has ever been opposed by all the higher philosophies. The Scottish philosophy has all along opposed it, and it has done so by arguments as likely as other and more recondite ones to prevail with the great body of thinking people. It shows that we have as good, as clear, and as valid arguments for the existence of mind as we have for the existence of matter. We know body by the external senses, such as touch and sight; we know mind by the internal sense, which, to say the least of it, is as trustworthy as the external senses. We know the two, first by different organs, and secondly we know them as possessing different properties: the one having extension and resistance, and the other thinking and feeling under all their forms.

The true rival of the Scottish philosophy is the German, which, I acknowledge, is at the present day much the more influential. The two, the Scotch and the German, agree and they differ. Each has a fitting representative—the one in Thomas Reid and the other in Immanuel Kant. The one was a careful observer guided by common-sense, with the meaning

of good sense, suspicious of high speculations as sure to have error lurking in them, and shrinking from extreme positions; the other was a powerful logician, a great organizer and systematizer, following his principles to their consequences, which he was ever ready to accept, avow, and proclaim. The two have very important points of agreement, which all men should carefully note. Reid and Kant both lived to oppose Hume, the great sceptic, or, as he would be called in the present day, agnostic. Both met him by calling in great mental principles which reveal and guarantee truth, which can never be set aside, and which have foundations deep as the universe. Both appeal to reason, which the one called reason in the first degree, the other pure reason. The one represents this reason under the name of common sense—that is, the group of powers common to all men; the other as principles necessary and universal. The one had laws fundamental, the other forms in the nature of the mind; both pointing evidently to the same things. The one carefully observed these by consciousness, and sought to express them; the other determines their nature by a criticism, and professes to give an inventory of them in the “Kritik of Pure Reason.” All students should note these points of agreement, so far confirmatory of the truth of both philosophies.

The Scotch and German people do so far agree. Both have a considerable amount of broad sense, and I may add, of humor. Both can pronounce the sounds indicated by the letters *ch* and *gh*, which many other people cannot utter—no Englishman can ever take into his mouth the word *Auchtermuchty*, the name of a place famous in the contest of the Scotch Free Church for independence. Scotland and Germany, in the opinion of Americans, are not very far from each other. But between them there roars an ocean often very stormy—as I can testify from having lived for years upon its shores. The philosophies certainly agree, but they also differ.

I may now specify their differences. As I do so, it will be seen that my preferences are for the Scotch.

First, they differ in their Method. The Scotch follows the Inductive Method, as I have already explained it. The German has created and carried out the Critical Method. It maintains that things are not to be accepted as they appear; they are to

be searched and sifted. Pure reason, according to Kant, can criticise itself. But every criticism ought to have some principles on which it proceeds. Kant, a professor of Logic, fortunately adopted the forms of Logic which I can show had been carefully inducted by Aristotle, and hence has reached much truth. Others have adopted other principles, and have reached very different conclusions. The philosophies that have followed that of Kant in Germany have been a series of criticism, each speculator setting out with his own favorite principle,—say with the universal *ego*, or intuition, or identity, or the absolute,—and, carrying it out to its consequences, it has become so inextricably entangled, that the cry among young men is, “Out of this forest, and back to the clearer ground occupied by Kant.” The Scottish philosophy has not been able to form such lofty speculations as the Germans, but the soberer inductions it has made may contain quite as much truth.

Secondly, the one starts with facts, internal and external, revealed by the senses, inner and outer. It does not profess to prove these by mediate reasoning: it assumes them, and shows that it is entitled to assume them; it declares them to be self-evident. The other, the German school, starts with phenomena—not meaning facts to be explained (as physicists understand the phrase), but *appearances*. The phrase was subtilely introduced by Hume, and was unfortunately accepted by Kant. Let us, he said, or at least thought, accept what Hume grants phenomena, and guard the truth by mental forms—forms of sense, understanding, and reason. Our knowledge of bodies and their actions, our knowledge even of our minds and their operations, are phenomenal. Having assumed only phenomena, he never could rise to anything else. Having only phenomena in his premises he never could reach realities in his conclusions except by a palpable paralogism, which he himself saw and acknowledged. We human beings are phenomena in a world of phenomena. This doctrine has culminated in the unknown and unknowable of Herbert Spencer, implying no doubt a known, but which never can be known by us. We all know that Locke, tho himself a most determined realist, laid down principles which led logically to the idealism of Berkeley. In like manner, Kant, tho certainly no agnostic, has laid down a principle in his

phenomenal theory which has terminated logically in agnosticism. We meet all this by showing that appearances properly understood are things appearing, and not appearances without things.

Thirdly, the two differ in that the one supposes that our perceptive powers reveal to us things as they are, whereas the other supposes that they add to things. According to Reid and the Scottish school, our consciousness and our senses look at once on real things, not discovering all that is in them, but perceiving them under the aspect in which they are presented—say this table as a colored surface perceived by a perceiving mind. According to Kant and the German school, the mind adds to the things by its own forms. Kant said we perceive things under the forms of space and time superimposed by the mind, and judge by categories, and reach higher truth by ideas of pure reason, all of them subjective. Fichte gave consistency to the whole by making these same forms create things. But the great body of the German philosophers claim merely that the mind colors things out of its own rich stores. This doctrine historically has furnished the germ out of which has sprung the grand ideal poetry of Germany. I rejoice, I revel in their lofty poetry, but I would not have poetry regarded as philosophy. Let us in portrait-painting have, first, the true figure, color, and expression, and then in ideal painting we may have as many ornaments and compositions as our imagination and fancy can supply.

“Back to Kant” is the cry in our day of the younger German school, re-echoed by the speculative youth of America. Yes, I say, back to Kant, who was a wiser man and held more truth than most of those who claim to be descended from him, and who have arrived at conclusions which he would have resolutely repudiated had they been made known to him. Yes, back to Kant; but do not stop there. Back to Reid, back to Locke, back to Descartes, back to Bacon, back to Saint Thomas, back to Augustine, back to Marcus Aurelius, back to Cicero, back to Aristotle, back to Plato. All of these have expounded much truth; let us covet the best gifts, and accept these wherever they are offered—in ancient Greece and Rome, in Germany, in Great Britain, in America. Let us choose what is good in

each, and here the method of the Scotch may guide us in the selection. It may give us the magnet wherewith to draw out the genuine steel from the dross mixture. When we go back to Kant, let it be to criticise his critical method and its results.

Our thinking young men in America, having no very influential philosophy in America, and with no names to rule them, they are taking longing looks towards Germany. When circumstances admit, they go a year or two to a German university—to Berlin or to Leipsic. There they get into a labyrinth of imposing and binding forms, and have to go on in the paths opened to them. They return with an imposing nomenclature, and clothed with an armor formidable as the panoply of the middle ages. They write papers and deliver lectures which are read and listened to with the profoundest reverence—some however doubting whether all these distinctions are as correct as they are subtle, whether these speculations are as sound as they are imposing. All students may get immeasurable good from the study of the German philosophy. I encourage my students to go to Germany for a time to study. But let them meanwhile maintain their independence. They may be the better of a clew to help them out of the labyrinth when they are wandering. The children of Israel got vast good in the wilderness as they wandered ; saw wonders in the pillar of cloud and fire, in the waters issuing from the rock, and the bread on the ground : but they longed all the while to get into a land of rest, with green fields and living rivers. We may all get incalculable good from German speculation, but let us bring it all to the standard of consciousness and of fact.

I should be sorry to find our young American thinkers spending their whole time and strength in expounding Kant or Hegel. Depend upon it, the German philosophy will not be transplanted into America and grow healthily till there is a change to suit it to the climate. By all means let us welcome the German philosophy into this country, as we do the German emigrants; but these emigrants when they come have to learn our language and accommodate themselves to our laws and customs. Let us subject its philosophy to a like process. Let it be the same with the Scottish philosophy : let us take all that is good in it and nothing else, and what is good in it is its method.

It is one of the excellences of the Scottish school, that it does not profess, like some of the German systems, to have discovered all truth, all about God and man and nature. It is reckoned by many like the country from which it has sprung, narrow and confined—some of us have had to migrate from the old country, seeking wider openings elsewhere. That philosophy has certainly not yet taken possession of the whole territory of truth, and there are regions open to it wide as the uncultivated land of America, inviting all to enter. The Scottish philosophy, if true to its principles, should welcome truth from whatever quarter it may come, provided it submits to be tried by an inductive entrance examination. For myself, I believe with Plato, and I may add with the Concord school, that there is a grand, indeed a divine idea in the mind, formed after the image of God and pervading all nature; but I wish that idea in the mind carefully examined and its forms or law exactly determined, and it is for inductive science, and not speculation, to tell us what are the laws and types which represent it in nature. I hold with Aristotle that there are formal and final as well as material and efficient causes in nature; but it is for a careful induction to determine the relation of these, and to show how matter and force are made to work for order and end. I am as sure as Descartes was that there is in the mind a germ of the idea of the infinite and the perfect, but I take my own way of showing what is the nature of these ideas so as to keep us from drawing extravagant inferences from them. I see, as Leibnitz did, a pre-established harmony in nature; but it consists mainly, not in things acting independently of each other, but in things being made to act on each other. I attach as much importance to experience as Locke did; but I maintain that observation shows us principles in the mind prior to all experience. I allow to Kant his forms, and his categories and his ideas; but their nature is to be discovered by induction, when it will be found that they do not superinduce qualities on things, but simply enable us to perceive what is in things. I believe with Schelling in intuition (*Anschauung*), but it is an intuition looking at realities. I am constrained to hold with Hegel that there is an absolute; but I believe that our knowledge after all is finite, implying an infinite, and that this doctrine can be so enunciated

as not to issue in pantheism. I reject with the school of Concord a sensationalism which derives all our ideas from the senses, and a materialism which develops mind out of molecules; but I am anxious that the physiology of the nerves and brain should aid us in finding out the mode of operation of the powers of the mind. I turn away with scorn from the pessimism of Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann; but I believe they have done good by calling attention to the existence of evil, to remove which is an end worthy of the labors and sufferings of the Son of God. I believe with Herbert Spencer in a vast unknown, above, beneath, and around us; but I rejoice in a light shining in the darkness. With all unsophisticated men, I see a power above nature in nature; but I reject the doctrine of God many and Lord many as held by the great body of mankind. I am willing to accept the whole body of grand ideas which the Concord school has been holding before the eyes of Americans for the past age; but it is because I believe they have a place in the mind, and I am not always willing to take them in the form in which they have been put. I receive with gratitude the whole casket of gems which Emerson has left us as a rich inheritance; but before they can constitute a philosophy they must be cut and set, and they will require a skilful hand to adjust them; and if they are cut, it must be as carefully as diamonds are, and this only to show forth more fully their true form and beauty.

I have rather been advising our young men not to seek to transplant the German philosophy entire into America. But as little do I wish them to transplant the Scottish philosophy. It is time that America had a philosophy of its own. It is now getting a literature of its own, a poetry of its own, schools of painting of its own; let it also have a philosophy of its own. It should not seek to be independent of European thought. The people, whether they will or not, whether they acknowledge or no, are evidently the descendants of Europeans, to whom they owe much. They have come from various countries, but on coming here they take a character of their own. So let it be with our philosophy. It may be a Scoto-German-American school. It might take the method of the Scotch, the high truths of the German, and combine them by the practical invention of the Americans. But no: let it in fact, in name and pro-

fession, be an independent school. As becometh the country, it may take, not a monarchical form under one leader, like the European systems, let it rather be a republican institution, with separate states and a central unity. To accomplish this, let it not be contented with the streams which have lost their coolness from the long course pursued and become polluted by earthly ingredients, but go at once to the fountain, the mind itself, which is as fresh as it ever was, and as open to us as it was to Plato and Aristotle, to Locke and Reid, to Kant and Hamilton.

JAMES McCOSH.

TARIFF REVISION: ITS NECESSITY AND POSSIBLE METHODS.

FIRST ARTICLE.

THE old writers, before the discovery of America, were accustomed to indulge in all manner of fanciful speculations respecting the conditions and actions of the people on the "other side" of the world, or their antipodes, supposing, indeed, that there were any. It was generally agreed that they must walk with their heels upward and their heads hanging down, and do everything in a reverse order from that which was then regarded as proper and natural in the Old World experience. A little practical experience, however, in enlarged navigation soon showed the absurdity of such imaginings; and yet if the old speculators had restricted the sphere of their imaginings to the mental rather than the physical actions of the "other side" men, they might not have been considered by posterity so far out of the way in their conclusions. For America, or rather that part of it known as the United States, has always been to Europe a country of surprises or contraries, in most matters political, financial, economic, and theological. And of these surprises none could be more remarkable than that one of the two great parties into which the country is politically divided should regard the continued maintenance in time of peace of an extraordinary, onerous, and unnecessary system of taxation as a policy likely to insure to it a popular favor and support; while the other great party, either through ignorance or cowardice, shirks the issue, hesitates to boldly array itself in favor of exempting the masses from excessive public burdens, and through some of its chief leaders even favors the policy and tries to do business on the capital of its opponents. In short, taxation in excess of any legitimate

requirements of the State—the thing which in all other countries has heretofore been regarded by politicians and statesmen as the certain precursor of popular wrath and party defeat—has really in the United States come to be looked upon as a good thing in itself, and as politically and economically expedient. “*If there were no public debt, no interest to pay, no pension-list, no army or navy to support, I should still oppose ‘tariff for revenue only’ and favor protective duties*” (taxes). (*Speech of Hon. Wm. P. Frye, Senate of the U. S., Feb. 10, 1882.*) Again in a debate in the U. S. House of Representatives, March 4th, 1882, on a proposition to reduce or abolish the oppressive and obsolete fees, exactions, and formalities of the existing consular system of the United States, Frank Hiscock, a representative of the State of New York—a State that is pre-eminently commercial—after admitting the existence of the grievances alleged, nevertheless declared himself in favor of their continuance, and simply for the reason that they were an obstruction to commerce; and if removed it might be difficult to replace them with other equivalent obstructions. Out of such a curious state of things have come certain results so plain “that he may run who reads,” and which may be enumerated in part as follows:

First. The annual gathering through the tax-gatherer of a surplus revenue of from one hundred to one hundred and fifty millions of dollars in excess of any legitimate requirements of the government; the same constituting a constant incentive for needless and corrupt expenditures, the multiplication of offices, and the enlargement of the sphere of influence of the federal government. The rapid reduction of the public debt occasioned by the war has been a never-ending theme of national self-congratulation; but taking taxation as the measure of the burden of obligation which the war entailed upon the country (and it is the only proper measure), the war debt has in reality been diminished by a sum which in comparison with the national receipts of revenue is very inconsiderable.¹

¹ Thus the current burden of the war debt (omitting the repayments of the principal of the debt, which is not in the nature of a demand obligation) is the annual taxation required to provide means for the payment of interest on the debt, and the requirements for pensions. The largest obligation incumbent on the United States in any one year on account of national debt-interest was in 1867, and amounted to \$143,781,000. The disbursements for pensions during that same

Second. A condition of things in which the country depends almost exclusively on its harvests for its prosperity, and has no export trade worth mentioning except in the raw produce of its soil, representing in the form in which it is exported the minimum of embodied labor. In place of an annually increasing ability on the part of the nation to withstand foreign competition in respect to the production of the so-called products of manufacturing industries, all the evidence points in the opposite direction; our exports of manufactured articles forming a considerably smaller percentage of the total exports in 1879-80 than they did in 1859-60.¹ Never, moreover, in the history of the

year were \$20,936,000. In 1871, six years after the termination of the war, and when it is reasonable to infer that nearly every person who had a legitimate claim for injuries *directly* and *immediately* contingent on his service in, or to, the federal armies had presented the same and made a settlement with the government, the pension disbursements amounted to \$34,443,000; and after reaching this maximum, the annual expenditure on this account, in accordance with all former experience of the United States and other countries, and also with the life-expectation tables of life-insurance companies, began to rapidly decrease, and in 1878 had become reduced to \$27,137,000. The payments on account of interest during this same year were \$125,576,000. The direct aggregate burdens of the war debt, as measured by taxation and expenditures, were therefore \$164,717,000 in 1867 and \$152,713,000 in 1871; on the other hand, the obligations on the part of the government for interest on the public debt (\$57,360,000 on the 1st of July, 1882) and for pensions (\$100,000,000 actually appropriated) will probably amount for the current fiscal year to about \$150,000,000; thus making the aggregate burden of the present war debt but little less than it was soon after the close of the war. For the future, some who have made a very careful study of the matter do not hesitate to predict that the enactment of the so-called "arrears of pensions" law (in accordance with which every man who served in the army or navy of the United States during the war and was discharged in fair health is practically considered to have a valid claim for a pension against the United States on account of personal disabilities contingent on advancing age) will entail, from first to last, a further aggregate expenditure on the country of not less than two thousand millions of dollars.

¹ The ratios which the exports of the unmanufactured and manufactured products from the United States have sustained to each other during the three decennial periods included between the years 1859-60 and 1879-80 are as follows:

	1879-80.	1869-70.	1859-60.
	Per cent of total.	Per cent of total.	Per cent of total.
Unmanufactured products.....	87.5	86.6	82.3
Manufactured do.	12.5	13.4	17.7

Unmanufactured products have risen, therefore, from being 82.3 per cent of the total exports in 1859-60 to 87.5 per cent in 1879-80; while, during the same period, manufactures have fallen from 17.7 per cent to 12.5 per cent.

country has the import—responsive to domestic demand and ready sale—of the products of foreign industries into the United States been greater than at present (1882)¹; while, on the other hand, the stocks of American manufactured products continually tend to accumulate and bring on the stagnation and disaster consequent on what is termed “over-production.”

Third. The “merchant marine,” or carrying trade, of the United States upon the ocean—a branch of national industry once second only in importance to agriculture—has practically ceased to exist. Differ as men may as to the proper remedial legislation for such a state of things, there ought to be no difference of opinion as to its cause. Commerce is the interchange of commodities and services between men and men and countries and countries; and its one essential condition of existence and growth is that such exchanges shall be reciprocal. To sell we must buy, and in order to buy we must sell. Now for many years the policy of the United States has been to impose taxes with the avowed purpose of restricting so much of the commerce of the country as is carried on by the agency of ships upon the ocean; and that it has been eminently successful in its results will not be disputed. If it were not a most serious matter, it ought to be regarded as a huge joke, to propose, as has recently been done, to assemble the several American States by their representatives in a Congress, and try to get them to reverse the principles of human nature by agreeing, on account of neighborhood and good feeling, to permanently trade at the United States shop, when a shop across the way offers to sell cheaper and take the products of the purchaser in barter payment. It can’t be done.

Fourth. That the market for the products of the manufacturing industries of the United States is practically limited to the requirements for home consumption, and that the power of domestic production in all branches of industry, consequent

¹ The imports of merchandise have never been so large as in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1882. The largest imports of any one year prior to 1880 occurred in 1873 and amounted to \$642,136,000. For 1880 the aggregate was \$667,954,000, but for the fiscal year 1882 the imported values were returned at \$724,623,000; of this increase, \$10,533,000, or 12 per cent of the present aggregate import of \$93,000,000, occurred in the class of metals, and \$23,731,000 in articles of clothing.

upon the application of machinery, conjoined with high intelligence, to our great natural resources, continually tends to exceed the power of domestic consumption, are facts too evident to be disputed. The natural, nay more, the inevitable, outcome of such a condition of affairs is an effort on the part of the producer to prevent the accumulation of a surplus, by restricting production and keeping a part of his machinery idle; and this in turn means limitation of the opportunity for employment to the laborer. The manufacturer also sees clearly, that if he could produce and sell cheaper he could enlarge his markets, and at least maintain if he did not enlarge the sphere of his business activity; but having become thoroughly indoctrinated with the idea that the maintenance of a system of national taxation, which abnormally augments the cost of all his services and supplies, is absolutely essential to his industrial prosperity, and even existence, he naturally opposes any reduction of taxes, denounces as unpatriotic and visionary those who favor such reductions, and as naturally seeks to avail himself of the only other avenue open to him for cheapening the cost of his products, namely, that of cheapening his supply of labor. This the laborer resists, and the outcome of this resistance is seen in strikes, local disturbances, and the extensive interruption of the business and exchange of the country such as has characterized the history of the present year. But what chance has the laborer for successful resistance, with a limitation of market for the sale of the products of his industry and an annual import of 700,000 foreign laborers, ready to compete for and embrace every opportunity for domestic employment? Under such circumstances there is no possibility of any strike or resistance on the part of labor being successful; and the result of recent experience might have been predicted in the absolute certainty at the commencement of the present year, as can be at present predicted of the future.

One of the most notable of the strikes of the year, that of the freight-handlers upon the piers and at the railroad termini of New York, is full of teachings of the utmost interest and importance. The question was put at the commencement of the difficulties, by the writer, to the foreman of a body of freight-handlers—not participating in the strike—on one of the steam-

boat piers of New York: "Is the strike likely in your opinion to be successful?" "There is not a ghost of a chance for success," was the prompt reply. "Why not?" *Ans.*: "Simply for the reason that two men stand ready to do the work that offered for only one." "Have the laborers, then, no remedy for their grievances?" *Ans.*: "Yes; let us have a law prohibiting the coming in of all those laborers from Europe." "Do you think the enactment of such a law possible?" *Ans.*: "Yes; if the laborers all over the country were united in demanding it, the politicians would soon bring it about." Now, whatever may be thought of the remedy proposed, there can be no doubt that the man thus interrogated had a clear view of the situation, and its utter hopelessness so far as it concerned the strikers.

But let us further consider this matter. The strikers were, it is understood, in receipt of seventeen cents per hour, and demanded twenty, on the ground that the former sum was inadequate for the support of themselves and their families. Popular sympathy was unquestionably on the side of the laborers and adverse to the railroads. The general public, in their indignation at the result of railroad management on the part of certain individuals, are prone to overlook the great service that the railroad system of the United States has rendered; to forget that no other one agency in all time has been more productive of benefit to the laborer—using the term in its ordinary sense,—by enlarging the sphere of his employment, cheapening product, and creating abundance; and that by it the cost of transportation has now been so far reduced, that one day's wages of the most ordinary laborer in New York will suffice to pay the cost of the movement from Chicago to New York of all the meat and grain that he can consume in a year—thereby placing such laborer in New York, so far as the prime cost of his food is concerned, on a par with the laborer that lives where food is the cheapest on this continent; and that in comparison with these benefits, all the injury that has resulted from "stock-watering" and diversion or squandering of railroad capital or receipts, great and reprehensible as this may have been, is relatively but as "the small dust upon the balance." But in the frame of mind that the public then were (and now

are) the expression was most common, that the demands of the strikers were most reasonable, and that the railroads ought willingly to accede to them. Now if these expressions were anything more than mere sentiment, the "*ought*" must have had a foundation on the principles of either "charity" or "equity;" if the former, then the issue pertains to the province of the moralist or philanthropist rather than to the economist; and to the latter, the economic question most pertinent is, according to what principles of justice or equity *ought* a railroad or any other corporation to be asked or expected to pay more for what it desires to buy and use—be it material or labor—than the current rates established for the same in the open market? And if public opinion could force such a reversal of the laws of trade, does any one suppose that such an arrangement could be permanent, and not utterly disastrous to the general business interests of the country? But had not the strikers any real grievances? Most certainly they had. They had found out that their ability to earn a comfortable livelihood for themselves or their families was becoming impaired; they had learned generally by hard experience what scientific investigation has demonstrated specifically, namely, that what of grain, meats, dairy products, sugar, other food, clothing, metals, and lumber an expenditure of \$1.08 would have given them in November, 1878, would have required an outlay of \$1.28 in November, 1880—before the drought influences of the succeeding year—and \$1.44 in June, 1882, for the obtaining of the same quantities; or that, wages remaining the same, the fall in wages owing to a decrease in their purchasing power, comparing the first half of 1881 with the first half of 1882, was equivalent to ten per cent. And becoming painfully sensible of such results, without recognizing their causes, both strikers and the public made haste to put the blame on the railroads, when the railroads, through their management, were no more responsible than any other portions of the body-politic. Had the situation prompted the inquiry of how it was that the strikers, while receiving the full market rates for their labor, and probably the highest nominal wages that are regularly paid for similar services anywhere on the face of the globe, should yet feel themselves unable to live comfortably on their wages; and how it is that this land of abundance, which is ever ready to

supply the food deficiencies of all other nations, has been made one of the dearest countries of the world to live in,—had these inquiries been instituted and intelligently prosecuted, a rational, and indeed the essential primary step in the way of bettering the situation would have been taken. And as indicating in part what such an inquiry would have brought out respecting the influence of the present system of excessive Federal taxation, attention is asked to the following facts:

Federal taxes, both direct and indirect, with very few exceptions, are levied on commodities, fall on consumption, and must be paid by the consumer in the increased price of the things he consumes. Hence it follows that the burden of such taxes must be disproportionately heavier on the man who from necessity expends all, or nearly all, of his wages, salary, or other income in mere living, than on he who only expends one half, one third, or a smaller proportion of his income for like purposes, and lays up the surplus for increasing his resources. Under ordinary circumstances any disproportionate taxation falling upon the entire class of laborers would be speedily equalized by an advance in wages; but with a tendency to the limitation of employment through limitation of markets, and the present extraordinary influx of foreign competitive labor, such equalization is very difficult, if not absolutely impossible. Every dollar raised by the government by taxation for any other purpose than to provide revenue for its most economical administration constitutes, therefore, a heavier burden on the recipients of small incomes and wages than upon any other class of the community.

Recent investigations have shown that, accepting the highest reasonable estimate that can be made of the value of the annual product of the nation, and supposing the same to be divided equally among our present population, the average income of each person—out of which subsistence, savings, education, means of enjoyment, reparation of waste, and taxes are to be provided—would not be in excess of *fifty*, and probably not over *forty* cents per day. But as a practical matter, we know that the annual product is not divided equally, and never can be, and that some receive the annual average as stated multiplied by hundreds and thousands; which of course necessitates

that very many others shall receive proportionally less. When now it is further considered that the present aggregate of federal, State, and municipal taxation in the United States probably amounts to seven per cent on the value of the entire annual product of the country, and that the unnecessary taxation of one hundred millions which the federal government now collects from the people is equal to fifteen or twenty per cent of what the whole people annually save from the product of their labors (taking no account of the additional burden which the imposition of such taxation entails through increase of prices, taxation which the people pay but which the government does not receive), it is possible to form some idea of how a fiscal policy of large taxation, which so many politicians and so-called statesmen advocate as in the interest of the masses, fearfully intrenches on the narrow measure of comfort which the masses under the most favorable circumstances can obtain. Such "taxes," says Mr. Atkinson, alluding to the fact before noticed, that the federal taxes fall on commodities, "take from the many what they may actually need for a bare subsistence; they must fall with greatest hardship on those whose earnings for their families are less than the average dollar a day to each adult man and woman; and while our present excess of national taxation may be equal to only *fifteen* per cent of the possible savings of the whole people, it may take *a hundred per cent*, even the little all, of what the poor may save." Doubtless some may point to the great immigration that flows in upon us from other countries, and claim that this fact is a sufficient answer to the above statement; inasmuch as it proves that the masses in this country have advantages which are not to be found elsewhere. Now so far as these advantages are natural this claim is not be denied; but its admission does not affect or answer the real question at issue, which is, To what extent have our great natural advantages—which ought to insure comfort and abundance to every industrious person—been neutralized or impaired to the masses by the economic policy which we have as a nation adopted? The multitudes who during the past summer, from Nebraska to New York, "struck" for alleged insufficient returns for their labor—as, for example, the coal-miners of Pennsylvania, whom Hon. Abram S. Hewitt in

the United States House of Representatives in March, 1882, declared to be, from his own personal knowledge, "absolutely suffering for the necessities of life"—were all, undoubtedly, the European immigrants of a few years ago. And if so, do not their proceedings prove that they are no more content with the existing state of things in this country than they were in the countries of the Old World from whence they emigrated?

The plea has recently been put forward in defence of the continuance of our present system of tariff taxation, that it is the best system for accomplishing a desirable thing, namely, the taxation of capital for the benefit of labor. It would, however, probably puzzle the proponent to tell, how such taxes can be made to "stick" upon capital in any greater proportion than upon labor; or even in anything like as great a ratio. For all experience shows that when capital is thus taxed it simply advances the tax, and requites itself for the advance by taking two or three times as much for itself. The most effectual way of primarily doing the thing, which a candidate for Congress from New Jersey has recently proclaimed to be most desirable, is to adopt the "Sicilian" or "Greek" economic method, of forcibly abducting capital as represented by the individual, carrying it off to a cave, and compelling it, under fear of prospective loss of ears or hands, to disgorge, and then sharing the proceeds of the assessment among the laborers. But the ultimate trouble here would be, that as soon as capital found out that it was liable to be thus arbitrarily treated, and could not easily requite itself for forced contributions, it would run away to some place where it could be better treated; and if there were no such places, as was the case in the middle ages, then it would hide itself in holes in the ground, or other secret places, as it does now in Turkey and Egypt—countries where the New Jersey principle is especially exemplified, thus narrowing the sphere if it did not wholly deprive the laborer of profitable employment. Certainly, to borrow an expression of the late H. C. Carey, the activity of "societary circulation," the cause of all material development, would be greatly impaired under such circumstances.

The paramount necessity of the hour—whether the masses under the education before alluded to, which they have received, respecting the blessings of taxation, as yet fully appreciate it

or no—is the reduction of Federal taxation, and any political party which fails to recognize it will, sooner or later, have reason to repent of its lack of sagacity. That an abatement of one hundred millions in the taxes now annually collected by the Federal Government, or one seventh of the entire present burden of taxation upon the whole country, can be made without in any way deranging the national finances or reducing to a corresponding extent the national revenues, will not probably be questioned. It should not be overlooked, however, in considering this whole prospective work of revenue reform, that the question of immediate importance is not so much how large a sum shall be abated, but rather by what method shall the abatements be effected; for under the existing fiscal policy of the nation, which has been also long continued, many vested interests have grown up and been fostered which are entitled to the largest and most generous consideration, and which cannot be arbitrarily and suddenly interfered with, without occasioning such changes in the direction of industry as may work great temporary injury to not a few persons. With the most honest intent, it will be only too easy for tax reformers to arrest by injudicious action the tide of public opinion now setting strongly in their favor, while those in favor of maintaining substantially the present system would do well to bear in mind, that by resisting moderate reforms at present, and by continuing the rapid reduction of the public debt, they cannot fail to ensure the sudden enactment of far more radical measures in the not distant future.

So much, then, in the way of exposition of the necessity of prompt and large reductions in the number and amount of Federal taxes. It is proposed to next ask consideration to the methods by which an abatement of taxes may be most safely and judiciously effected under the tariff—the department of revenue in which abatements are most urgently needed.

The tariff of the United States as it now exists, and considered entirely apart from any economic policy which it may be intended to subserve, is a disgrace to our civilization. The honor of the nation, the interests of ordinary morality, the necessities of business, and the claims of civil-service reform, all alike demand that it be reconstructed with a view to simpli-

fication and intelligibility. If it be replied that this is the language of a partisan and a theorist, we would ask, if it is not a libel on good government, and an outrage, that constant suits at law and appeals to the Treasury on the part of merchants should be made necessary—some 18,000 of which are now reported as on file—in order to settle the meaning and construction of the mere words in which the statutes imposing the rates of duty have been expressed? That, in deciding upon the rates of duties to be imposed upon certain fabrics, the difference of a shade of blue or brown, or the weighing in a damp atmosphere, makes the same quality of merchandise just enough heavier to turn the scale and largely augment the assessment of the duty; that a constant espionage of the mails and an examination of the contents of sealed letters is necessary to protect the revenue; and the mere misplacement of a comma, as in the case of a former tariff enactment in respect to dried fruits, makes a difference of hundreds of thousands of dollars in the receipts of the Treasury.

France has a tariff of the kind needed in the United States, if its taxes are to be imposed on many articles, embodying the protective policy: extensive, but so scientifically constructed as to be almost free from ambiguity or the possibility of misinterpretation. The Walker tariff of 1846, the best tariff in respect to administration and adaptation to the end designed which the United States has ever had, was a model of simplicity and conciseness. It was not an attempt to amend anything that had previously existed, but was an original construction, framed after much patient inquiry, with the aid of the best experts, and recognized the ad-valorem system exclusively; all imports subject to duty being arranged in eight alphabetically designated classes, to each one of which an ad-valorem rate was assigned, ranging from 5 to 100 per cent. To attempt to now reconstruct the tariff as a whole, and make it simple and harmonious, we must, it would seem, take either the French or the "Walker" system as a model. To attempt to do it on the principle that has alone been recognized since 1860, namely, that of establishing a separate and varying rate for every article or limited class of articles, and endeavoring at the same time to balance the reciprocal relations of a multitude of industries and make compensation to each for a pro-

gressive and unequal taxation of its respective elements, is impossible, simply because it would demand superhuman knowledge to do it. A volume almost might be written full of incidents which would be most amusing if they had not been often most disastrous, of influences unexpected (even by those well acquainted with the subject) and most remote in their effects, which have been the result of attempting to impose tariff taxes in this country in this manner. Hence those who know most of the tariff are, as a rule, the most conservative and the least inclined to advise radical and arbitrary legislation. But what chance is there for a commission not more than two members of which bring any fund of previous knowledge to their work, and whose attention has been mainly occupied with statements submitted, as Adam Smith once expressed it, "with all the passionate confidence of interested falsehood," of reporting any complete yet simple and intelligent system? As well expect an equal number of well-meaning, moderate men, as the result of six months' desultory experience, to be able to revise an intricate code of civil or criminal law, to make a geologic survey, or lucidly expound the best method of managing a complicated competitive railroad system. Or supposing, by some gift of inspiration, they were able to submit such a report; what chance would there be for its adoption by Congress? A single amendment, offered by some member whose main interest in the tariff was to know what some influential and selfish constituent desired, might prove as destructive of all harmonious adjustment and working as would the interposition of some rude fragment of wood or metal among the delicate wheels and levers of some nicely constructed machinery.¹

¹ As an illustration of the difficulties unavoidably connected with the control or direction of economic or fiscal legislation by men whose ideas of trade and commerce have been largely gained by an experience of selling nails by the pound, molasses by the quart, and tape by the yard, the following story may be related: By the act of June 30th, 1864, the duty on imported bituminous coal was fixed at \$1.25 per ton. By the act of 1873 this duty was reduced to 75 cents per ton. A merchant of Boston interested in the coal-mines of Nova Scotia, happening to be in Washington shortly after the change in the law, called on a prominent member of Congress who had been instrumental in effecting the reduction, with a view of expressing thanks to the latter for his action and vote. In the course of the conversation which ensued it was incidentally mentioned that

It seems, therefore evident that no general reconstruction of the tariff is possible at present, or even in any not distant future; and that no general propositions for relief from the abatement of excessive taxation in this department of our revenue are likely to be ever entertained, except for an increase of the free list, and a recognition of the principle embodied in the celebrated "Compromise Tariff Act" brought forward by Henry Clay in 1832, under political and industrial circumstances not unlike what exist at present, and subsequently adopted by Congress: which provided in the main for a reduction of 10 per cent in all duties in excess of 20 per cent at three successive intervals of two years.

A United States Senator from Massachusetts—Mr. Hoar—has been pleased to say of this latter method "that there never came out of a lunatic asylum propositions so monstrous, so indefensible, so destructive," and that its adoption "will be to create a business revolution not equalled" by anything in our experience. But such assertions may be passed by as the utter-

the Washington Capitol building itself was lighted with gas derived from the very Nova Scotia coal which had been mainly affected and cheapened by the reduction of the duty in question. Some surprise being manifested by the Congressman that such should be the case, the merchant explained its happening in this wise: Small vessels sailed in the first instance, mainly from New England to ports of the British North American Provinces, laden with miscellaneous freights—furniture, hardware, glass, coarse textiles and carpets, drugs, medicines, paper, machinery, etc.—the product of our domestic industries. These shipments directly or indirectly paid for Nova Scotia coal, especially adapted to the economical manufacture of gas, which coal was then transported in American bottoms to the Potomac and sold to the Washington Gas Company. A cargo being unloaded, the vessel was immediately reloaded with coal from the Cumberland mines of Maryland, especially desirable for blacksmithing or steam purposes, which coal in turn was transported and sold in the Boston market; and the circle of exchanges being thus completed—each movement of which brought profit to American labor and capital, and enlarged the sphere of employment for our merchant marine—a new and similar series of commercial transactions were at once entered upon with the same recurring results. To all this the only reply which the Congressman vouchsafed to make was, "Well, I had no idea that Nova Scotia coal could be used in Washington. Had I been aware of it I certainly should have voted against the reduction of duty. I think I made a mistake in voting as I did." And this story is true, almost *literatim et verbatim*, and the Congressman in question still holds his seat in the national halls of legislation and is never weary about talking of the necessity of encouraging our domestic industries.

ances of an intellectual crank who has persuaded himself that the continual taking of excessive portions of the product of the labor of the masses under the name of taxation, and using a large part of the taking for extravagant expenditures, is equivalent to the creation of wealth. The argument that successive percentage reductions of the tariff would compel the manufacturer to conduct his business for a series of years on a falling market is more rational. But if it has any value at all, it is conclusive against all reductions of taxation. The real objection to the Clay "compromise" plan is that it gives little or no immediate relief from the present burden of tariff taxes, and practically will not reduce the revenues. Its recommendations are that it will work no real injury to any one, will be in the nature of a tentative experiment, and a positive step in the right direction, and, apart from general action, in accordance with the two plans above mentioned. The only further method for reducing and amending the tariff that would seem to be possible is that of taking up and considering its multiplied provisions in detail, and legislating separately in respect to the numberless articles or classes of articles taxed; having reference in so doing to two points: first, the reduction of national taxation; and second, of making such reductions, severally and in the aggregate, instrumentalities for cheapening the cost of all domestic production and of living, enlarging the market for our manufactured products, widening the opportunities for the employment of labor, and bringing back to its former status our now all but extinct merchant (ocean) marine. And in respect to this latter point, Prof. Siemens, in his recent address before the British Association, tells us that the time is near at hand when there is to be a revolution in the construction and propulsion of ocean ships analogous to what occurred when iron was substituted for wood, and steam for sails; a statement which may be construed as saying to the United States, "You are to be relieved, by the progress of invention and discovery, from your present disabilities in respect to equipment for prosecuting the ocean carrying trade, and may have an equal chance in starting against all competitors under the new conditions, if you will only not continue to neutralize the inventive skill and business enterprise of the nation by the

creation and maintenance of artificial obstructions in the path of progress." And with a view of aiding in this work, it is proposed to next submit some points that may be worthy of consideration on the part of Congress and the public.

DAVID A. WELLS.

